The Transparency of Emotions

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Abstract

I am sad, and you – watching me – can feel this. What does becoming aware of someone else's emotions consist of? In this dissertation, I articulate and defend the claim that other people's emotions are, in the ordinary case, transparent to us. By this I mean that, on the whole, they are not more difficult or more problematic to become aware of in the case of others than in our own case – the *transparency* intuition. I argue for this claim against a purported *asymmetry*, existing at many different levels, between feeling one's own emotions and feeling other people's emotions, one alleged difference being that one does not experience other people's emotions as if they were our own – the *ownership* intuition. First, I set up the problem raised by these (supposedly) incompatible claims in the context of early phenomenalist theories of empathy, and suggest a way to reconcile them with respect to our awareness of *sensations*. Second, having examined some crucial aspects of the nature of the emotions and the way they (may) differ from sensations, I apply the suggestion made concerning the latter to the case of the former, and argue that both the *transparency* intuition and *ownership* intuition can be met if we distinguish between different layers of emotional engagement with the world, and in particular, with other people. Third, in the context of the recent literature on mind–reading, I assess the manner in which my account of the awareness of the emotions in others and ourselves bears upon the question of our *understanding* of other people's emotions. Finally, I examine the impact of my account on the possibility of *knowing* about other people's emotions in the context of contemporary (externalist) epistemologies.

À mes parents,

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My idea of philosophy is very much that of a collaborative endeavour (taking place mainly in public spaces) in which intuitions are probed and arguments put to the test. I have always had the privilege of having friends who would indulge me in this activity, and to all of them – willing and unwilling interlocutors – I am more grateful that I can ever properly express.

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Author's Declaration

I declare that the work in this dissertation was carried out in accordance with the Regulations of the University of Bristol. The work is original except where indicated by special reference in the text and no part of the dissertation has been submitted for any other degree.

Any views expressed in the dissertation are those of the author and in no way represent those of the University of Bristol.

The dissertation has not been presented to any other University for examination either in the United Kingdom or overseas.



CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

"Are you cold?" his son enquired.
The father slowly rubbed his legs.
"Well, I don't know, I can't tell till I feel."
"Perhaps some one might feel for you," said the younger man, laughing.
"Oh, I hope some one will always feel for me! Don't you feel for me Lord Warburton?

Henry James, *The Portrait of a Lady*

I. Motivations

What does becoming aware of someone else's emotions consist of? I am sad, and you – watching me – can feel it. How does that work? There are many reasons why one might be interested in such a question and, consequently, many ways one might want to approach it. One is to have a description of the physics of such episodes. Another is to learn of the role of interpersonal awareness of emotions in an evolutionary story. Another is to discover how infants become proficient in becoming aware of other people's emotions. And yet another might be to know whether and at what point awareness of someone else's emotion is also knowledge about someone else's emotion – in which case, one will be interested in *descriptive* questions only insofar as this bears on one's *normative* preoccupations in epistemology.

Of course, answers to any one of these interrogations are likely to borrow from answers to the others and many more. And although I am interested in all of these questions, and shall touch upon them when the time comes, I shall be primarily concerned in this thesis with the more descriptive aspects of the issues raised by them. How is it that ordinary cases of becoming aware of other people's emotions are so easy? How is it that in the ordinary case, it seems that it is no more difficult to feel your emotions than it is to feel mine?

Before I go any further, I should try to dispel the immediate worries, if I can, of those who will be unhappy about the assumption implicit in the first question I have just asked. I can imagine hearing: "Do you really believe it easy

to feel other people's emotions?" And I agree; the appeal of my earlier question lies precisely in this: that, perhaps, it is *not* so easy. I am not thinking only of the philosopher's incredulity towards my claim. For I have been having conversations that bear a characteristic pattern for several years now. In it, my conversant begins by telling me: "At the end of day, the only emotions I can be really certain about are those that *I* have, ... for the rest, it is only guessing and hard work to really know what feelings others go through".

The first thing to note about this is the epistemological way in which my objectors understand the issue. When Julien says:

> – It is 'easy' to see other people's emotions!

My conversant generally responds:

> – But how can you be certain about what you think you see?

To this I usually reply:

> – I do not mean to say that it is easy to get it right [although I do believe this], only that what other people feel comes to me easily whether or not I get it right.

After a moment's reflection, my interlocutors often, though reluctantly, come round to my opinion. For a while. Until their fighting spirit comes back:

> – Often, 'actually very often', we have absolutely no clue as to what others feel, even when it is quite clear that the person facing us is going through distinct and, from our point of view, particularly defined feelings.

Of course, after so many years, I am familiar with this grievance; and this is what I now come back with:

> – Of course, we are often clueless as to the manner in which we can make sense of what others feel. But, surely, there is something that we can see just in front of us— actually, that we can feel— and don't you think that it is that which we *do* feel in others, their feelings, which, as you might be hinting at, we are clueless at making sense of?

I will typically add:

– It is true that we are often clueless as to what others feel, but it is equally true that we are clueless as to what we personally feel. In fact, some are so clueless as to what they themselves feel that it might confuse them for hours, or even for days and months.

At that point my objector is generally confused, and I secretly and shamelessly celebrate a small professional victory, not always convinced that I have any more substantial grounds for celebration.

While hoping that you will not think my conversational partner too dense, and the ways I engage with her too perfidious, these are, in a light-hearted guise, the ideas that I shall try to articulate and defend in this dissertation. In a word, emotions are, more often than not, easy to become aware of, whether they are experienced by us or by others. When we have time, however, when we are philosophers, or when we experience films and literature, or – worse – when we are in love, this easiness seems to fade away and may be supplanted by uncertainty, and often perplexity.

In this thesis, I try to explain in what sense there is an 'easy' part to our becoming aware of other people's emotions, and in what sense there is a 'difficult' part to our becoming aware of these same people's emotions. I try to articulate a framework in which the 'easy' part relates and interacts with the 'difficult' part. While doing this, I strive as far as possible to keep the phenomenological, conceptual, empirical and epistemological issues separate. In particular – and this is addressed especially to the philosophers – I reserve the epistemological and normative aspects of the question – "How do you *know* that I am sad?" – for the end.

This, then, will allow a journey through the vast literature on my topic, which I hope will provide the reader with a good idea of who takes what attitude to my own questionings. This feature of the thesis is a bonus but is not its objective, since I have no credentials and no ambition as an historian of ideas. But I shall try to make links between at least four distinct traditions with similar concerns to mine.

Firstly, at the turn of the century early phenomenologists, with Husserl at the centre, were preoccupied by, and gave a lot of thought to, the more descriptive and conceptual issues relating to the phenomenological aspects of

my claim. At that time and in that milieu, the central question to be addressed was "What is empathy?"

Secondly, there is "The problem of other minds" tradition featuring Ayer, Austin, Wittgenstein and Malcolm, among others in the middle of the 20th century. They were concerned with the epistemological aspect of the topic, if not its relevance to scepticism.

Thirdly, there is the contemporary literature on 'mind reading' that consists of a lively debate to which developmental psychologists, linguists and philosophers all contribute, with very little concern for phenomenology and much concern for the data made available by developmental psychology.

Fourthly, there is the neurological, neuro–psychological, anthropological, evolutionary, and experimental psychology literature on emotion and the recognition of emotion. This is generating more and more interest and is certainly, at least in principle, relevant to my concerns.

A fifth tradition merits mention, though discussion of it will have no place at all in this dissertation: the contemporary continental approach to the relation between Self and Others (e.g. Levinas). I have no particular excuse for this omission, except for the fact that one cannot take care of everything, and that this thesis will have enough of a continental flavour without a direct engagement with the names associated with that outlook on my topic.

This being said, I believe what is to come to be firmly rooted in the analytic tradition, with its concerns and motivations stemming directly from the once raging, and today old–fashioned, "problem of other minds". Let me give you a feel for the latter (alleged) problem.

II. Questions of symmetry

The overarching theme of this dissertation can be introduced via a brief exposition of a view that is sometimes called 'the reflection+analogy theory'. A partisan of this reconstructs the processes under which we come to ascribe mental states to others along the following lines. On each occasion that a subject feels a certain emotion, she also experiences some specific movement or behaviour in her body. In the long run, she manages to collect an important list of generalisations correlating certain specific feelings with certain specific

behaviour. When she masters these generalisations, she is ready to use them to ascribe emotions to others taking the reverse route. She sees behaviour, consults her list of generalisations, and *infers* the emotions of others on this basis. After a while, the subject is so good at the exercise that she successfully goes over this procedure without having to think about it. The subject, by *analogy* with her own case on which she has *reflected*, becomes proficient in ascribing mental states to others.

Discontent with this picture has come essentially from two different bastions, Wittgenstein and its followers on the one hand, and Strawson, Evans and their followers on the other hand. In both cases, the problem they identify with the reflection+analogy view stems from constraints that they believe apply to the very possibility of property ascription in general, and to which the model just outlined does not conform. The differences in the two respective grievances are not obvious, and often they seem to lie in a variation of emphasis rather than substance.

Reconsidering the model under inspection, Wittgensteinians reformulate the view under scrutiny in the following illuminating way: while I have a privileged access to my emotions by feeling them, I have only an indirect access to the emotions of others by *inferring* them from their manifestations. On this view, the application conditions of emotion words are very different depending on whether one ascribes an emotion to oneself (i.e. one's feelings), or whether one ascribes an emotion to others (i.e. others' behaviour). If, like the Wittgensteinians, one is especially preoccupied with the theory of meaning, and if, in particular, one rejects as incongruous the idea that a given sentence in language might have very different conditions of application when circumstances are not wholly dissimilar – i.e. when those differences are clearly not explicable by recourse to contextual differences – then one will tend to discard the reflection+analogy theory as utterly misguided. The worry driving the rejection is that it makes no sense to suppose that I learn to apply an emotional concept to others on the basis of the condition of application of the concept to me, i.e. a certain feeling. However good I am at identifying my own feelings, they will never give me any indication as to what others feel.

Evans, following up a line of thought first developed by Strawson, has argued that thought is subject to what he calls the Generality Constraint. The

Generality Constraint appears to entail that it makes no sense to suppose that I might have a thought which can be interpreted as involving a given concept, without *ipso facto* supposing that I have the capacity to exercise this concept in other thoughts. If I am capable of thinking that John is angry, I must be capable of thinking that, for example, Mary is angry, or that John is, for example, famous (so long as I possess the other concepts involved in these latter thoughts). The idea is that there is a deep incoherence in the supposition that a predicate could be applicable only on a single occasion to just one object. Whatever one may think about the Generality Constraint, its truth would place the defender of the reflection+analogy model in big trouble. For it would mean that I could not have thoughts about myself without *ipso facto* being capable of having thoughts about other people. If this is correct, then the reflection+analogy model which, to recall, consists of building generalisations correlating one's own emotions with one's own behaviours – generalisations consequently used to interpret other's emotions – is an aberration. If the Generality constraint holds, then I cannot have a thought about my emotions in the first place without also being capable of having thoughts about other people's emotions.

Beyond the subtle differences between these two families of objections, what they have in common is the express requirement that there must be some sort of *symmetry* between first and third person attribution of experience, a requirement to which the reflection+analogy model, at least in the bare form in which I presented it, does not conform. Now, I believe that the orthodox response to this general complaint has been to bite the bullet, that is, to concede that there must be symmetry between first and third person ascription of experience. However, as a rule, the admission that the general picture had to be revised in accordance with the symmetry principle did not coincide with any attempt to revise the fundamental assumption underlying the whole discussion, that is, with any challenge to the claim that first and third person access to experience is radically different.

A caricature of the acceptance of the need for symmetry in the absence of any revision of the fundamentals on which the whole discussion is based, is the contemporary 'theory–theory' account of experience attribution. On the latter account, the application conditions for psychological concepts are behavioural

both in the first and third person case, behaviour being conceived of as the effect of an inner psychological cause. The symmetry on the proposal at hand is ensured by the fact that psychological terms have the same conditions of application in my own case and in yours; but at the same time no revision is undertaken to the conception of the inner and outer 'routes' to experience as being radically different. This might be thought to be an advantage until it is noticed that, in this new and revised picture of experience attribution, the fact of having 'first person' kinds of experiences seems to play no role whatsoever. It suggests a picture that fails even to take into consideration the possibility that there might be interesting differences between a human being attributing experiences to herself and others, and a robot doing likewise. This is no prejudice against robots, whom we might resemble in many ways. It is just the thought that perhaps our own emotions, feelings and sentiments do have a role in our resulting competence in treating others as psychological beings, a role which might be as significant for philosophy as it obviously is for psychology. This is something the reflection+analogy account attempts to do justice to, and to which the theory–theory doesn't.

It might be retorted that the point just alluded to holds, perhaps, against the theory–theory, but fails to have enough scope to really get off the ground in the greater scheme of things. I shall argue that this is not so. The worry I just expressed applies equally, for example, to Wittgenteinian attempts at, as they like to say, 'dissolving' the problem. In order to reach symmetry Wittgensteinians emphatically discard private experience as having any relevance to language use. Language use is, according to Wittgensteinians, the central concern of philosophy and, if private experience is irrelevant to language use, then it is no less irrelevant to philosophy. Appeal to the notion of *criteria*, which is the Wittgensteinian positive suggestion in the area, is a contribution to the epistemological questions associated with the problem of other minds. That is, the problem of the possibility of knowing about the attitudes and contents of other people's minds, not a contribution to our understanding of the way our own felt experiences might play a part in our becoming competent in treating others as bearers of experiences.

My suggestion, which I shall now formulate cryptically, is the following. Symmetry should be understood and cashed out on the model of first person

experience. That is to say, I shall examine the possibility that there is indeed symmetry because access to other people's experiences is very much the same as access to one's own experiences – 'from the inside', as it were. This dissertation is an attempt to formulate this claim and, in particular, to say how it bears on the emotion case. It is an attempt at examining the conceptual issues and problems that it raises, and in particular, at examining how it copes with the legitimate concern according to which there is also an asymmetry between 'access from the inside' and 'access from the outside', that will also have to be accounted for.

A few more words before I expose in more detail the plan for the thesis. My 'first person' symmetry claim might remind the reader of two similar approaches in the existing literature. First, McDowell's proposal, according to which we can have direct access to other people's experiences,[1] and second, what is known as *simulation theory*, which is an account of the way one's own psychological thought processes might contribute to an understanding of other people's thought processes. The former proposal is distinct from mine in the essential respect that it is an attempt to make headway towards resolving the epistemological problems associated with my question. McDowell's examination of the relation between experience and its expression is embedded in a project that is aimed at dissolving the sceptical pressures an internalist conception of knowledge generates for the question of our awareness of other people's psychological states. Although I shall, in the sixth and last chapter of this thesis, show what bearing my own theory has on epistemology, my project is to give a sound descriptive account of the perception of emotions. As to simulation theory, I believe that it is, indeed, an account which rests on motivations similar to mine, and I will in due course examine the similarities and differences between it and my own account.

III. The programme

In the first chapter, I present Husserl's, Scheler's and Stein's theories of empathy, focusing on the first two. I use these authors to evoke the two

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[1] See McDowell (1982) in its original version, rather than its reprint in Dancy (1988) in which most people seem to read this paper.

intuitions that any account of episodes of our awareness of other people's emotional experiences shall have to conform to, if it is to be faithful to the phenomenology of such episodes. These intuitions, which I call respectively the *transparency intuition* and the *ownership intuition*, unfortunately appear to pull in opposite directions. That is to say that, for your experiences to be really *transparent* to me, they should, in fact, be presented to me as if they were my own experiences – the transparency intuition. Now, if we say that they are so presented to me, as, in fact, Scheler would have it, we satisfy the transparency intuition at the expense of the ownership intuition. Indeed, if there is no difference in the way my own experiences, by contrast with your own experiences, are presented to me, then there is no real sense in which I am presented with an *owned* experience, i.e. your experience rather than mine – the ownership intuition. This is a trap Husserl is most concerned to avoid, and in order to do so he (re-)introduces the notion of awareness "by analogy". Through that move, I claim, Husserl ends up satisfying the ownership intuition at the expense of the transparency one. I thus suggest that we have to find a middle route between Husserl's and Scheler's accounts.

In the second chapter, I outline a strategy that should allow us to avoid the respective pitfalls into which Scheler and Husserl fall. I argue that, by taking seriously two key ideas that are confusedly present in the work of both phenomenologists, we might succeed in accounting for both intuitions. The first idea is that all perceptions are *integrated* in the following sense. On the one hand, every perception consists of the operation of some or all sensory modalities operating in unison. In particular, I argue, with the help of Gibson's conception of ecological perception and Bermúdez's elaboration of Gibson, that this integrative feature of perception – which, among other things, forbids us to think of proprioception and exteroception as two different epistemic routes *via* which someone might access properties of oneself – forever precludes the possibility of really distinguishing between inner perception and outer perception. Consequently, it also precludes the possibility of really distinguishing between a capacity sensitive to psychological properties in a 'psychological way', which would contrast with a capacity indirectly sensitive to psychological properties in a 'physical way'.

The second idea is that we should distinguish, in our phenomenologists' terminology, between the phenomenological and the sensory levels of experience or, in my terminology, between the *vehicle* level and the *saliency* level of experience. Putting the two ideas together, I claim, allows for the accounting of our two intuitions. I illustrate the case by focusing on the sensation case. In a nutshell, sensations, yours or mine, are transparent in the sense that they are presented to me in an *integrated* perception that is not more first–personal than third–personal, and at this level at least, i.e. *ownership* is not *salient*. If, however, I focus upon or pay special attention to the *vehicle* of the experience, that is to say the sensory basis which reveals the sensation to me – makes it *salient* to me – features of the sensation that were not initially *salient* to me, and among these features the creature who is affected by the sensation, i.e. its *owner*, become *salient*.

In the third chapter, I set the scene for a possible application of the line of argumentation developed in the second chapter concerning sensation to the case of emotions. The question I ask here is: what is the structure of this 'thing', emotion, which I claim is transparent in others. The question is particularly pressing, I claim, since most theorists of the emotions conceive of them, perhaps in contrast with sensations, as highly complex and multifarious entities involving propositional content. The worry, therefore, is that the thought that the emotions of others can be perceived transparently is simply preposterous. Taking this worry very seriously, I encourage the thought that all emotions are intentional states with content, but I attempt to show that we have to distinguish between basic emotions, which I call *emotional valuations*, and more complex emotions that I call *emotional evaluations*. In this chapter, I contrast the kind of content involved in basic emotions, which I suggest should be conceived of on the *perceptual model*, with the kind of content involved in complex emotions, which I suggest should be conceived on the model of *belief*. This I take to be the preparatory work for the defence in the fourth chapter of the claim that basic emotions, which we share with some animals and infants, can be perceived transparently in others. Complex emotions, however, are not at all transparent and are reached via complex mechanism of inference, analogy, comparison, rule of thumb, etc.

The fourth chapter contains the crux of the thesis. Here I articulate and defend the claim that emotional *v*aluations can be perceived transparently, and give reasons for thinking that this has to be the case in order to account for our capacity to become proficient emotion attributers, i.e. to become competent in emotional *e*valuation. I start by articulating the transparency claim, arguing that the claim is not trivial if it involves both a *sharing* component and a *recognition* component. Perceiving your emotion transparently means that I both share the emotion with you *and* recognise that you have it. Building on a proposal by Brewer, who suggests that we should construe the way we perceive emotions on a specific indexical model of the way in which we perceive secondary qualities, I propose my own model of the perception of emotions that describes and explains the kind of triangulation taking place between the perceiver of the emotion, the experiencer of the emotion, and the object of the experiencer's emotion. The main twist in the argumentation is that I conceive of the perception of emotion at the primitive level as being a case of someone else's basic emotion being the object of the perceiver's basic emotion. In a phrase that the reader will become used to I say that *perceiving emotions in others at a basic level is a case of emotionally valuating other people's emotional valuations*. I then argue that this model instantiates the transparency thesis, and in virtue of that allows for a non–circular account of the way in which children learn to be competent in applying the concepts of the emotions to themselves and others, i.e. to be competent in the capacity of emotional *e*valuation. In the process of arguing for this claim, I expand on the contrast I make between emotional *v*aluation and *e*motional evaluation, suggesting, in line with the argument set up in the second chapter, that emotional *e*valuation consists, in part, of the capacity to pay special attention to the *vehicles* of the emotional *v*aluation, in particular its sensory basis, thus making what was not *salient* in the first place, notably who it is who is having the emotion, i.e. its *owner*, *salient*. This is how I reconcile the two intuitions mentioned earlier, for emotion at least, if not for all forms of mental attribute.

In the fifth chapter, I attempt to dispel worries that will have arisen from the proposal offered in the fourth chapter. One might object that the way in which my model of our perception of other people's emotions instantiates the transparency thesis is such that an episode of emotionally *v*aluating someone

else's emotional *v*aluation is too "weak" or not "rich enough" to count as a genuine case of *understanding* that someone else is experiencing an emotion. In order to answer this legitimate worry, I use as a starting point Goldie's conception of what it takes to understand some person's emotion. Reviewing with Goldie the different accounts existing in the philosophical and psychological market of the ways in which we come to understand ourselves and others as subjects whose actions are explained by their emotions, I argue that it is only in as far as one has epistemological concerns in mind – as might be the case for Goldie – that is, only if one takes the notion of understanding as relevantly akin to the concept of knowing, i.e. as implying "success", that emotionally *v*aluating someone else's emotional *v*aluation ceases to count as an episode of understanding. I therefore propose an alternative, weaker, non–epistemological, but psychologically plausible, conception of understanding, which I claim is satisfied by my model of our transparent perception of other people's emotion. "Understanding *à la* Goldie", I argue, is fit for an account of how we emotionally *e*valuate other people's emotions.

In the sixth and last chapter, having laboured the descriptive and phenomenological aspects of my question, I turn to its bearing on epistemology. In this chapter I defend two claims. First, I argue that the perception of the psychological and the perception of the physical pose the same sceptical threats, no more and no less, for epistemology, irrespective of one's own inclinations in the theory of knowledge. Second, I argue for the stronger claim that knowledge of other people's experiences is possible. I start by contrasting the views an internalist and an externalist approach to knowledge are likely to take towards perceptual experience of the external world in general. I go on to contrast these two views and to show how, with some key externalist assumptions in the theory of knowledge, together with some semantic assumptions with respect to the individuation of the content of experience, it is possible to defend a *non–classical foundationalism* with respect to perceptual experience. The foundation in question is semantic rather than epistemic, but given the externalism, I suggest it has epistemic consequences as well. Before turning to the application of this epistemological model to the case of emotional *v*aluation of other creatures' experiences, however, I argue for my first claim, i.e. that emotional *v*aluations of other people's emotions do not pose any special sceptical threats

that ordinary perceptions of physical objects do not also pose, whatever standpoint one occupies in the theory of knowledge. This is the outcome, I shall claim, of construing access to the inner and the outer in a similar fashion, i.e. the outcome of the structural parallel we have found to hold in the second and third chapters between first and third perspective at the level of emotional *v*aluation.

In the second half of the chapter, I argue for my second claim, that knowledge of other people's emotions is possible. I begin by showing how non–classical foundationalism, with respect to experience in general, applies to the case of emotional *v*aluation of other people's emotions in the framework of two remaining epistemological problems associated with the awareness of other people's psychological states. I first show how non-classical foundationalism dissolves the problem of *deception*, a problem specific to the case of the perception of other minds. Second, I deal with the question of how *justification* should be understood in the epistemological picture I am putting forward. Having adopted a broadly externalist strategy and, this being the case, having taken on board the possibility that young infants and animals are entitled to knowledge, I argue that the internalist preoccupation with justification has to be taken into account when knowledge is attributed to human adults. This is to say that we would doubt that someone knows that someone else is experiencing a certain emotion if the putative knower were entirely incompetent with respect to all the possible ways in which support for such attributions can be gathered, i.e. incompetent with respect to emotional *e*valuation. For this reason, together with the fact that many aspects of a full-blown ascription of emotion are not resolved at the level of emotional *v*aluation – *in particular the question of ownership* – I argue that the reflexive level of emotional *e*valuating is part of the evidence package – together with one's emotional *v*aluation – that one might bring in support of one's final emotional *e*valuation that someone is currently experiencing a given emotion. This is to say that, when the context is such that the level of justification required for knowledge is very high, for example in a seminar on scepticism, I argue that Goldie's model of 'understanding emotions' construed as a quest for knowledge constitutes the right model.

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CHAPTER 1: A JOU RNEY INTO PHENOMENOLOGICAL LAND OR THREE THEORIES OF EMPATHY

I. Introduction

The structure of the chapter is as follows. In the first section, I present Husserl's theory of *analogical apperception*; in the second, I go on to present Scheler's theory of the *direct perception* of other minds; in the third section, I outline Stein's theory of *empathy*. The two latter accounts stem, in fact, from earlier work by Husserl, and the whole debate takes place in a thoroughly phenomenological framework articulated by Husserl himself. The reason for considering the ideas of these authors, often called 'realist phenomenologists',[2] is not a symptom of a *phenomenologist* bias on my part; rather, it happens that all three believed empathy to be one of the most important concerns of philosophy, and have thus spent a lot of energy and effort in trying to answer the problems it poses. In this exposition, historical perspective and accurate exegesis have not been my priority. Rather, I use these authors to simply highlight important intuitions, and then attempt to show how it is possible to make good these intuitions in the more homely Fregean tradition in the chapters that follow.

II. Husserl's theory of *analogical apperception*

Husserl's theory on the manner in which we know about other people's psychological states is fully embedded in his theory of sense perception.[3] I wish, therefore, to outline the latter. For Husserl, objects – like chairs and trees – are

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[2] For the motivations underpinning this appellation, see Mulligan (2001).

[3] Husserl's views on this topic are mainly to be found in his *Meditations Cartesiennes* (1931, *trans.*, 1985) and in *his Die Krisis der europaisschen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phaenomenologie* (1936, *trans.*, 1970), which I quote from their English translations. It is ironic that Husserl's most anti-Cartesian philosophy, especially on the relation between the body and the mind, should be found in a book called the *Cartesian Meditations*. For a thorough examination of Husserl on the topics dealt with here, and to which I am indebted in the coming sections, see Bell (1990) pp. 151-215.

presented to the perceiving subject 'in person'. That is, the object itself is the direct object of the act of perceiving. Although this view constitutes a version of what we might want to call *naive realism*, Husserl's unfolding of it gets quite complex. He acknowledges that objects of perception are always present *via* some of their *aspects* or *sides*. A subject has a certain perspective on an object that allows him to be presented only with one side of the object at a time, and not the others, nor can he see the *whole* object. Nevertheless, Husserl tells us that the intentional object of perception is the object itself. The question thus becomes the following: how does something become the intentional object of an act of perception if no more than one of its sides is presented to the perceiving subject? It is important here to remember that if the object is to remain the intentional object of perception, then perceiving an object will not be a judgment or an act of inference. And Husserl is adamant that perceiving is not a case of judging or inferring. Unfortunately, according to Mulligan, Husserl never quite tells us what perceiving in his sense consists of, despite his having reserved a special notion supposedly covering the phenomenon: *apperception*.[4] The aspects of the object that are not directly given in perception, as well as the whole object, are *apperceived* by the subject. Husserl rejects, at least in his earlier writings, the idea that apperception should be explained in terms of the subject having *expectations* or *imaginings* regarding the aspects or sides of the objects that are not directly presented to the subject. Nevertheless, it is the notion of apperception that Husserl uses to explain the manner in which other people's psychological states are presented to subjects.

Husserl's view on the perception of psychological states is useful because it promises an intermediate position between the view that perception of these psychological states is direct, and the view that they are inferred from behaviour. At least, this is what we are led to believe, given the notion of apperception. In the first place, Husserl insists that a subject's perception of someone else's psychological state cannot be direct. For, he rightly notes, this would blur the difference between the subject's perception of his own, as opposed to others', psychological states:

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[4] Cf. Mulligan (1996), pp. 193-194.

> If what belongs to the other's own essence were directly accessible, it would merely be a moment of my own essence and ultimately he himself and myself would be the same person[5]

If other people's experiences were felt in a manner akin to the manner in which I feel my own experiences, then these experiences would be *my* experiences. Husserl's answer to that is not one of overreaction. He abstains from concluding that other people's psychological states are inaccessible to us, though he admits that they are presented *via* the other's body and behaviour. The question becomes once again, what is the relation between the perception of someone else's body and the perception of this same person's psychological state, if it is not one of inference. For Husserl insists that "we quite rightly speak of perceiving someone else"; "... what I actually see is not a sign and a mere analogue; ...on the contrary, it is someone else" (§55, p.124). At this point he reintroduces the notion of apperception, which in this specific passage he calls *appresentation*:

> There must be a certain mediacy of Intentionality here, ...making present to consciousness something that is "there too", but which nevertheless is not itself there and can never become an "itself-there". We have here accordingly, a kind of making co-present, a kind of appresentation.[6]

Psychological states are *apperceived*, says Husserl. If we felt that the notion of apperception was mysterious when applied to the perception of middle-sized objects, it becomes even more so in the context of the perception of psychological states; the passage just quoted can hardly be said to be illuminating. For, we should keep in mind that, although the other sides of a middle-sized physical object are presented to the perceiving subject only indirectly, they can be perceived directly in principle. They are possible objects of direct presentation. However, there is no analogy in the case of psychological states of others for, as we saw, they are never presented directly. Husserl is aware of this problem and states that "only a precise explication of the Intentionality actually observable in my experience of someone else, and the motivations essentially implicit in that Intentionality, can resolve the enigma"

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[5] Husserl (1931), [*trans.*, 1985, §50, p.119].

[6] Husserl (1931), [*trans.*, 1985, §50, p.109].

(§55, p.121). It is in unlocking this enigma that Husserl develops his theory of *empathy* or *analogical apperception*, which can be summarized thus. The possibility of perceiving another person's body as the *living* body of a conscious being is a function of my ability to project onto or transfer an understanding that I originally acquire only from my own case. This is a most interesting idea, especially in the light of Husserl's insistence that the perception of someone else is "no inference from analogy", and more than that, it is "not an act of thinking of any sort"(§50, p.111). It is easy to read Husserl's theory of empathy as a version of the familiar theory that I expounded in the introduction to this thesis. Namely, the view according to which getting to know that someone else is affected by specific states of consciousness consists of exercising an analogical inference from our own states of consciousness. To understand what Husserl has in mind, it is useful to take a look again at his theory of simple perception.

For Husserl, the body is an absolute 'here' in relation to which all other physical objects are situated 'there'. "But in virtue of my *motility* it is possible to reverse these egocentrically identified locations, making what was 'there' 'here', and *vice versa.* I can change my position in such a manner that I can convert any 'there' into 'here'" (§53, p.116). But more fundamentally, it seems that it is in the very intrinsic nature of experience that it includes implicit reference to the object of the experience, not only as it is presented to me from 'here', but also how it would be presented 'to me from 'there', from the rear, from nearer to it, and so forth. "This implies that, perceiving from there, I should see the same physical things, only in correspondingly different modes of appearances" (§53, p.116). But this implies, as well, that implicit to all experiences, we will find a reference to the perceiving subject. All experiences are oriented, centred in a way which calls for a description in egocentric space. Experience thus informs me of the location and the aspects of an object as much as it informs me about my location and the way it looks to me from where I am.

First, we should notice that these few remarks give the beginning of an explanation of what *apperception* consists of. The direct and actual presentation of an aspect of some object contains essentially other possible aspects of that object as presented to me *were I* situated differently towards it. Although we are still left in the dark as to how this transposition is supposed to work (is it an anticipation, or an act of the imagination?), we can at least start to see how this

will not be an act of inference of any sort. Secondly, and undoubtedly a related point, we can see how sense perception in general, or what is sometimes called outer perception, is not and cannot be viewed as solely concerned with the outside world, solely concerned with the environment outside the body. All experiences are as much experiences of the Self – whatever it means at this stage – as they are experiences of the outside world. I wish to emphasize how these ideas are all present in Husserl's *Cartesian Meditations*, and even more so in *Crisis*. What Husserl calls 'kinaesthesia' is not that which allows us to sense internally, as opposed to those other abilities that allow us to sense the external world. All perceptions involve and depend upon kinaesthesia. This is how the following passage should be understood:

> All kinaesthesia, each being an 'I move', 'I do', are bound together in a comprehensive unity...Clearly the aspect-exhibitions of whatever physical object is appearing in perception, and the kinaesthesia are not processes simply running alongside each other; rather they work together in such a way that the aspects have the meaning of, or the validity of, aspects of the object only through the fact that they are those aspects continually required by kinaesthesia.[7]

I do not claim that this is very clear, certainly not at this stage. It emphasizes, however, the role of kinaesthesia in allowing the very possibility of experiencing the external world. The reference to the Self as being implicated in the perception of external features of the world is even clearer in the following passage of *Crisis*:

> Sensibility, the ego's active functioning of the living body or the bodily organs, belongs in a fundamental, essential way to all experience of objects. It proceeds in consciousness, not as a mere series of object-appearances, as if these in themselves, through themselves alone and their coalescences, were appearances of objects; rather, there are such in consciousness only in combination with the kinaesthetically functioning living body, the ego functioning here in a peculiar sort of activity and habituality.[8]

The claim that the living body is essentially involved in all experiences ceases to be an empty slogan when its link to agency is understood. All experiences present the external world as a field of possible experiences and actions, "primarily through seeing, hearing, etc; and of course other modes of the ego belonging to this (for example, lifting, carrying, pushing, and the like)

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[7] Husserl (1936), [*trans*., 1970, §28, p.106].

(§28, p.108). The world and its objects constitute a space of possible experiences different from my actual experiences of them, experiences that include those of the will. 'Liftabilty', 'graspabilty', 'carryability', 'pushability', etc., all might be features that I now apperceive. In this sense, a constitutional aspect of the Self is given in simple experiences, namely the potential for action or, in other words, the capacity of exercising my will.[9] Those cryptic remarks will be made clearer in the next chapter where I examine the relation between perception, action and the developing Self.

Our present goal, however, is to consider the role of apperception, understood as consciousness *of* an object by a living body, applied to the case of the consciousness by a living body *of* another living body. We have considered already the phenomenon of the decentralisation of the egocentric space as intrinsically involved in experience. In other words, the fact that I can and generally do experience objects as they would look from locations other than 'here'. In so doing, of course, my living body can be itself the object of this decentralization. My body is given to me kinaesthetically as much as it is given to me from the perspective I would have upon it were it situated 'there' rather than 'here'. Closely related to the possibility of decentralized space, we have what Husserl calls 'the living body's reflexive relation to itself':

> Touching kinaesthetically, I perceive with my hands, I also perceive with my eyes, and so forth... As perceptively active I experience (or can experience) all of nature, including my own living body, which is thus reflexively related to itself. That becomes possible because I can perceive one hand 'by means of' the other, an eye by means of a hand, and so forth – a procedure in which the functioning organ must become an object, and the object a functioning organ.[10]

To put it in rather crude terms, what we are told here is that my life, my feelings, my actions, etc. are presented to me, perhaps most of the time, simultaneously from the inside *and* from the outside – to use terms that we can see by now as being inadequate. Similarly, from a Husserlian point of view, my

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[8] Husserl (1936), [*trans.*, 1970, §28, p.107].

[9] For contemporary research in experimental psychology on the relation between the will, perception and action along very similar lines, see Russell (1996).

[10] Husserl (1931), [*trans.*, 1985, §44, p. 9].

emotions and actions are felt, as it were, both from 'here' and 'there' at any given time.

The application of this idea to the perception of other living bodies' experiences should not be too difficult to see. Putting together the notion of a decentralised egocentric space and the notion of the living body's reflective relation to itself, we get a good grasp of Husserl's idea of *analogical apperception*. If my experiences are presented to me *associated* with how they look from 'over there', i.e. with the way they are typically expressed, then there is no reason why I should not be capable of using this knowledge to perceive other people's expressive behaviour as associated with their typical experiences. In effect, making use of this knowledge is not something I ever chose to do. Other people's behaviour is always given to me as expressive, i.e. (as being the expression of an inner psychological state of which I know from having experienced it for myself. "The natural body" says Husserl, "appresents the other ego by virtue of pairing association with my living body" (§55, p.123). Or again "...the assimilative apperception becomes possible and established, by which the external body over there receives analogically from mine the sense living body". (§54, p.118).

Let us pause for a moment. I find Husserl's theory of analogical apperception very appealing. The main reason for this lies in the impression that it gets the phenomenology of perceiving other bodies right. But whereas I can only applaud the strategy of attempting to find a middle way between a conception that conceives of our access to others as a direct affair and a conception that conceives of it as an inference, it seems to me that we are left with somewhat vague and unexplained notions like *assimilation*, *association*, or *analogy*. How do these processes come about and how do they work? In what sense exactly are we sure that we are not again facing the analogical picture of attribution of experience *simpliciter*? Moreover, we are left with problems such as the following. We understand that Husserl conceives of the relation between experience and its expression as being of a very intimate kind. Notions such as "intrinsic" and "essential" are repeatedly used to characterise the relation in question, but I am still not sure of what precisely Husserl has in mind. Another problem is related to the fact that it does not seem right to think that experiences have typical expressions, or that bodily behaviour is typical of definite

experiences. Were we not to take a very 'cartoonesque' view of the matter, we would realise that experiences can be and are expressed in very different ways. And if that is the case, then the very process of associating experiences with bodily behaviour becomes quite mysterious. Another question that arises, and which is possibly directly related to the latter point, concerns the type of understanding of the other that Husserl's picture presents us with. It is not clear to me in what sense other people's experiences are "given" to me in apperception. How rich an understanding does it deliver, and how are we to start assessing what "richness" in that context might mean? Is it not the case that, although analogical apperception allows for the perception of others as living things, it does not deliver anything strong enough to count as perception of other people's specific experiences?

Despite all these questions and problems, I believe that Husserl's theory is on the right track. We will not answer many of these questions here, in particular, that concerning the "richness" of the deliveries of the perception of others will be postponed until the fifth chapter. What I hope to exploit in what follows is how careful consideration of perceptual deliveries, especially the distinction between presentation of an object and appresentation of it, calls for a revision of the distinction between internal and external perception. This concern is also at the core of Scheler's theory of empathy.

III. Scheler and the direct perception of other people's experiences

Scheler holds possibly the most radical version of the claim that the perception of other people's mentality in general, and mental states in particular, is a direct affair.[11] The view is as fascinating as it is confusing, and many would say that it is confused. The foundation of this view lies in a thorough rejection of the Cartesian "old notion" concerning the relation between the mind and the body as an "interaction between two [self-contained] substances" (p. 253). Once it is understood that this picture is incoherent, says Scheler, but most importantly, when it is understood that it gets the phenomena completely wrong, the view that our relation to others is totally transparent becomes the only sound avenue to take. The phenomena that Cartesianism gets completely wrong are chiefly to

be found in the distinction drawn between two (allegedly) radically different ways in which a living creature can be presented to one. That is, either from the first person perspective (internal perception), or from the third person perspective, (outer perception). By contrast, Scheler tells us that, "...at bottom, ...there is no very crucial difference between self-awareness and the perception of other minds"(p. 251). But the claim is, in fact, much stronger than this. The normal case, Scheler believes, "is an immediate flow of experiences, undifferentiated between mine and thine, which actually contains both our own and others' experiences intermingled and without distinction from one another" (p. 246). So, it is not only the case that "we can think the thoughts of others as well as our own, and can feel their feelings as we do our own!"(p. 245), or that "everyone can apprehend the experience of his fellow-men just as *directly* (or *indirectly*) as he can his own"(p. 256), but experiences in general do not present themselves as being the experience of a some specific subject. For it is possible "for the same experiences to be given both as our own and as someone else's"; as well as for "an experience [to be] simply given, without presenting itself either as our own or as another's"(p. 246). In fact, this is systematically the case for the child, as child-psychology shows. The child is incapable of differentiating between her own experience and experiences of others; and it is only through an effort of objectification, that the child will start to "apprehend [her] own self against the background of an ever-vaguer all embracing consciousness in which our own existence, and the experience of everyone else as presented, in principle, as included together" (p. 250).[12] I have not found in Scheler an explanation of how this process of 'objectification' and 'detachment' – that should finally lead to the ability to ascribe experiences to *individual* selves – works. Learning, we are told, "is not animation, but a continual de-

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[11] Scheler (1913–16), [*trans.*, 1954, all the quotations are from the latter].

[12] Note how Scheler's description of the child's evolving conception of Mind contrasts with contemporary descriptions of the same phenomenon in the so-called theory of Mind debate, e.g. Wellman (1990), Perner (1991), Russell (1996). The latter debate portrays the child's development as a process of learning to understand that *her own* point of view on the world is not the only one, and that other people's point of view might differ from hers. In contrast Scheler seems to view the child as having to learn that *all* experiences are held from a specific point of view, for they are not, initially, given as belonging to anyone in particular. Although I cannot argue for this here, it seems to me that Scheler's description is not incompatible with current data in developmental psychology.

animation" (p. 239), but how de-animation occurs remains quite a mystery. However, we will see at the end of this section what Scheler might have had in mind with respect to this process of objectification.

But by now, we should have understood that, contrary to general wisdom which views learning to read minds "as a subsequent addition of mental elements to an already-given inanimate world of material objects", Scheler argues that expression is "the very first thing that man apprehends of what lies outside him, and that he only goes on to apprehend sensory appearances of any kind, inasmuch and insofar as they can be construed as expressions of mind" (p. 239). 'Expression', it should be quite clear by now, is not the causal end of an inner process or experience that can be distinguished from this inner process or experience. At an ontological level, expression is the mind. "...Every 'expressive unity' at this level... remains a unity belonging to the whole of the living organism as an individual whole" (p. 262). And this fact, of course, simplifies considerably the epistemology of the perception of other minds. This has the immediate consequence that the "perceptions of our fellow-men do not relate to their bodies (unless we happen to be engaged in a medical examination)", but "to integral wholes" (p. 261), unitary psychophysical entities. "To know of the existence of an individual self, it is quite unnecessary to be acquainted with its body"(p. 242).

Scheler knows that this picture is unlikely to convince his detractors, if only because it flies in the face of a fundamental fact, namely, that the perceived body of someone else can 'say' one thing, when the experiences affecting this very body 'says' something else; she can smile but feels sorrow. The very motivation for the view that the perception of emotions must be an indirect affair, an act that brings you from bodily behaviour to inner experience – for there can always be a discrepancy between the two – is something Scheler has to address. And, in fact, he is not afraid of doing so and believes that the phenomena speak for him and not for his detractors. First of all, he insists that anybody who would deny that we are "directly acquainted with another person's joy in his laughter, with his sorrow and pain in his tears, with his shame in his blushing" (p. 260), etc., just deludes himself or others for the sake of salvaging his favourite theory. More interestingly, Scheler draws our attention to the fact that there are numerous cases when we do operate inferences and conclusions as

to the mental states of others, but he argues that these cases are the exceptions rather than the norm. "Thus, for example, the actions of a man with whom I have previously spoken, and whose feelings and intentions were, as I thought, plain to me, may yet compel me to the conclusion that either I have misunderstood him and deceived myself, or else that he has been lying or pretending to me. Here then, I actually draw conclusions about his states of mind" (p. 260). He goes on to give a whole series of cases where inference, reasoning and analogising occurs, and makes the convincing point that in all these cases "the material premises for these conclusions are based upon [the] elementary perceptions of the person concerned", and that "they therefore presuppose these immediate perceptions" (p. 260-61). I suppose that the point here is that it is thanks to the fact that I have already made up my mind as to what experiences affect the other that I can start using them to make calculations and inferences as to the soundness of my immediate perception of these experiences. Responding more directly to the point made by his detractors, Scheler insists that other people's states of mind are, in general, completely transparent to the normal observer, even and especially when they lie. "I perceive that he is only pretending to feel what he does not feel at all, that he is severing the familiar bond between his experience and its natural expression, and is substituting another expressive movement in place of the particular phenomenon implied by his experience". And later, he adds that one can literally see the deception in someone else, "I can be directly aware of his lying itself, of the very act of lying, so to speak" (p. 261). Sometimes, however, Scheler's observations seem to have the consequence that any discrepancy between one state of mind and the way it is expressed is close to impossible: "[W]hen the expression of an emotion is violently repressed, this invariably has the tendency to repress it simultaneously from internal perception as well. When joy or love are inhibited in their expression, they do not simply remain the same from the internal point of view, but tend to evaporate" (p. 251).

If I understand Scheler correctly, then the very act of deception, or at least how it is normally conceived in the Cartesian framework, is not, in fact, possible. Of course, we can be misled by our perceptions of other psychological states, we might take something for something else, but this is true about anything we might perceive. And this is why we find ourselves ratiocinating,

comparing perceptions with others, looking for discrepancies between them, and drawing inferences accordingly.

One might think that Scheler's view on the perception of other minds is entirely founded on an aberrant, or at best mysterious, picture of the mind/body question, and as such cannot be given any credit. It would, therefore, be quite helpful if we could say some more on the grounds for his conception of the individual as an 'integral-whole', and what is meant by this expression. As hinted earlier, at the heart of this notion we find that "its intuitive content is not immediately resolved in terms of external or internal perception" (p. 261). The mistake of the Cartesian is to privilege internal perception in a way that is not at all justified, and goes far beyond "an inveterate tendency to under-estimate the difficulty of self-knowledge, just as they over-estimate the difficulty of knowing other people" (p. 251). Here the quarrel with this conception of internal perception is not about incorrigibility or infallibility – which are of course myths – but privacy. "The concept of the mental...characteristic of what can only be given in one subjective act at a time, and therefore in effect, to one person at a time" (p. 256), "and cannot be identified throughout a multiplicity of subjective acts" (p. 257). The legend fabricated by the Cartesian is that the self has access to properties that he is the only one capable of accessing, and this always through the same channel, this mysterious internal perception, in isolated episodes of self-perception. Thus, in this picture, we are left with a series of properties that, contrary to those populating the world, cannot be apprehended by different subjective acts of different people, nor can they be apprehended by the same person through a multiplicity of subjective acts from different modalities. And, if it is then declared that this is the means by which we apprehend ourselves, we are left with a picture that renders impossible the perception of others. For now, we have a gap between internal and external perception which appears to be unbridgeable. In response to that, Scheler goes on to claim that "every act of possible internal perception is associated with a similar act of possible external perception; (2) the act of external perception does in fact have an internal sensory basis as well" (p. 249). Scheler's point is that internal perception does not distinguish itself from external perception by having a special object – the Self – which would be the unique object of its operation. For, "if I touch myself with my middle finger, the double sensation

still consists of one and the same sensory content at the surfaces of the two separate parts of the body" (p. 249). What is to be understood from that, I believe, is that the sensation I get from rubbing my fingers is one sensation only. A distinction can be made between internal and external perception here, by focusing on one 'pole' of the sensation rather than on the other 'pole'. For example, I can focus on the sensation as a feel of my middle finger – internal sensation – while the thumb is rubbing it, but I can also focus on this same sensation as a feel of my thumb – external perception. Reflecting on the case of touch, I agree with Scheler that the distinction, as drawn by the Cartesian, does not seem tenable. But how much can it be generalized to other modalities and other kinds of perceptions? This is what we have to investigate and, unfortunately, Scheler is not generous with examples. From the fact that perceptions are always simultaneously inwardly and outwardly directed, he concludes immediately that both self and others can be apprehended in the same fashion – a fashion that he believes to be immediate – and that the same properties of the self can be apprehended at different times by the self. This is how I think we can interpret the following (rather obscure) passage.

> Thus internal perception represents a polarity among acts, such acts being capable of referring both to ourselves and to others. This polarity is intrinsically capable of embracing the inner life of others as well as my own, just as it embraces myself and my own experience in general, and not merely the immediate present.[13]

Unfortunately, it does not seem to me that there is such a direct route from the rejection of the Cartesian distinction, and its reinterpretation, to the view that that self and others are presented in the same way, i.e. directly. But let us try to reconstruct the argument, and see where exactly the obscurities lie. Every philosophical question about any object starts with the object as it is presented to the perceiving subject; I suppose that this is phenomenology. From the viewpoint of phenomenology, others are presented to the subject as *living* individuals, as entities through and through psychological. This fact flies in the face of an alleged intuition according to which, although the subject is presented to himself in a psychological mode, others are like inanimate objects, presented to the perceiving subject in the physical mode, and need, so to speak, to be

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[13] Scheler (1913–16), [*trans.*,1954, p. 151].

affected by a process of animation before they start to be living selves themselves. But this distinction, as careful consideration on perception in general shows and as the true sense of "internal" and "external" perception reveals, cannot be sustained. If that were not enough, it is sufficient to look at the consequences of the view under attack to convince oneself that it is misguided – for we end up with a theory that makes it impossible for anyone to have access to other people's psychological states. This is so unintuitive that the view that generated it should be regarded as particularly suspicious. What is recommended instead, is to take seriously how the phenomena appear to us when interacting with our fellow-beings. We have no difficulty in feeling their feelings and thinking their thoughts, and this is how it should be, provided that the contents of our perception, whatever their objects are, are always the products of a combined and unitary effort of all our senses – senses that cannot be viewed as either directed inwardly or outwardly, but simultaneously in both 'directions'. And the truth is that, when careful attention is paid to these synthetic perceptual products of our senses, we realise that the world is first and foremost the realm of expression and, only subsequently, a mechanistic world of bodies to whom specific experiences can be ascribed.

I find Scheler's view on the perception of the emotions particularly attractive, despite its radicalism and obscurities. It raises many worries, however. The first, very general worry, is that it is not easy to get a firm grip on notions such as 'psycho-physical wholes', 'flows of consciousness', or the 'synthetic deliveries of the senses' when so little is given to clarify these terms. Secondly, and more specifically, we need to know more about the idea that every subjective act has two poles, in the sense that it is always both inwardly and outwardly directed. Thirdly, if this is the case, we need to know how direct the route is from this point to the thesis that others are psychologically transparent. Fourthly, I am not as confident as Scheler seems to be, with regard to the specificity of the psychological states we are capable of perceiving – perception understood on the Schelerian model – in other people. Some of the nuances in affect, that he claims we see in other people, might require information that cannot be contained in the purely perceptual circumstances considered. Does he really mean that I can distinguish the red of embarrassment from the red of shame purely perceptually? Fifthly, and this is much more

serious, we are left completely in the dark with regard to the manner in which we end up ascribing experiences to specific individuals, and how this process of 'objectification' within the general flow of consciousness is supposed to occur. Sixthly, a related but nevertheless distinct point concerns the manner in which other people's experiences are pictured to be in Scheler's scenario. I find it at least questionable – as a question regarding the adequate description of the phenomenology of the problem under discussion – that experiences of others should be thought of as presented to the subject without a bearer. Is the opposite not the case? It does not matter how much I feel for you, it does not matter how close I might be emotionally to you, when I sense your fear, is it not the case that I sense your fear as yours and not mine? How will Scheler distinguish between emotional contagion and emotion perception? I am particularly sympathetic to the idea that the perception of other people's experiences is a case of normal perception construed on a naïvely straightforward model. We have to find a way, however, to accommodate the fact that in a typical case there is a contrast between me experiencing my pain and me experiencing yours.

Before going any further, I wish to put forward a distinction made by Scheler that is directly related to the two last worries mentioned above, and that I intentionally left out until now, because of their obscurity. When philosophers from the analytic tradition think about phenomenology or the phenomenological character of experience, they generally have the notion of *quale* in mind. This is not what phenomenologists of Scheler's bent have in mind when they talk of phenomenology. Scheler draws a distinction, which he believes is of the utmost importance, between phenomenology and sensation and, correspondingly, between internal intuition and inner sense. What Scheler calls internal intuition is the capacity associated with the phenomenological level; what he calls inner sense is the capacity allowing one to feel sensations. Confusion between these two levels is the mistake of the Cartesian. Inner sense allows access to "bodily states, especially their organic sensations, and the sensory feelings attached thereto". These, we are suddenly told by Scheler, account for "the special separateness among men", because, of course, they cannot be perceived directly. We all have our own sensations and those are "wholly confined to the body of the individual concerned". Internal intuition however, apprehends, not

sensations, but the *mental*. "An identical sorrow might be keenly felt, but never an identical sensation of pain, for here there are always two separate sensations" (p. 255). I am not sure of what Scheler has in mind. Does he mean that sensations are always so particular that they never have more than one instance, so that presumably one could not share it by having another token of the same sensation type? Does he mean that because emotions like sorrow can be instantiated in many different ways, they can be shared in the sense of having two different tokens of the same emotion type? This reading, however, will not do, as Scheler talks specifically about *perceiving* properties of the mind, not simply *sharing* qualitatively identical properties of the mind.

Refraining from any further speculation, I would like to suggest a particular reading of the distinction, which I will exploit further in this thesis when I propose my own account of the perception of other people's psychological states. Scheler says that, "the body and its changes merely condition the appearance or aspects that our experience presents to inner sense, but never the experience itself"(p. 254). I read this as meaning that there is a subtle but capital distinction that can be made between the content of the experience, the world as the experience reveals it to be, and the experience that reveals this world to us. In possibly more contemporary and acceptable terminology, I will speak about what is *salient* in experience, and the *vehicle* of this experience. The latter is rarely the object of experience, rather the world is. According to me, and contrary to Scheler, I believe that this distinction applies to all experiences, including sensations like pains or tickles. Now, reflecting on this distinction, we have the beginning of a way in which the mysterious 'de-animation' or objective attribution of experience can take place. If, I decide to, or I am taught to, make my sensations in themselves – as opposed to what they reveal to me of the world – the objects of my experiences (I make them *salient*), I cannot but see that they belong to a specific body, whether mine or someone else's. Certain conditions have to obtain before the experience of others can be presented to internal intuition, conditions that "certainly include the ontological condition that my body should be subject to effects whose causes are located in, or proceed from, the other's body" (p. 249). 'Reflection' on these conditions allows for de-animation and objective attribution of experience. I ask the reader to bear with me until the end of chapter II for a full unpacking of these ideas.

IV. Edith Stein and the perception of *foreign* experiences

Edith Stein, a student of Husserl, devoted an entire essay to the question of empathy.[14] The first part of this essay consists of the description of the phenomenon, whereby she puts forward her own account and compares it with others, notably with Scheler's and Husserl's; in the second part she sets out to trace the origin of the capacity for empathy. We will be chiefly concerned here with the former part of her investigation. Stein's contribution to the topic, which is developed in a thoroughly Husserlian framework, is undoubtedly the most original of those we have chosen to present. Her analysis is particularly sensitive to the complexity of the problem, the richness of the means by which we get into contact with other subjectivities, and does not dismiss any of them without careful consideration. I believe she is the first one to understand that various accounts of empathy do not necessarily compete, or if they do, it is only insofar as they deserve the label 'empathy' best. But this is not to say that the unlucky candidates in the role of empathy have no role to play in our interaction with others.

"Empathy is a kind of act of perceiving" (p. 11), says Stein. Here, perception should be understood broadly as a mental act having an intentional object, encompassing such things as acts of remembering, expecting, or imaginings. The latter three are *sui generis* types of mental acts insofar as they have different structures, and empathy should be viewed too as a *sui generis* type of mental act. It is the act of becoming aware of a foreign experience. Interestingly enough, Stein uses memory and imagination as models for the understanding of empathy, and though distinct from them, it remains very difficult to understand her conception of empathy in isolation from the analogy with imagination or memory. Why imagination and memory? Simply, because what she calls 'outer perception' will not do as a model for the awareness of other psychological states. "The pain is not a thing and is not given to me as a thing, even when I am aware of it 'in' the pain countenance" (p. 6). Only the pain countenance is given to me outwardly as an object of outer perception. Outer perception presents its objects in the 'there itself right now' mode, but

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[14] Stein (1917) [*trans.*, 1989, all quotations are from the latter].

empathy does not. For, and in opposition to Scheler, though the other sides of an object of outer perception can always be, in principle, presented to me in the 'there itself right now' mode, pain cannot. I can consider the changing aspects of the pained face as much, and as long, as I want from different angles, but the pain cannot, in principle, be given to me in this direct mode. Yet, says Stein, in spite of the fact that empathy is not outer perception, it still might be endowed with 'primordiality'. There is no need to be scared by the term here, as it translates quite well into a concept more familiar in the Fregean tradition, namely, the concept of *acquaintance.*[15] At this stage, I will ask the reader to go along with the argument using the intuitive grasp of the notion. It is sufficient to say now that, for Russell, a subject could not only be *acquainted* with objects in which he might be in direct perceptual contact, but also with mathematical objects (axioms, numbers, sets, etc.), or even with *types* of empirical properties. We, therefore, have a relatively clear idea of what it means for some act to have the character of outer perception without the character of acquaintance, or more importantly for that matter, the reverse. In the case of empathy, we are interested in knowing whether, despite the fact that it does not have the character of outer perception, it might still have the character of primordiality or acquaintance. Again, Stein's answer is negative. We cannot be acquainted with other people's experiences, and this is why the model of memory, and even more the model of imagination, become so attractive. For, it is essential to emphasise, the fact that other people's experiences are not presented primordially to the subject should not deter us from wanting to account for the immediacy and sensuousness that seem so characteristic of empathy. The model of perceptual memory or imagination appears to promise just that.

Stein makes a distinction between the primordiality of the subject of the experience and the primordiality of the content of this experience.[16] This distinction is present in the same way in the familiar notion of acquaintance. In experience, I might be acquainted with myself – indeed Russell thought that selves are such things that we can be acquainted with – although not with the

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[15] See e.g. Russell (1912).

content of the experience this Self has. Now, memories and imaginations constitute an excellent ground for illustrating this distinction. When I recall a past perceptual experience, the content of this experience is not primordially given to me; neither is the self who had the perceptual experience, but my actual self that is doing the remembering is given to me primordially. But in memory, though the content is not presented primordially, the act of remembering "points back to the past primordiality. This past has the character of a former now" (p. 8). An interesting and capital point Stein makes is that the self in these kinds of memories can be presented to the remembering subject in two different ways. My self can be presented to me having the perceptual experience in the past, so to speak, from a detached perspective, but I can, as it were, relive the perceptual experience of the past and merge myself in the past self.[17] In fact, as far as perceptual memories are concerned, these two modes of remembering typically occur in sequence (and will be found in imagination and empathy as well): "The same act of representation in which what is remembered emerges before me as a whole implies certain tendencies. When these unfold, they expose 'traits' in their temporal course, how the whole experience was once primordially given" (p. 8). And it is during this 'unfolding' that merging with one's past self occurs. But, Stein insists that whatever kind of memory it is, "the memory always remains a representation with a non-primordial subject which is in contrast with the subject doing the remembering" (p. 9).

All this seems to be equally true about imagination except for one significant feature. The self that is doing the imagining is, as in episodes of remembering, primordially given. The imagined self, according to Stein, can either be in the content of the imagining as object – as when I meet myself in imagination – or I can, so to speak, merge myself into the imagined self. In

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[16] This distinction between the self and its properties, or more accurately the availability of this distinction, will play an important role further ahead in our discussion. See Chap. 2, sec. II.3, and Chap 4, sec. III.3 below.

[17] Compare with what G. Currie (1995, p. 166) calls *personal* and *impersonal* imaging: "When I imagine merely that such and such happens, without imagining that I see (or have other kinds of epistemic contact with) what happens, we have a case of *impersonal imagining*. When imagining involves the idea that *I* am seeing the imagined events, we have a species of *personal imagining*". Is Currie's distinction akin to Stein's? Wollheim's (1984, pp. 74 ff.) distinction between *centrally imagining* and *acentrally imagining* with their sub-classes might be more useful! As we shall see in Chapter 5 when we address simulation proper, the number of distinctions available is numerous.

neither cases though, she insists, is the self given primordially, "they do not coincide, though there is a consciousness of sameness", "there is no positive identification" (p. 8). So far, memory and imagination seem completely parallel. The difference between imagination and memory is that in the former the act does not point towards a past primordiality. "The fantasised [imagined] experiences are in contrast with memory because they are not given as a representation of actual experiences but as a non-primordial form of present experiences" (p. 9). Except for this marked difference, imagination is akin to memory in the sense that its content can arise as a whole, and its tendencies can be fulfilled step by step.

What about empathy then? Ignoring for an instant the differences between these types of perception, we should emphasise their similarity. In all three cases, memory, imagination and empathy, we are faced with a perceptual intentional act that has the characteristic of following a typical sequencing, although none of the steps in the sequence *need* to take place. First, we have the emergence of the experience when its object appears as a whole. Second, we have the fulfilment of the tendencies of the content of this experience. And third, we have the comprehensive objectification of the explained experience.[18] Can we recognise empathy in this sequencing? Here is how Stein describes it:

> This content [of the act of empathy] is an experience which, again, can be had in different ways such as in memory, expectation, or in fantasy. When it arises before me all at once, it faces me as an object (such as the sadness I "read in another's face"). But when I enquire into its implied tendencies (try to bring another's mood to clear givenness to myself), the content having pulled me into it, is no longer really an object. I am now no longer turned to the content, but to the object of it, I am at the subject of the content in the original subject's place. And only after successfully executed clarification, does the content again face me as an object.[19]

Typically, then, there are two fundamental stages in empathy, which are best understood as a gradual modification of the *other's* actual and primordial experience. Similarly, memory is a modification of a *past* experience whereby I experience primordially a content given to me non-primordially, and the same is true of imagination which is a modification of *a putative actual* experience

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[18] In Chap. 5, sec. II.3, we will have the opportunity to examine, in the context of a discussion of Simulation theory, what these different stages may involve.

[19] Stein (1917), [*trans.*, 1989, p. 10].

whereby I experience primordially a content which is given to me non-primordially. In empathy, we have a modification of an experience *that is not ours*, whereby I experience primordially a content that is given to me non-primordially. The three cases are parallel. So what is the difference? Again, we are told that, in empathy as in imagination or memory, we are typically faced with different stages where the experience is first given as a whole and then its tendencies fulfilled step-by-step. Here, again, it appears to be parallel to memory and imagination. The difference, however, lies in the way in which the self that is empathised with is given to the empathiser in these different stages. We remember that, in memory and imagination, the self – remembered or imagined – is generally first apprehended as an object when the experience is given as a whole, and then a process of 'fusion' between the two selves – the imagining self with the imagined self, and the remembering self with the remembered self, respectively – occurs when the tendencies of the content of the experience is fulfilled. Again the 'fusion' with the self – imagined or remembered – is only partial, it is never given primordially. So, again, what is the difference between this and empathy? Well, according to Stein, the difference lies in the fact that the empathised self in empathy is not, in any sense, the empathising self. "And this is what is fundamentally new in contrast with memory, expectation, or the fantasy of our own experiences. These two subjects are separate and not joined together, as previously, by a consciousness of sameness or a continuity of experience" (p. 11). The self of the other's experience is given as *foreign* in empathy, and this is what is the gist of her account, and what makes it so different from Scheler's account. The difference, however, should not be exaggerated. For, it is obvious that the experience of empathising itself has a role to play, insofar as it allows me to empathise with you, to utter a tautology. It is through my experience, which is given to me primordially, whereby I experience your experience non-primordially, that I succeed in empathising with you. About the latter point Stein says the following: "If I experience a feeling as that of another, I have it given twice: once primordially as my own and once non-primordially in empathy as originally foreign. And precisely this non-primordiality of empathised experience causes me to reject the general term "inner intuition" [she refers here

to Scheler's concept] for the comprehension of our own and foreign experience" (p. 34).

One can see in Stein's account the seeds of many contemporary discussions of the attribution of emotions as it is formulated in the framework of what is known as *simulation theory*, and the role imagination has to play in these theories. My own view is that simulation, though it accounts for an important part of how we come to understand other people's emotional lives, does not fit well with the first stage of Stein's three-tier account of empathy. While simulation seems the right picture for 'the fulfilling of the tendencies present in the object of the empathised experience', it is not convincing as a means to perceive "the other person's experience as a whole". In this respect I find Scheler and Husserl much more congenial, and in the second chapter I shall give their picture a try. I do not mean these few remarks to constitute a reason for discarding simulation, or any trends of it; in the fifth chapter we shall have the opportunity to explore the consequences of my view on the direct perception of emotion in the framework of simulation theory, and how Stein's account might fit in it. As for now, we are going to leave Stein aside, and I ask the reader to bear with me and give direct perception a chance.

V. The issues at stake and how to resolve them

We have presented three ways in which we could understand the perception of other people's psychological states as a direct affair. A fundamental purpose behind these three conceptions was to account for the fact that it seems as if other people's mental states are presented to the perceiving subject transparently. All of them, however, propose to satisfy this basic conviction differently. At this point, I think four main issues have emerged. First, there is the idea that if the distinction between inner and outer perception – as conceived by the Cartesian – can be shown to be untenable, then the door to a more direct picture of how we perceive other people's mental states opens up. Both Scheler and Husserl make this point forcefully, but rather confusingly, by articulating a distinction between the sensory level of experience and the phenomenological level of experience, or, what I will call in the remainder of this thesis, the

vehicle level of experience and the *saliency* level of experience[20]. This is the second issue. Thirdly, we have the problem that when this door opens up, there is a risk of losing the difference between the experience of the subject that empathises and the experience of the subject that is empathised with. This is the main problem of Scheler's account; ultimately, his account does not allow for the distinction, as Stein rightfully emphasises. Fourthly, there is the question of the richness of the deliveries of these direct perceptions. Indeed, one might agree that there is something like seeing an emotion in someone else's face, but that this cannot count as an instance of ascribing an emotion and. in this sense, cannot be rich enough to count as ascription at all.

In the next chapter, I will ignore the very important fourth problem in order to concentrate on the first three. It is very important to keep in mind that this fourth problem is going to be neglected. I will speak of experience in general, focusing on the experience of sensations in oneself and in others, but ignoring the question of the conditions that have to be met for an experience of a sensation to count as a genuine ascription of a sensation. This question, particularly as it relates to the ascription of emotion, will be the object of the rest of the entire thesis.

In the meantime, I propose to investigate further the question as to whether there are, indeed, grounds to revise the distinction between inner and outer perception in the framework of contemporary work on this issue, and to ask whether this revision has the consequences Scheler and Husserl believe it has for the problem of our access to other people's experiences. My answer to this question will be positive. The next step will then consist of articulating my own view, while trying to avoid the traps into which Scheler and Husserl seem to have fallen, the first by blurring completely the distinction between the perception of one's own experience and the perception of someone else's experience, and the second by retreating to a version of the inference plus analogy model. I set myself two tasks. The first consists of articulating the idea

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[20] As we have seen, Husserl distinguishes between *perception* and *apperception*, while Scheler distinguishes *sensory experience* and *internal intuition*. I intend my distinction between the *vehicle level of experience* and *saliency level of experience* to match, at least at this stage, these two distinctions. In the following chapters, I shall say much more about what this distinction covers.

that there are no sharp boundaries between inner and outer perception. The second is to explore the consequences of this claim in relation to the problem of the perception of other people's psychological states. We start with the first one.

CHAPTER 2: THE TRANSPARENCY OF OTHER PEOPLE'S EXPERIENCES

I. Introduction

In this chapter, I shall outline my account of the structure of our awareness of other people's experiences, focusing for now on their pains and other sensations. In the third and fourth chapter, I extend and elaborate on this outline to give an account of our awareness of other people's emotions. The objective is to avoid the pitfalls into which both Husserl's and Scheler's theories fall; that is, I shall try to account for both the transparency intuition and the ownership intuition, and not merely account for one of them at the expense of the other.

This said, I shall follow Husserl's and Scheler's strategy in their attempt to show that talk of the 'inner' and the 'outer', insofar as experience is concerned, should be viewed as referring to two different dimensions of attention or reflection one can pay to experience, rather than referring to two different epistemological routes sanctioning verdicts with entirely different epistemological status. I shall argue for this in three stages. First, with the help of Gibson's notion of ecological perception and Bermúdez's elaboration on it, I will argue that there are good *prima facie* reasons to think that outer perception or *exteroception* works, as a rule, in parallel and simultaneously with inner perception or *proprioception*, and vice and versa. Therefore, perception on the whole provides as much information about the inner features of a perceiver as it does about the outer features of this perceiver's environment. In this context, whilst we can still talk of the 'inner' and the 'outer', these are to be conceived of as aspects of an experience that becomes *salient* to a creature when she pays special attention to them. In the ordinary case, however, the inner and outer dimensions of these experiences, together with many others, are fully *integrated* in experience; this is to say that there are no 'inner' and 'outer' types of experiences that are, respectively, structurally different.

Second, and in line with what has just been said, I will argue that there is no reason to think that 'inner' experience – conceived simply as a perceiver's awareness of some feature of her body, rather than some special type of experience – should not be viewed as structurally strictly parallel to 'outer' perception – conceived as a perceiver's awareness of features of the environment outside her body rather than a special type of experience.

Third I utilise this new understanding of the inner and the outer to account for the transparency intuition and the ownership intuition. The thought goes like this. The fact that inner and outer perception are structurally the same explains why there is no reason to think that they constitute two epistemological routes sanctioning verdicts that would differ in status within the theory of knowledge. This is an important point, and one which I shall exploit fully in the sixth and last chapter of this thesis, where I shall be concerned with issues relating to our knowledge of other people's experiences. This issue, however, will not be the focus in the present chapter. Here I shall be specifically concerned with the psychological aspects of my question. I shall develop the idea that experience is *integrated* and, in particular, I shall exploit the fact that the inner and the outer aspects of it are not commonly *salient* to creatures as 'inner' or 'outer' before they pay special attention to them or make them objects of self–reflection. This will enable me to account for both intuitions I set out to explain. In a nutshell, *transparency* on the one hand shall be explained by means of the phenomenon of *integration*. Ordinary experience of the mental is not presented to one as being *owned* by anyone, nor is it presented in a special "inner way", nor in a special "outer way", as being a mental episode experienced by a particular creature, for example, you or me. *Ownership* on the other hand will be explained by our capacity to focus on specific aspects of how the world is presented to us *via* experiences, and how special attention or reflection paid to our experiences might reveal to us which creature, in particular, goes through which experience.

II. Perceiving in and out

II.1. Proprioception and Exteroception

When we think of inner perception, two models come to mind. If I turn my attention to the pain in my foot and consequently judge that my foot hurts, there is a clear sense in which I have perceived a property of my self. This is a typical example of what philosophers call *introspection*, which is one possible way of thinking about what inner perception consists of. But one could argue that the pain I feel in my foot is, in fact, already a perception in itself. By sensing my pain alone, I perceive my foot hurting; judging that *I* have the pain is a luxury I can dispense with. *Somatic proprioception*[21] is the name psychologists and philosophers give to this latter means of becoming aware of properties of oneself, and constitutes a second model of inner perception. It is what Husserl has in mind when he talks about *kinesthesia*, and perhaps also what Russell is thinking of when he says that one can be *acquainted* with oneself.[22] Reflection on both introspection and proprioception can lead one to suspect that the boundaries between inner and outer perception might be fuzzier than previously thought. I suspect that introspection was what Wittgenstein had in mind when he launched his now famous attack on the alleged privilege of the first person perspective.[23] The upshot of these attacks is, indeed, a revision of the alleged

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[21] *Proprioception* is the operation of a heterogeneous group of internal systems providing information about the body (purely about the body or about the body in its relation to the environment). These systems provide information about pressure, temperature, and friction from receptors on the skin and beneath its surface: information about the relation of body segments from receptors in the joints, some sensitive to static position, some to movement; information about balance and posture from the vestibular system in the inner ear and the head/trunk dispositional system and information from pressure on any parts of the body that might be in contact with a gravity-resisting surface; information about bodily disposition and volume obtained from skin stretch; information about nutrition and other homeostatic states from receptors in the internal organs; information about muscular fatigue from receptors in the muscles; information about general fatigue from cerebral systems sensitive to blood composition; information about bodily disturbances derived nociceptors. Some of these systems operate completely below the threshold of conscious awareness, some yield information that is consciously registered. Of this second kind, some operate through the medium of sensations (*mediate proprioception*), such as pain, fatigue or hunger; some are only accompanied by sensations (if at all) (*immediate proprioception*).

[22] Cf. Russell (1912).

[23] See Introduction, sec. II, above.

distinction between inner and outer perception, but one that need not concern us here.[24]

It is by reflecting on proprioception that I aim to establish that inner and outer perception cannot be viewed as distinct modes of apprehending one's environment. As we have seen, Husserl's contribution to this debate, though rarely mentioned, was prescient. Nowadays, the name associated with this idea is that of J. J. Gibson. A psychologist of perception (and, indeed, a perceptive psychologist), Gibson has done more than anybody else to reframe the question of inner and outer perception and to put it high on the philosophical agenda.[25]

II.2. Gibson's ecological perception

Ecological psychology concerns itself with the relation between organisms and their environment. In Gibson's approach to ecological psychology, and to the psychology of perception in particular, this relation is conceived of in a way that he describes in the following terms: "Oneself and one's body exist along with the environment, they are co-perceived".[26] The rather radical idea behind this statement is that ordinary perceptual systems of biological organisms operate in a way that grant simultaneous access to both information about the environment and information about the perceiving self. Far from being 'windows' to the external world only, the senses also provide an organism with awareness of properties of its self. The critical point of the idea is not that organisms can

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[24] As we had the opportunity to see in the introduction, there are two important, but fairly independent, trends in the Fregean tradition which have put into question the distinction between first-person and third-person epistemic access to psychological properties. Here is how what I say will relate to these. Both traditions, on the one hand, Wittgenstein (1953) and the abundant literature his work has generated, and on the other hand, Strawson (1959, p. 99 ff), Evans (1982, pp.103 ff), and the literature their work has generated, have *on the basis of semantic considerations* consistently attacked the distinction between first-person and third person access as conceived by the Cartesian. At the core of their argument – which rests crucially on an epistemic conception of meaning – we find that, because we have to insure that the meaning of psychological predicates is the same when applied to oneself as when applied to others, epistemic access to oneself and to others cannot possibly be conceived of on the Cartesian model, which conceives of them as radically different. As the reader will have realised by now, I believe that perception is a pre-verbal affair, and consequently that arguments starting with semantic considerations, be it 'word-use' or 'concept application', are a poor starting point for me. I will therefore be concerned with this family of arguments only tangentially when emphasising with Evans the minimal requirements for content. See Introduction, sec. II, for more details, and Chap. 3, sec. III, for more on minimal content.

[25] Gibson (e.g. 1966, 1979 [1987]).

[26] Gibson (1979 [1987]).

choose, as it were, where to direct the attention of their senses – either inwardly or outwardly – but that the very act of sensing the outer world is also an act of sensing the inner world. The fundamental contribution of Gibson's theory of perception to our long-standing conception of how organisms are supposed to access features of both the world and of themselves *via* their senses can be put in the following way. We have to stop thinking of the world as being accessed *via* the five senses. We also have to stop thinking of the inner physical and psychological self as being accessed *via* some special inner sense called *proprioception*. Instead, we should think of proprioception as underscoring all exteroceptive perception such that the latter could not operate without the former. That proprioception informs organisms about states of themselves is now a well documented and a well accepted idea, which is not to say that proprioception cannot be distinguished from other modalities. All perception, of oneself or of one's environment, involves a mixture of proprioception and some other modality or modalities – or so, with the help of Gibson, I shall argue.

How does proprioceptive perception provide information about the self? The variety of information about ourselves that we gain is totally dependent upon the way in which we gain information about the external world, the location of the objects in it and their movement. The perception of *invariants*, the fundamental perceptual capacity to which Gibson draws our attention, is possible only *via* a perceptual system that is capable of simultaneously gaining information about properties of the body and properties of the environment.

(1) The most basic way in which exteroceptive perception provides information about the self is linked to the very shape of the perceiver. Every animal has a field of view which is bounded by its body, and the particular way in which this animal's body blocks out aspects of the environment is unique to that species of animal. According to Gibson, what hides the surrounding environment when you look upon the world is not emptiness but the self.

(2) More fundamental to the matter is the way in which the systematic flow in the visual field, in virtue of its systematicity, specifies invariants about the self's posture and movement. Here is how Eilan summarises the point:

> [...] when the perceiver moves, this is invariably accompanied by flow in the optic array. Gibson's idea is that by and large, the world being as it is, there is a correlation between particular patterns of flow and particular properties of the perceiver's

> movement, so the flow pattern, can sufficiently specify for the perceiver both that she is moving and various properties of her movement: its direction, speed and so forth.[27]

It is thanks to this mechanism that I do not have the impression that any given object moves when I turn my head or comes to me when I step forward in its direction. Simply by looking at the world, I am constantly informed about very important properties of my body, and this is undoubtedly information about myself. Related to *invariance* are the *constancy phenomena* on which Gibson also insists, and which are relevant for us because they give a clear sense of the distinction between what we have called the sensory level and the phenomenological level of experience, or in my phrases, between the *vehicle* level and the *saliency* level of experience. It not only our perception of size, but also our perceptions of shape, colour and form that remain constant, despite widespread variation at the *vehicle* level of experience.

(3) But even more important for our purposes, as we shall see in the fourth chapter, is Gibson's notion of *affordance*. According to Gibson, normal perception of the environment provides a third kind of self-specifying information. This information relates to the self in the sense that features of the environment present themselves to the perceiving subject directly as possibilities of action and reaction.[28] *Affordances* are properties of the environment that are relative to the particular observer. Objects, says Gibson, are represented to the particular perceiver as liftable, places as within reach or to the left, shapes as graspable, ditches as leapable and so forth. These self-specifying properties are, according to Gibson, given in the very structure of the given animal's perceptual system; they are not learned, nor inferred, nor projected, but directly perceived as higher-order invariants. In this picture, ordinary human perception is never neutral, but always charged with meanings or values at the most fundamental level. But, again, note that these are not associated or glued onto value-free perceptions. Gibson thinks that affordances are features of the environment.

Since Gibson's first articulation of the notion of affordance, many experiments have been conducted for the purpose of illustrating the

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[27] Eilan (1996, p. 346).

[28] Note the similarities with Husserl on the same issue, cf. Chap. 1, sec. II above.

phenomenon.[29] Though it is, of course, extremely difficult to exclude alternative explanations in terms of learning, inference or associations, rather than in terms of affordances, these experiments, because they were conducted on very young infants, appear to show that we are, indeed, equipped with innate mechanisms for directly perceiving features of the environment as immediately relevant for the young perceiver's action. As far as we are concerned, what is important at this stage of the argument is the idea that, at a very primitive level, ordinary perception provides information as much about the external world as it does about the perceiver himself.

It is important, however, not to exaggerate the import of Gibson's contribution to my problem. The lessons from Gibson for my concerns are, I believe, the following. The *salient* in the sensory field of a perceiver is highly integrated in at least the three following senses. First, what is *salient* in the perceiver's sensory field is in sharp contrast with what would be *salient* were the perceiver focused on the *vehicle* of his experience. The wall looks uniformly white to her, is *salient* to her as white, although, were she to focus on the experience that reveals the wall to her as white, she would see nuances and shades of colours which were not at all *salient* to her in the first place. This contrast is not only true of colour perception, but also true of size perception, of shape perception, of movement perception, etc., as well. Second, what is *salient* in the perceiver's sensory field is integrated in the sense that a particular perception essentially contains possible perceptions involving different sensory modalities from the ones actually implicated in the given perception. The idea of affordance presupposes that I relate to the features of my sensory field as relevant to other possible ways in which I might sensorily be in contact with those features, by touching them, tasting them, etc, in order to act upon them. Third, what is *salient* in the perceiver's sensory field is integrated in the sense that sensory perception informs me about features of the world outside myself in relation to aspects of it that are relevant to the possible impact I can have on it. In this sense, it delivers information about my environment as well as about myself in this environment.

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[29] Particularly convincing is the visual-cliff experiment conducted by E. Gibson & al (1969).

Now, the question is whether the idea that the verdicts of perception are integrated in this way can be used to unravel the more specific traditional philosophical problems associated with the perception of other people's psychological properties, in particular, sensations and emotions. Can it be that other people's experiences function a bit like affordances, in the sense that they present themselves to perceivers as features of the environment upon which they might act? And were this to be a real option, can it be that perceptions of other people's experiences as affordances constitute genuine cases of perceptions, such that they would satisfy both the transparency and the ownership intuition? I propose, in what follows, to push as far as possible this line of thought, although I will refrain from using the term 'affordance' outside its Gibsonian context.

II.3. Is proprioception perception? Shoemaker vs. Bermúdez

If Gibson's contribution to our question provides a good starting point for the articulation of the interaction between inner and outer perception, it hardly addresses, and certainly cannot resolve, the philosophical problems associated with this interaction. In particular, some have claimed that proprioception is not a form of perception at all. Shoemaker has put forward a very well developed argument to this effect,[30] an argument that might be thought to reinforce the Cartesian picture. It might be taken to reinforce the Cartesian picture because it trades on the claim that we have seen rejected so forcefully by Scheler, according to which the self in inner perception is 'given to only one person at a time', and that this is what makes it so peculiar. Ultimately, of course, it cannot be used to reinforce the broader Cartesian picture, for if inner sense is not at all a form of perception, then it cannot be put to the use a Cartesian would like it to be put to. Nevertheless, it fosters the idea that inner sense allows an access to oneself that cannot be had in any other way. If correct, Shoemaker's argument will cut short Scheler's and Husserl's projects, for it is based on the assumption that it is possible to make sense of inner sense as a form of perception which is

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[30] Shoemaker (1994, Essay III).

dependent and depends upon outer sense. Bermúdez has convincingly shown, however, that Shoemaker's argument does not succeed.[31]

What does Shoemaker's attack on inner sense consist of? The core of the objection is the complaint that self-awareness and, explicitly, proprioception, because it has only one object – the body – is not a form of perception at all. If it is the case, says Shoemaker, "that perception involves "object-awareness" and that object-awareness of a thing involves having to it a kind of relation such that [...] it is possible for one to have this relation to any of a range of different objects, [...] then it is clear that introspective awareness of the Self does not satisfy it".[32] Does proprioception have a unique possible object of perception? And why, if that were the case, should proprioception be disqualified from being a case of perception? These questions have to be answered first, and, if answered negatively, we shall be in a position to assess whether Scheler and Husserl are warranted in utilising the phenomenon of proprioception to elucidate the perception of other people's experiences.

An issue that has been blurred so far is the structure that a thought about oneself or about someone else has to have. We spoke about sensing one's own experiences or sensing others' experiences and a question this raises is whether or not there are thereby two things that we have to perceive: someone and a property of that someone. This seems very plausible, and in fact many have argued for this dual capacity as a minimal requirement not only for thoughts about other people's psychological properties, but for thought in general:

> We thus see the thought that *a* is F lying at the intersection of two series of thoughts: on the one hand, the series of thoughts that *a* is F, that *b* is F, that *c* is F, [...] and, on the other hand, the series of thought that *a* is F, that a is G, that *a* is H.[33]

Here is not the place to discuss the import of this idea in general.[34] If the content of an attribution of an experience to someone has typically the form: *Other/Self is in inner circumstances e*, then two distinctive capacities will have to be

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[31] Bermúdez (1998, Chap. 6).

[32] Shoemaker (1994, p. 210).

[33] Evans (1982, p. 104).

[34] Evans' *Generality Constraint* will be at the centre of considerations about content that I will develop in Chap. 3, sec. III.2 below.

exercised, one associated with the reference-identification component of the attribution and the second associated with the property-identification component of the attribution. The latter capacity consists of recognising that some psychological property is instantiated in some object, whilst the former capacity consists of identifying a certain object to which some psychological property is going to be ascribed. The reference-identification capacity component, and the property-identification capacity component together allow for basic thinking. As we shall shortly see, this much is, in fact, not needed for thought in general, but one might think it compelling in the case of attributions of psychological properties to people. If I am to recognise that some object is going through changes over time, I must be capable of identifying that object independently of these changes. My capacity to track a flying bird, for example, depends on my capacity to identify the bird from one appearance to the next, independently of my recognition of it as instantiating the flying property. This is why ordinary perception allows for two basic types of mistakes. I can be right about the fact that something is flying, but wrong about the fact that it is a bird. Alternatively, I can be right about the fact that there is a particular bird in the sky, but wrong about the fact that it is flying. It might be a bird attached to a wire, or I might be flying and think (wrongly) of a stationary bird that it is flying.

Now, it is not clear at all that anything of that kind happens in proprioception, or so it is in Shoemaker's case. At first blush, no such dual capacity seems to be at work in proprioception. The pain in my foot and the fact that it is my pain are not identified separately. They come in a package, as it were. It is not the case that I first identify the object of the pain, namely myself, and then ascribe to it the property of hurting. For that very reason, it is not possible for me to misidentify the pain in my foot as the pain in someone else's foot. In philosopher's jargon, proprioception is *immune to error through misidentification*[35] of the object to which a certain property is ascribed and, for that reason, Shoemaker continues, proprioception is not a form of perception at all. In contrast with intentional perception, in proprioception "the reality known

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[35] The phrase is Shoemaker's; cf. his (1994) and Evans (1982).

and the faculty of knowing it are, as it were, made for each other – neither could be what it is without the other".[36]

For genuine intentional perception to take place at all, the properties that are detected through it must, in principle, be ascribable to objects other than oneself. This much is clear from Evans's passage quoted above. But in proprioception there is a unique object of attribution of properties. Proprioception thus violates the principle according to which perception should potentially have a *multiplicity of intentional objects*. This is enough to discount proprioception as a genuine form of perception. Is this attack justified?

Bermúdez believes that the problem with this objection is that it represents falsely basic facts about perception.[37] It is doubtful that there is something like an inner sense working in isolation from the rest of the senses and of which the only object would be the body, as our earlier discussion of Gibson's conception of perception has clearly indicated. Recall, for example, Scheler's discussion of the operation of the sense of touch.[38] The touching of a physical object provides both exteroceptive and proprioceptive kinds of information, and the thought that only exteroceptive touch satisfies the multiplicity of objects principle just mentioned is simply false. If I am in the dark exploring a cube by means of touch, I perceive its cubic nature by focusing my attention on proprioceptive information.[39] The question, of course, is whether this argument can be extended to all modalities. Can't I feel a 'pure' pain for example? The answer, I believe, should be negative. Pains are felt in certain locations of the body, and the way they feel contrasts with the way the rest of the body feels. Speaking metaphorically, one can say that pains are salient in the foreground, with the rest of the somatic field functioning as the background. I could, for example, feel two pains of identical quality in each of my arms against the background of an otherwise undisturbed felt body. If this is correct, then proprioception does clearly satisfy *the multiplicity of objects principle*, and the objection fails. In the pain case, for example, there are various

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[36] Shoemaker (1994, p. 245).

[37] Bermúdez (1998, p.136-145).

[38] See Chap. 1, p. 42 above.

[39] For more on cross–modal perception, see e.g. Martin (1995).

locations in the body that I identify as hurting.[40] We have an identification component and a predicative component. And as we will see, I might be mistaken on both accounts.

At this juncture, we have two important results. First, none of our perceptual systems work in isolation. The verdict of perception is always the integration of the outputs of all or most modalities, including proprioception. Again, this does not mean that we cannot distinguish between inner and outer perception. But the distinction is understood now as concerning the location of the property identified, outside or inside the body, not as two different epistemic routes providing different types of awareness of features of the world. Second, Evans' requirement, according to which all perception consists of at least the joint exercise of two capacities that can be applied to potentially a multiplicity of objects, is satisfied only when it is understood that the body does not have to be seen as one unique object, but a complex one in which different sensations can be felt at various locations.

When this is understood, we appear to have at least the beginning of a clarification of what our phenomenologists might have meant by *apperception* and *internal intuition*, respectively, and what I called the *integrative character* of experience. That integration does in fact obtain is shown by numerous well-accepted experiments, clearly establishing that perception is almost always cross-modal, i.e. that it requires the contribution of a combination of modalities of which proprioception is an essential component.[41]

That proprioception is immune to error through misidentification, *as opposed to* ordinary perception, is also doubtful. The fact is that being subject to error through misidentification cannot be a fundamental feature of proprioception, as demonstrative-perceptual thought is clearly a form of perception and is also immune to this kind of error. I cannot be wrong about the referent of the 'that' in my perception '*That is blue*' (though obviously it can fail to refer, which is a different matter).

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[40] For a fascinating discussion of these issues, see Dokic (2000).

[41] See Appendix I for an illustration of a complex case of cross–modal perception in the phenomenon of young infants' imitative behaviour.

I think enough has been said at this stage in favour of the idea that inner sense can be viewed as a genuine form of self-perception, given that proprioception does, in fact, always work in parallel with exteroceptive perception. Inner sense and outer sense always depend on each other; and Husserl and Scheler are to that extent vindicated. Of course, this fact once again tells us nothing about the question of whether these primitive forms of perception can support something 'rich' enough such that it would support the idea that they are genuinely *perceptive* of the self and its psychological properties. After all, we spoke here merely of bodily properties. This will be discussed in the fifth chapter, the entirety of which is devoted to a response to this worry.

But one worry that can be dispelled right away is the following: one could argue that in proprioception, as opposed to genuine self-consciousness, the perception of the bodily properties *just happens* to be about the self, whereas these bodily properties of the self, if we were facing a genuine case of perception, should be perceived *as* properties of one's body. This is a weird complaint, however, since it could be raised just as well with respect to introspection. Neither introspection, nor proprioception can support a sharp distinction between mere self-reference and genuine self-consciousness. This is obvious when one considers a real case of accidental self-perception. An example would be if one saw oneself in a mirror and failed to see that it was oneself. Of course, this cannot happen in proprioception, but nor can it happen in introspection. The perception in these two cases cannot be accidental. But no one would suggest that introspection is not a form of self-consciousness on this basis.

What we have achieved so far, with the help of Bermúdez, is twofold. First, that proprioception *is* a form of perception. This is a question that did not really preoccupy our phenomenologists but seemed a possible objection to their line of argumentation. Second, that proprioception and exteroception cannot be viewed in isolation, as two different perceptual capacities, by contrast with what the Cartesian would want us to believe. Any perception is the delivery of the integration of all the senses working together. If this is correct, we have achieved our first task, viz. to have effectively shown that it is not the case that there are two different epistemic routes, first vs. third person, to features of the

world. Let us now move on to engage in our second task, which is to explore the consequences of this outcome for our understanding of the perception of other people's experiences.

III. Perceiving other people's experiences

III.1. Back to Scheler and Husserl

Why would anyone think that the possibility of direct perception of other people's psychological states is opened up by the fact that perception is integrative in the various senses just mentioned? Why should the fact that there is no sharp distinction in experience between being presented to oneself and being presented to the world encourage the thought that perceiving psychological properties of oneself and psychological properties of others are on the same footing? Here are Scheler's thoughts on this issue. For him, the idea that the psychological is of a different nature to the physical arises logically from conceiving of epistemic access to oneself and epistemic access to the world as radically different. When this prior conception is shown to be untenable – as I hope it has been shown – then we no longer feel compelled to endorse a picture of the mind that involves two layers, one of which, the psychological, is hiding behind the other, the physical. Once it is understood that inner and outer sense are just different dimensions of the same process, then everything starts to militate in favour of the view that mind and body constitute a whole, of which, again different dimensions can be emphasised. Hence the claim that I can see your psychological states in the same way that I can see mine, 'directly' or 'indirectly', depending upon how we construe perception in the first place.[42] And, according to Scheler, the phenomenology of the perception of other people's experiences militates strongly in favour of the former, in the sense that there are generally no obstacles whatsoever to my being able to see your sadness or pain.

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[42] Of course, strictly speaking, even if there were two epistemic routes to the self, that wouldn't show that mind and body are fundamentally different. We can get newspaper and television coverage of the same events. That is to say that there is no inconsistency in being both a materialist and an epistemic dualist.

Although I find all this very compelling, some do not, and not without reason. When you are sad and I am happy, and I happen to see your sadness, I do not need to be sad to experience your sadness. Experiencing your sadness is not, in general – although it can be – a case of experiencing sadness myself. As both Husserl and Stein emphasise, direct perception of other people's experiences is the wrong model, for the result would be that one would find oneself no longer in a position to distinguish between the sadness of the other and the sadness of oneself. I have already explained why this result seems, according to them, a *reductio* of Scheler's view.

I am not so sure that they are right to be confident about this, and as we have seen, Scheler is happy to bite the bullet. He believes that experiences do not present themselves as belonging, in principle, to anyone in particular. If this is the case, then doubt or wondering as to who is sad and who perceives the sadness is perhaps very natural. If you do find this suspicious, think of the following example. You go to visit a friend in hospital who is dying from cancer. You sit at her bed, and the atmosphere is very heavy. Who is sad and who feels pity? Who or what is going to determine this?[43] My opinion on the matter is that Scheler's picture is right on target if we consider such examples. Nonetheless, it is our duty to give Husserl's theory a chance. For him, experiences have bearers, or as I will say, they have *owners*, and are presented to the perceiving subject as such. The consequence is that other people's experiences, regardless of how close I can feel with them and for them, remain *their* experiences. To say much more than this about Husserl's theory is speculation, but in the next section we shall see that there are at least two ways to interpret him.

I shall try now to articulate Husserl's and Scheler's theories more precisely. To recall the nature of the problem in somewhat crude terms, we are looking to articulate the idea that, in my perception of your experience, my experience of your experience is very much like your experience – the transparency intuition – except that it is my experience that I experience not yours – the ownership intuition. This is, somewhat inelegantly, our problem!

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[43] I owe this example to Morton (forthcoming, Exploration II).

III.2. The structure of Scheler's and Husserl's proposals

One way of continuing to take seriously Scheler's idea – according to which there are no such things as radically separate, inward and outward respectively, epistemic routes to worldly items – is by showing that sensation and perception are *structurally* the same. This might be a way of explaining why there is no more difficulty in feeling one's own experiences than there is in feeling experiences of others, i.e. a way of explaining the transparency intuition. That this is at least a viable option, I hope, has been shown by our answer to Shoemaker's objection. On the current proposal, becoming aware of emotions, sensations, moods, etc., through one's body, say, is as much a case of *intentional* perception as becoming aware of objects, processes, events, etc., in the external world, because they all exhibit the same fundamental structure.[44]

In articulating more precisely Scheler's and Husserl's proposals, I shall focus on one type of experience: sensation; and attempt to show how we can reconcile the transparency intuition, together with the ownership intuition, with respect to sensation. Sensation is a good candidate for our analysis, for it is generally thought to be the kind of thing that is most difficult to see directly in others. In other respects, however, it is a bad candidate, for it seems that higher level cognitive states, such as emotion – which we might also want to believe can be perceived directly – involve much more than sensations. I suggest we put this worry aside for now. I will offer my conception of the transparency claim with respect to emotion, as well as a consideration of how the emotional case compares with that of sensations, in the next two chapters.

To say that becoming aware of a sensation is structurally equivalent to becoming aware of an object in the external world, so that we have to think of sensation on the model of perception, is to say that awareness of sensation meets the conditions most central to perception. First, all perceptions are *about* something. Second, in all perceptions, *attention* allows focusing and assessment of specific aspects of that which is the intentional objects of them. Third, all perceptions are prone to (sometimes) *misrepresenting* their intentional objects; the content of the experience might either be a hallucination or an illusion.

These three conditions are generally thought to be central features of intentional perception of objects visually presented to subjects, and of course, the question is whether awareness of sensation really does have these features.

There are good *prima facie* reasons for thinking that these conditions are met in the sensation case too. First, the intentionality condition appears to be met because, as we have seen, sensations are localised. Pains, itches or tickles are felt in particular regions of the felt body, and one can be said to perceive these regions as painful, itching or tickling. Second, the particular regions affected by this or that sensation can be focused upon and as it were 'scanned' for the purpose of evaluation, just as objects or scenes lying in the visual field can be 'scanned'. Third I can sometimes be mistaken about my sensations, confusing a feeling of pain in my leg for a feeling of pressure on it (illusion), or even feel a pain in my leg although this leg has been amputated (hallucination).

The fundamental structure just uncovered focuses on sense experience as a means by which information about the world is gathered, how it works and how it can go wrong. The qualitative aspects of the sensation, in the exposition just offered, seems to have been left out, as an ingredient that does not belong to the fundamental structure of these mental episodes. Viewed from this perspective, it makes it a particularly anti-Cartesian conception of sensation.

How this is going to help us reconcile our two intuitions is not straightforward. First, if my perception of my injury and my perception of yours exhibit the same structure in the sense outlined above, then perhaps we start to have an idea as to why transparency is a feature of both my perception of my injury and my perception of your injury. For nothing in the latter case exhibits obstacles to be overcome which do not have to be overcome in the former: both are as direct or indirect, depending on what interpretation we want to give to the structure. Both allow for the gathering of information about a located injury in the same way, and both allow for the same kind of mistakes. But notice that, unfortunately, this will not be enough to account for the transparency intuition. Not only do we want it to be the case that both acts are equally reliable (or unreliable) as a means of gathering information, but we also want it to be the

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[44] For one possible articulation of the view that sensations have Intentionality, see Anscombe (1963). For a more recent version of the same thesis, see Tye (1995).

case that your injury is transparent to me in the sense that it is also given to me from your perspective, your special angle on it. And nothing in the story told so far promises to account for that!

Second, if sensation and visual perception of an injury have the same fundamental structure, then how does one become aware that one is experiencing one's own injury rather than the injury of someone else? Nothing in the account so far makes room for the fact that identifying injuries in oneself and identifying injuries in others are quite different things – this is the problem of ownership, and the second intuition that we have to account for, in a way that is compatible with a plausible account of transparency.

How then can we complement the story told so far so as to really account for transparency, whilst taking into account the intuition that experiencing one's own sensation is not the same as experiencing the sensation of someone else? Let us have a look at Scheler's and Husserl's unsatisfactory proposals again.

Here is how Scheler, I suggest, would describe first-person experience in the context of the claim that sensation is structurally equivalent to perception.

(1) Experience (a particular body part is F)

This describes a particular experience enjoyed by a particular subject. In brackets, we have the content of what she experiences. This is possibly the most simple and naïve way to describe the experience of a sensation in oneself. Although reporting that one has butterflies in one's stomach or pain in one's shoulder will most probably take the form 'I have butterflies in my belly', or 'I have pain in my shoulder' the proposed description neglects the presence of the first-person. As argued earlier, the thought *has* to be structured. I experience *something being F*; and the analysis insures that via the presence of the body part in the description. Now, as Hume is well known for having emphasised, it is not clear at all that the referent of 'my' in the report of this experience is presented to the subject in any clear-cut way. A more faithful description of the experience omits the reference to the first-person pronoun and uses an indexical instead. When I experience pain in my shoulder, from the inside, it is like 'that shoulder hurts', and not 'My shoulder hurts'. As far as this point of the proposal is concerned, it seems sound.

The problem with it, though, is that we may want to use the proposal exactly as it is, as a description of an experience, not of my own sensation in my shoulder, but of anything else in the world – or for that matter, your sensation in your shoulder. If transparency is the case, then on this indexical proposal, experience might be the exact description of how it is to experience sensations in others. I imagine this is exactly what Scheler has in mind; or at any rate, this analysis would fit nicely into his own account. For us, however, it will not do, as we disagreed with him that, in the normal case, there is no difference between my experiences of my own sensations and experiences of other people's sensations. Description (1) therefore does not capture the difference between the first-person and the third-person.

Scheler's account places the difference between first-person and third-person perspective purely at the level of *reference*. What makes your experience *your* experience is ultimately to be traced back to the fact that the *pain* is in *your* shoulder, not to whether someone in particular is aware of it. But, as we have just seen, there seems to be more to this that we need to account for. Perhaps an analysis in terms of *sense* would be more adequate. Here is an attempt to cash out the difference in terms of *modes of presentation*:

(2) Experience (a particular body part is F [where F is presented under the mode M])

Here M is a mode of presentation of a property F. The idea is that the nervousness in my body is presented to me in a certain way, one that differs significantly from the mode of presentation M* under which your nervousness is presented to me. However we might want to develop this idea and characterise further the way in which two tokens of the same type F are presented to me under different modes of presentation, it is not clear that we did not just revert to the Cartesian picture. For, as is well known, one might not immediately recognise that one faces the tokens of the same type F under two different modes of presentation, unless it is also the case that one makes a judgement as to the identity between the two F's. In the case we are interested in, there is no possible *discovery* as to me being in the same state as you, as we have discovered, that Hesperus is identical with Phosphorus. For, by hypothesis,

it is transparent to me that you have the same experience as me, or the same experience that I had.

Although difficult to ascertain, the suggestion under discussion might very well be what Husserl had in mind. Different modes of presentation are like different *sides* of the same object.[45] When the object is *apperceived*, then all the sides are implicitly present in my perception, although I am presented only with one of the sides. But Husserl felt that there was a link missing in his account of the perception of other people's experiences, and this is why he re-introduced terms like 'association' and 'analogy'. The subject has to know that different sides of the same object, i.e. different modes of presentation of a psychological property are, in fact, about this same property. A story has to be given as to how the subject 'associates' these different modes of presentation together. And this is exactly what Husserl does. He produces a story – the world is presented to the subject in a unified perceptual field – that downplays, or perhaps precludes, the possibility of a *discovery* that two *sides* presented to a subject are two sides of the same thing. The whole question is, how convincing is this story?

The reason we might think that this attempt to explain the puzzle in terms of sense amounts to reverting to the Cartesian model is that it construes inner and outer modes of accessing one's experiences in two radically different ways, which is perhaps what Husserl ultimately did. Now, the present objection is valid against any proposal that makes inner sense and outer sense altogether radically different, which is the traditional objection raised against the inference+analogy model. I do not think, however, that Husserl's situation is so critical, as his account might well be interpreted somewhat differently. Perhaps we should really think of inner perception simply as a variety of outer perception, as Scheler clearly does, and as Husserl might be thought to be doing, whilst trying to account for the difference between the two kinds of access, without recourse to maintaining that there is a difference at the level of reference or at the level of sense.[46] Let us explore this option.

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[45] See Chap. 1, sec. II above.

[46] Mike Martin (1995) has made a proposal along just these lines. What we need to account for, according to him, is the special sense of ownership characteristic of the first-person, and absent in the third-person. His original contribution is to put down the difference between the two as a difference concerning the spatial structure of bodily experience as opposed to experience of

III.3. Transparency and Ownership

The way out of our dilemma, I believe, should proceed via the denial that ownership is *explicitly* represented to the perceiver at the *saliency* level, but that it is represented *implicitly* at the *vehicle* level. This is a strategy pursued slightly differently by Searle[47] in his analysis of the causal aspects of perceptual acts, in still different terms by Woodruff-Smith[48] in his discussion of *acquaintance*, and more directly on the topic that concerns us by Dokic.[49] Without referring any further to the way these authors develop the strategy, I wish to present the way I understand and intend to use it. In the presentation that follows I freely use the distinction between the implicit and the explicit, and only later expand on how I understand it. I first illustrate the strategy in an ordinary case of the perception of a distal object, and then show how we can exploit it for the perception of other people's experiences.

Imagine an individual being aware of a car in front of her. That *this* car is the cause of this person's current perception of a car is part of the conditions of satisfaction of her perception, but that this is the case is not explicitly represented by her. She does not see the car *as* the cause of her perception. Note

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items outside one's body, and not at all as a difference in the property F which is perceived. The idea is that in bodily experiences the boundaries of the perceived object (the body) are *co-extensive* with the somato–sensory field. There are no bodily experiences to be felt outside the boundaries of the felt body, in contrast with visual perception. The boundaries of a seen object always fall *within* the limits of the visual field. There are always points to be seen outside the boundaries of the object.

At least two worries come to mind. First, it is rare to have experiences of our body in which our entire somato–sensory field is filled. Quite the contrary, most sensations present themselves as salient against a background of undifferentiated sensations. In that respect, it seems to me that the contrast with visual perception is not quite so significant. But a more important worry is Martin's lack of concern for the idea that the subject's environment is presented to him as integrated in the senses I alluded to, i.e. one of which is the idea laboured in this chapter according to which objects and their location are presented to the subject in a way that depends on the operations of different modalities, including proprioception. When this point is made, the relevant contrast between co-extensivity of felt body and somato–sensory field in the one hand and inclusivity of felt object within the perceptual field in the other cease to exist. And it could be argued that in cases where the entirety of my somato–sensory field is involved in my experiencing my body, that I do experience it against the background of my entire perceptual field. If this is so, perhaps we do have the relevant contrast in visual perception as well. After all, I cannot see objects that are behind my head (though I might hear them), in the same way that I cannot feel my body outside it.

[47] Searle (1983, esp. Chap. 2).

[48] Woodruff-Smith (1989, esp. the last chapter, and its footnote 18).

[49] Dokic (forthcoming).

two interesting consequences of the claim. First, the perceiver can be said to perceive the car only if it is, in fact, the car that she sees that causes her perception. Second, although the latter fact is not explicitly presented to her, she can reflect on it, and come to know that the specific experience she has is an experience of *that* car only if the car is present *where* she sees it, and caused her experience. The second and related aspect concerns the dependence of the changes in the scene experienced and the changes in the experience that reveals these changes. We have here a counterfactual dependence between the two members of the perceptual relation. Were it not the case that these changes are taking place out there, it would not be the case that the experience that reveals these changes to the perceiver changes the way it does. Experience thus tracks[50] changes in the environment, and does it more or less well. Abnormal conditions, posture and positioning of the perceiver, the condition of the perceiver's perceptual system, and its current state poses limits on how accurate this tracking might be. That experience tracks, so to speak, changes in the environment is also a condition of satisfaction of someone's perception, although, of course, the fact in question is not explicitly represented by the perceiver. But again, it could be made explicit by her, were she (for purposes of judgement, assessment, comparison, etc.) to focus on the co-variation of her experience of the scene perceived and the world as the experience reveals the scene to be. In the next section, I will suggest that this experience to which I sometimes pay special attention is the level of *vehicle* whereas what it reveals of the world is the *saliency* level.

But for now, how would this strategy help to explain *ownership* of experience? Let us swap the car for a pain. First, someone experiences pain if and only if there is a pain to cause the experience that reveals it to the perceiver. What the perceiver sees is a localised pain, and she does not represent to herself the fact that she is perceiving *that* pain unless it is *it* that causes her experience. Second, the experience that reveals this pain to the perceiver tracks the changes in it, its intensity, perhaps its movements along her arm, etc. And again, she does not perceive this tracking relation *as* a tracking relation. However, if she

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[50] On the matter of 'tracking', see Evans (1982, esp. p. 146, pp. 174-75, and pp. 192-96). Evans speaks of informational states with content, rather than experiences, tracking changes in the

were asked to do so, by a doctor for example, then she could put it to the front of her mind, as it were, and engage in the difficult task of thinking and talking about it.

Up to this stage in the exposition, the case is strictly parallel to that of the perception of the car; we have to explain now how ownership enters into the picture.

First, note a very peculiar aspect about pains felt in one's own body. Their instantiation is essentially dependent on the experience that reveals them; one cannot have a pain in one's own body without an experience to reveal it.[51] This contrasts of course with pains perceived in other people's bodies whose instantiations do not depend on the experiences that reveal them. Hopefully, if I close my eyes and run away, I do not see your pain anymore, despite the fact that if you genuinely had one then it should still be there. This, I contend, is a very important element of ownership. Although I do not *explicitly* see the essential dependence between my pain and the experience that reveals it, and although I do not see *explicitly* the contingence of my experience of your pain and its instantiation, I can pause, reflect on it and come to appreciate who the owner of the pain is.

Second, if it is true that experiences of pains track changes in the pain, then special attention to this tracking relation might also bring to light whose pain the pain I experience is. At least two dimensions of what the 'special attention paid to the tracking relation' consists of are worth mentioning. The first concerns the tracking of the *location* of the sensation. A finger pain or a tooth pain is presumably located in a finger or in a tooth, but which finger it is or which tooth it is, is not always obvious. Until careful attention is given to the question, it is often impossible to answer, and even then I might not be able to tell. But I would go even further and say – and probably Scheler would follow me on this point – that I might not be aware of whose finger or whose tooth the pain is located in until I reflect upon it. But once it is clear to me that the pain is

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environment.

[51] This is, according to Dokic (forthcoming) the special 'ontological fact' about bodily experience – a fact that is only implicitly represented by the subject – which single-handedly explains ownership. I have no fundamental objection to the idea, but I believe he has to say much more about the manner in which the implicit fundamental ontological fact interacts with, without determining, the phenomenological level.

located in your finger, I can certainly use this to decide questions of ownership, perhaps in combination with knowledge I have of the importance of the body in questions of ownership. The second dimension concerns the tracking of the intensity of the pain or even, perhaps, its qualitative aspect. It is no secret that experiences of pains located in one's own body usually have an intensity, and also perhaps a quality, which differs from those experienced in other bodies. Those aspects can also be used to decide questions of ownership, although it takes training, attention to one's sensations, and sometimes reflection, to become competent in determining the right verdict.

The proposal is thus the following. To experience a sensation is to perceive a property F. At the explicit level, this is (most of) what there is to the perception of a sensation, and this satisfies partly the transparency condition. Special attention placed upon the experience that reveals this F to me brings to the fore elements which were implicit in my perception, such as its localisation, its intensity and special quality, and the contingency or non-contingency of its instantiation in a specific case. Focusing on these different dimensions of my perception will help me decide questions of ownership.

III.4. Vehicle vs. saliency

Exploitation of the distinction between the implicit and the explicit is vacuous until explained. The question is how talk of '*special attention* on the *explicit* experience that reveals the *implicit* dimensions of the perception' should be understood. This schema, as it is, seems too rigid to account for the 'smoothness' of how, in practice, perception works. Appealing to Scheler's and Husserl's distinction between the *sensory level* of experience and the *phenomenological level* of experience, as I have started to do, is a first step in the right direction as far as understanding how the 'smoothness' in question should be conceived. Understanding their distinction is also a step towards a more charitable interpretation of their respective accounts in the light of our present discussion. According to Scheler, confusion between these two levels is the mistake of the Cartesian. Sensory experience allows access to "bodily states,

especially their organic sensations, and the sensory feelings attached thereto".[52] These, we are told, account for "the special separateness among men", because, of course, they cannot be perceived directly in others. We all have our own sensations and those are "wholly confined to the body of the individual concerned". *Internal intuition,* however, apprehends not *sensations* but the *mental*. "An identical sorrow might be keenly felt, but never an identical sensation of pain, for here there are always two separate sensations" (p.255). Certain conditions have to obtain before the experience of others can be presented to internal intuition, conditions that "certainly include the ontological condition that my body should be subject to effects whose causes are located in, or proceed from, the other's body" (p.249). 'Special attention' paid to these conditions allows for the previously mysterious way in which de-animation and objective attribution of experience works. Although somewhat confusing, these few remarks by Scheler might be interpreted in the light of the proposal made in this chapter. This is equally true of Husserl's insistence that the world is ordinarily *apperceived*, i.e. the objects of our experience, although apprehended only from one side at a time at the sensory level, are given as *wholes* at the phenomenological level. In my terminology, this is to say that in ordinary cases of perception of other people's experiences, the fact that this experience belongs to someone else is not *salient*, unless or until special attention to the *vehicle* of my perception reveals it to me.

How precisely the interaction between these two levels works is a complicated question that is essentially empirical. However, it is certainly possible to make a few general remarks. Experience in general, we said, tracks what and where changes occur in the environment. Most of this information is not provided by focusing on the sensations our body goes through – the *vehicle* of the experience – but just by being aware of how the world is presented to us *via* sensations, the *saliency* level of experience. Sometimes, however, because information we are gathering in this way clashes with what we already know, or because we are interested in some aspect or other of the way our perceptual systems tracks changes in the world, we focus on the experiences that reveal these changes to us. What is important to understand, however, is that this

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[52] Scheler (1913–16 [trans., 1954, p. 255]).

interest or care in our tracking devices is not an unhealthy philosopher's preoccupation with epistemological questions, but an integral part of a child's growing up and learning about how and when her perceptual systems are reliable information gatherers. The idea here is that the very fact that we keep an eye on the ways the sensory vehicles track and are trained to read into specific aspects of this tracking is likely to alter what will become *salient* for us in the environment. The infant used to see the ball vanishing when it disappeared behind the wall, whereas now the ball appears to her as being behind the wall. The infant used to feel experiences without owners, now those experiences appear to her as belonging to people. Having said that, it should be made clear first, that what training can achieve insofar as our perceptual systems are concerned is very little, or, in other words, severely constrained by what those perceptual systems are and how they work. Most changes during the child's development of the phenomenological level of experience will be explained by normal maturation of the brain, rather than training. But the upshot is, nevertheless, one in which some discriminatory capacities – being sensitive to many different shades of whiteness of the snow, for example – can become second nature by training. When the training is 'over' and the discriminatory capacities are in place, the need for concentrating on the *vehicle* rather than what it makes *salient* will, in part, disappear. Second, it has to be emphasised that learning to make efficient use of our perceptual system is not a case of adjusting or correcting what the focus on our sensory vehicles would tell us of the world. For example, no attention paid to my sensations will tell me when my head, as opposed to a car, moves when a car is going from right to left in my visual field.

I do not claim that these scattered comments provide more than the beginning of an explanation of the nature of the interaction between experience (*vehicle*) and the way experience reveals the world as being (the *salient*). What it does, however, is indicate a route for understanding what is meant by the distinction between the implicit and the explicit in perception, as well as showing that any explanation of the interaction in question will be rather

complex, involving quite a bit of empirical testing, some of which, of course, has already been done.[53]

IV. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have suggested a way of understanding creatures' perception of other creature's experiences, like pains, which satisfy, I claim, two intuitions that we have about such perceptions in the ordinary case. First, that they are transparent in the sense that it is not more difficult to be aware of them in others than it is to be aware of them in oneself, and second, that they must be perceived as owned by someone other than oneself if such perceptions are to count as perceptions. In the previous chapter, we considered two proposals, one by Scheler and one by Husserl, both of which failed to satisfy both intuitions at the same time. In the present chapter, we have seen that both proposals seem to satisfy one intuition at the expense of the other. We have also seen however, that this reading of both proposals was forced on us only if we did not take into account the significant distinction that they both make between what I called the *vehicle* level of experience and what is *salient* in experience. At the latter level, I have argued, with the help of Gibson and Bermúdez, that perception is fully integrated, one aspect of integration being, as far as the perception of other people's experiences is concerned, that experiences do not present themselves to creatures going through them as being more first personal than third personal. What is *salient* when one has pain is simply located pain, not *my* located pain, not *your* located pain, and not *her* located pain, etc. This is why we have

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[53] It is difficult not to interpret the following piece of recent empirical research – also mentioned by Dokic (forthcoming) and Hutto (forthcoming, 2001) – as having no bearing on, or even as providing evidence for, the view on the transparency advocated for here. Hutchison *et al.* (1999) have recently discovered cortical neurons that respond to painful stimuli in humans. One of these neurons is activated by pinpricks applied to the subject's hand, and also responds to pinpricks being applied to someone else's hand. These neurons can be compared to the so-called 'mirror neurons' for action discovered by Rizzolatti *at al.* (1996) in macaque monkeys. The latter has provided evidence that observing someone else's action and performing the same action are underpinned by the same sub-personal mechanisms. These neurons, which are situated in the pre-motor cortex of the monkey, fire equally when the monkey actually performs an action, as when he merely watches another monkey performing the same action. Similar neurons are also thought to exist in human beings. It is, of course, a delicate question whether and in what ways these mechanisms ground the transparency of bodily experience at the phenomenological level, but it is impossible not to see a parallel between these findings and the view that a subject's perception of other people's experiences is integrative in the sense advocated here.

transparency, i.e. this is why there is no more difficulty involved in being aware of one's own pain than there is in being aware of someone else's pain. This same perception of pain, however, might –and more often than not will – reveal the owner of the pain when focusing, paying special attention to, or reflecting on what reveals the pain, the *vehicle* of the experience. Paying attention to or reflecting on its localisation, its intensity and special quality, and the contingency or non-contingency of its instantiation in a specific case will reveal who owns it. It is thus at the *vehicle* level that the ownership intuition is met.

In the next two chapters, I explore the possibility of extending this line of thought concerning pains, as I pursued it in the present chapter, to the case of emotions. Might other people's emotions, as in the case of pains, be transparent? The application of the argument pursued in the present chapter is far from straightforward, given that emotions, as opposed to sensations, have objects that go far beyond bodily properties.

CHAPTER 3: EMOTION AND CONTENT

I. Introduction

It is now widely acknowledged that emotions have contents. I argue that this is only true given a correct understanding of the notion of content. This chapter has, thus, a negative and a positive part. First, I attempt to show that the kind of content philosophers generally believe emotions have is ill suited to account for the nature of our basic emotions. Second, I develop a notion of content which I believe accords with our basic emotions.[54]

In more detail, here is how it should go. First, I shall argue that since any theory of the emotions has to account for the fact that animals and young infants experience emotions, a sound account of them should not construe emotions as requiring cognitive capacities, i.e. types of contents that the latter creatures are not likely to be able to acquire or manifest. In particular, I argue that most contemporary cognitive theories of the emotions fail because the kind of content they believe emotions to have, is too sophisticated for animals and infants to have. Rather than wholly discarding these cognitive theories of the emotions, however, I argue that their relevance and application concerns only one part of that which we think of as belonging to the emotions. This part, I believe, is that aspect of emotional life that is exclusively human. Those exclusively human

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[54] There are interesting inventories in the biological literature on emotions of the basic or primitive ones. For example, Maclean, (1975), has isolated six fundamental emotions, "desire", "anger", "fear", "sorrow", "joy" and "affection", which are, according to him, related to six fundamental behavioural activities: searching, aggression, protection, dejection, gratulant, and caressive (p.13). Panskeep's (1982), four criteria (p. 411) for emotions generate only four basic ones: "expectancy", "rage", "fear" and "panic"(p. 414). Although often illuminating, the number of different lists of our primitive emotions suggest that they are more revealing of the aspects of the emotions the author is interested when selecting his criteria, than of any natural kinds of emotions that the scientist is supposed to discover. I use the term basic emotion as an intuitive umbrella term for all those emotional phenomena that I will cash out later in this chapter under the label *emotional valuation*. Which emotions fall under this category is very much dependent on how specific emotions are conceived. My own opinion is that conceptual analysis of the emotions generally reveals that they do not form unified types, and decisions as to whether an emotion is basic or not will always have to be decided in context.

emotions, I contrast with basic emotions, which are such that human adults *as well as human infants and animals* are capable of having. In a second stage, I argue that this dichotomy is encouraged by considering the phenomenon of irrational emotions. In a third stage, I give my own cognitive account of those basic emotions that are not covered by classical cognitive accounts of them. This chapter is first and foremost concerned with the notion of content, and only secondly concerned with the emotions, the nature of which I explore more fully in the next chapter.

II. Layers of content: basic emotion as perception

Let us say that (1) animals and young children have emotions. Let us say too that (2) to have emotions, a creature has to have at least some beliefs. Now, if we add that (3) to have a belief a creature needs to master the concept of truth, then we face a problem. For, if, as is likely, (4) animals and young children do not master the concept of truth, then one of these claims has to go.

Most of us would wish to resist the third claim, or so the literature suggests. I shall not. I proceed in the following way. First, I expose the rationale for each of these four claims, I assess their plausibility, and then discuss the issue as to which of them should be given up, if any. Rather than rejecting (3), which is what most philosophers do, I argue that they may all be correct, including (3), but that (3) depends on an interpretation of (2) which is not compulsory. That is, I will defend the idea that there are at least two concepts of beliefs, one of which does not entail the mastery of the concept of truth. The latter concept of belief is fit to figure in an account of our basic emotions, or so I shall argue.

II.1. Angry animals and happy children: assessing claim (1)

It is difficult to defend the idea that animals and young children have emotions,[55] for it is far from clear that the concept of emotion is not, in fact, a theoretical term such that the alleged claim we set ourselves to defend is, in fact, derivative from our preferred theory of the emotions. This worry is misplaced,

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[55] Unless otherwise stated, I use the term 'emotion' to mean 'occurrent emotion'.

however. Whatever our preferred theory of the emotion is, everyone has to accept that, central to the idea of a creature having emotions as well as pivotal in our practice of ascribing them, we find the following two elements: first, it feels a certain way to experience an emotion, and second, emotions are, in general, about something, i.e. they are intentional states.[56] English syntax exhibits this latter feature in attribution of emotions by means of the following devices. The verb that denotes the emotion is either followed by the relative pronoun "that" in turn followed by an embedded proposition, or the verb is simply followed by an "of", "towards", "about", etc., in turn followed by a noun phrase. Thus, Ali is afraid *that* the dog will bite her, or Ali is afraid *of* the dog. In both cases, Ali's fear is about something.[57] Now, whereas it is not clear that we want to report emotions of animals and young infants by means of ascriptions of propositional attitudes, especially when the embedded proposition presupposes a complex conceptual repertoire – we might hesitate to say, for example, that the dog is afraid that its master will not come until next week – we definitely want to report their emotions by means of emotional verbs followed by a preposition and noun phrase. Dogs can be afraid *of* the thunder, aggressive *towards* a stranger, excited *about* their food, etc.[58]

As far as I can see, there are only two reasons we might bring forward to deny the fact that animals and young infants have emotions. First, we might

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[56] Of course, neither of these two conditions is either necessary or sufficient for emotion, whether taken in isolation or taken together. This does not bother me as I have no intention of offering any such characterisation, and I do not believe this to be possible. The argument to follow is, thus, clearly non–deductive. To say that it consists of an 'inference to the best explanation' is perhaps the best way to characterise it.

[57] Cf. e.g. Gordon (1974), on the topic of the 'aboutness' of the emotions.

[58] Searle (1983, Chap. 2) and others once believed they had an argument in favour of the claim that animals are not endowed with intentional contentful states just because these latter types of reports, as opposed to reports followed by an embedded proposition, form extensional contexts. The idea was that, (1) given that the mark of Intentionality is intensionality, (2) given that we are disinclined to report animal mental activities using sentences with embedded propositions, then animals could not be credited with mental states having Intentionality. The problem with this argument is twofold. First, though we are disinclined to report animal mental states using 'that-clauses" for complex propositions, we might wish to do so with simple ones – "the dog believes that there is a mouse in the cupboard". Secondly, intensionality might not be the only mark of Intentionality. Do we really want to deny that the dog's fear is about something that he apprehends in a certain way, or under a certain mode of presentation, perceptual perhaps? The fact that the way in which we report his fear allow for substitution might only reflect something about our linguistic practice, not something about the Intentional character of the mental state ascribed. More on this in section III of the present chapter.

define emotions in a way such that logically the creatures in question will not be capable of having them. If, for example, it is believed, for whatever reason, that only a creature capable of introspection or self–reflexivity is dignified enough to have emotions, then, of course, animals and young infants will not have them. This is always a possible worry someone might have about my claim, and I suppose the worry in question can only be assessed against the merits of the account of the emotions that prompted it in the first place. The objector might have a lot to lose by giving up his favourite account of the emotions which excludes some creatures from having them, but I will ask him to follow me, to assess the merits of my account, and to become fully acquainted with it before he makes his choice. More seriously, one might object that if a stimulus–response model of animal or young infant emotional responses is available, then there is absolutely no reason why we should view their emotions as being 'about' anything. The complaint here is that if the emotional behaviour of the creatures in question can be explained in non–intentional terms, then a simple principle of theoretical economy should prompt us to refrain from positing entities, i.e. contents, which are notoriously difficult to handle. This, I believe, is a legitimate worry. The main premise, however, is false, and the behaviour of animals and infants, as ordinary usage does suggest, cannot forgo explanations in intentional terms. As will be argued more fully below, the emotional responses of the creatures in question cannot – no more than it can with human adults – be plotted in a law-like manner, and thus a stimulus response model for their behaviour is forever unavailable.

Now, for one who believes that ordinary usage of emotional terms has some bearing on the discussion – and I will argue that it has – then whatever way we want to theorise about the emotions, we are at this stage encouraged in thinking that animals and young children have them.

II.2. Do I need to master the concept of truth to have beliefs? Assessing claim (3)

To understand our third claim, it is useful to understand where it comes from. *Interpretationism* is a philosophical tradition, rather then a specific claim, of

which Davidson and Dennett are the leading proponents.[59] As I will use the term, Interpretationism designates, first of all, a method about the way in which mental phenomena at large should be approached. Its main recommendation is that anyone who is interested in understanding the mental should explore the very ordinary ways in which we ascribe psychological properties in the process of making sense of others and ourselves. The method urges that we should ask ourselves what we mean and what conditions obtain when we attribute mental predicates to explain and foresee the behaviour of various creatures around us.[60] The specific argument I am going to discuss, loosely based on an argument by Davidson,[61] is only one tiny element in the enormous literature that the interpretationist tradition has produced. Davidson's specific argument has been extensively discussed in the literature, and the general consensus is that it has been discarded for good, although weaker versions are still very much held to be sound.[62] As will become apparent, I disagree with Davidson's general picture of the mind – i.e. that cognition should be understood in the framework of a belief-desire psychology – although I will defend his characterisation of the propositional attitudes.

The argument, to the effect that a creature that does not possess the concept of truth would not have beliefs at all, is quite simple. Before presenting it, we should be cautious of the following point. Beliefs have at least two components: the attitude of believing something and the propositional content which is believed. A consequence of this distinction is that if the argument is successful, it will not follow that creatures without the concept of belief, *de facto*, will not have cognitive states with propositional structure. Unless it can be shown that only beliefs and similar attitudes have propositional structure – which is unlikely – then the argument concerns only the attitudinal element of

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[59] Davidson and Dennett, although not its only representatives, are certainly the main reference points in the literature about the *Interpretationist* approach to the mental. See, in particular, Davidson (1974a, 1974c, 1975) and Dennett (1987). For a thorough examination of the *Interpretationist* tradition, see the excellent Child (1994, esp. Chap 1).

[60] Davidson (1975, p.158).

[61] See in particular Davidson (1975, p.170; 1982, p.480).

[62] See Child (1994) for an exhaustive review of possible criticism against Davidson's Interpretationism, and how weaker versions can nevertheless be sustained.

the concept of belief. Appeal to this distinction will be made later against the Davidsonian approach.

The argument's structure is the following. To have beliefs one must have the concept of objective truth; young infants and animals do not have the concept of objective truth, therefore, they do not have beliefs. The premise, which should be of concern to us, is the idea that to have a belief one has to have the concept of objective truth. According to an appealing and widespread understanding of what it is to believe something, we have the idea that it amounts to *holding a proposition true*. If I believe that African stamps are nicer then Asian ones, then I hold the proposition that *African stamps are nicer then Asian ones* true. Now, it is tempting to say that it does not make sense to ascribe this belief to someone who would not understand what it would take for the belief to be false. More accurately, what beliefs have in addition to mere representations is that the features that the representation represents the world as having are believed by the one who possesses the representation that they represent the world correctly, and that they might represent it incorrectly. Basically, this requires that the representing creature understands the difference between how the world is represented to him by its representation and how the world really is, or in simpler words, the creature has to understand the difference between appearance and reality.[63] If this is the case, then this is too much to ask from non-human animals and young children, and we should conclude that they do not have beliefs.

The argument seems to me to be perfectly valid if it is, indeed, the case that believing *p* is a case of holding *p* true. One problem, however, is that it is not at all obvious that this is the only way, or even the natural way, of thinking about beliefs. To put it in a way that highlights the problematic nature of the claim: Is it true that to believe something is to believe that a particular representation of ours represents the world (in) the way the world really is? Here is a possible objection to this line of thought. After all, when, for example,

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[63] A more cautious way of putting the point is by insisting that what a believer has to understand is what we can call, after Luntley (1988, Chap. 1), *The Principle of Independence* constitutive of the concept of truth. To understand that a proposition is true/false, or that a representation is correct/incorrect, requires at least the understanding that what makes it true/false or correct/incorrect must be independent from the proposition or the representation it makes true/false or correct/incorrect.

Ali says of her dog that it believes that there is a mouse in the cupboard, it is not clear that she means that the dog believes its representation to represent correctly this state of affairs. What this means is that one might accept the suggested analysis according to which one cannot 'hold a proposition true' without mastering the concept of truth, but reject the analysis according to which 'believing' is a case of 'holding a proposition true'.

This is possibly all the more problematic for a Davidsonian as she explicitly attempts to capture our everyday concept of belief, not some by-product of some neural phenomenon described by some neurologist or cognitivist. The Davidsonian is interested in beliefs as we ascribe them to creatures around us using everyday folk-psychology – the gist of Interpretationism. A Davidsonian approach to the mental is clearly not directed at the sub-personal level of mental activity, which can and is often conceived of on the analogy of beliefs. Now, if it turns out that we have to discount some of our everyday belief attributions, for example those we use to explain the whereabouts of our pets, it is the Davidsonian's task to tell us why this is the case.

The following line of response is open to the Davidsonian, however. It is common enough that we use the same words to express somewhat slightly different ideas. Even if we are inclined to ascribe beliefs to non-human animals and young infants, we might be perfectly ready on reflection to concede that there is a fundamental distinction between the way competent adults believe things and the way non-human animals and young infants 'believe'. The Davidsonian might argue that most people would be ready to admit that ascribing beliefs to animals and young infants is improper or metaphorical.[64]

My opinion on this move is that, ultimately, the debate between the Davidsonian and his opponent will continue to depend on intuitions about the concept of belief, and no resolution is likely to carry much conviction. And

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[64]If our interpretation of Davidson is correct, then we can see that there is a significant difference between him and philosophers like Ryle (1949) and especially Dennett (1981, 1987). While the three of them insist on the primacy of the third person point of view for the understanding of the propositional attitudes, Dennett's "intentional stance" is much more liberal than anything Davidson proposes. As long as attribution of propositional attitudes help us to make sense of the behaviour of systems around us – for example attributing to one's toaster that it wants to bother us – Dennett appears to believe that it is fine (e.g. Dennett, 1981, p. 67). For a Davidsonian, however, these are only ways of talking.

there is a good reason for this: both the Davidsonian and her detractor capture intuitions about our everyday use of the concept of belief, but because this use is very loose and embraces different phenomena, they end up with incompatible accounts of beliefs. I will argue later in this chapter that there are at least two concepts of beliefs, one of which is captured by the Davidsonian analysis of it. In the meantime, I propose to keep the Davidsonian characterisation of belief as he construes it, while emphasising that it does not commit me to the much stronger Davidsonian claim according to which cognition starts with belief so understood.

Continuing the dialectics of this chapter, we must now present and assess the claim of the cognitivist about emotions, according to whom having emotions necessarily requires having beliefs. It is already clear, however, that if the cognitivist accepts the Davidsonian line on belief, she will have to deny that children and animals have emotions. Alternatively, she can reject the Davidsonian line on belief, and propose a deflated account of them such that animals and young infants can have them. Another possibility consists of accepting the Davidsonian line on belief, but deny that it is all that there is to say about it. This would consist in exploiting the idea that ordinary ascription of beliefs is ambiguous between at least two conceptions of belief. It is the latter option which, orthogonal to the debate between the Davidsonian and his detractor, is the one I will pursue in the second half of the chapter.

II.3. The Cognitive view of the emotions: the indispensability of beliefs: assessing claim (2)

First, we should clarify what we mean by a cognitivist view of the emotions. By doing this, we will also introduce terminology and distinctions that will prove useful further along in our discussion. The cognitive conception of emotions can be viewed as an answer to the worries expressed against the phenomenalist conception of emotions. The exposition that follows is intended ultimately as a presentation of the cognitive view of the emotions and not as a rebuttal of the phenomenal view, as the conception of our basic emotions which I shall defend in the next chapter shares much with it. I do not, therefore, consider all the replies that the phenomenalist might want to give to his cognitivist detractor,

although the reader will easily figure out possible lines of responses in the light of the conception of sensations advanced in the first, and especially the second chapter.[65]

The friend of a phenomenalist conception of emotions will typically hold the following familiar views: what is distinctive about emotions is that they have a special feel, and what distinguishes different emotions is that they feel different.[66] More specifically, we firstly have a metaphysical claim: different emotions are different qualitative experiences or different groups of sensations; secondly, we have a semantic claim: the meaning of emotion terms is given by these qualitative experiences or collection of sensations; and finally, we have an epistemic claim: emotions are accessed *via* these experiences.

Objections to the phenomenalist conception are familiar as well. It is important, though, to keep in mind what follows, for in producing objections to the phenomenalist conception, we shall specify at the same time important constraints to which any theory of the emotions shall have to conform.

(1) A theory of the emotions should, in principle, be capable of providing, if not a principle of individuation, at least reasons for distinguishing as we do among the different emotions. The phenomenalist suggests that the particular phenomenology of the particular emotions can do just that. But can it really? Can joy, contentment and happiness really be distinguished on the basis of how they feel? Can terror and horror be distinguished on the basis of how they feel? In the latter case, I am tempted to say that terror feels "stronger" than horror. But is this satisfactory? The intuition lies, rather, in the thought that what distinguishes them does not lie in the way they feel. Similarly, couldn't we think of emotions without any particular feel? And what is the phenomenology of

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[65] The exposition that follows has greatly benefited from Tappolet's (2000, Chap. 5) illuminating taxonomy of the main options in the theory of the emotions.

[66] It is possible, in fact, to distinguish between two different versions of the phenomenalist conception: the 'psychic' conception and the 'bodily' conception. An extreme version of the first conception would endorse the idea that a pure soul could have emotions; it thus stresses the psychic or phenomenological aspect of the experience of the emotion; cf. Leighton (1984) for a contemporary version of this view. An extreme version of the second conception would insist that emotions are, in fact, nothing but the bodily changes felt whilst experiencing the emotions; cf. James 1890, p.499-50. More recently, Tye (1995) argues that differences in the felt quality of an emotion arise because of differences in the bodily states that are sensorily represented. This could be viewed as an intermediary view between Leighton and James if it were not for the fact

regret? (2) Emotions can be said to be *appropriate* or *inappropriate*. It is perhaps appropriate to feel adoration in the presence of Socrates, but it is inappropriate to feel lust in front of my old goat. It is appropriate to feel repulsed at a cutting-up-babies party, but it is inappropriate to feel happy at the same occasion. Evaluating emotions in terms of their appropriateness is something we do, and therefore something the theory has to incorporate.[67] Unfortunately, it might be argued that the phenomenalist conception will not be able to satisfy this constraint. It is not immediately clear what it means for a given qualitative experience to be (in)appropriate. We do not say about a physical pain that it is or is not appropriate, and if we say so, we either mean that the person does not really have a physical pain, or that he has a very weak resistance to physical pain. But this would be a metaphorical use of the word 'appropriate', certainly nothing similar to what we mean when we say that a case of fear is inappropriate. (3) Emotions are intentional states. If I am furious at Ali, my fury is *directed* towards Ali; if I am worried that Ali has been disloyal to me, my worry is *about* the fact that she might have been disloyal to me. Emotions have objects, are directed toward objects. Can we say the same about the phenomenalist's emotions? Does it make sense to say that a qualitative feel, a sensation, has an object? The answer seems to be negative. Shivers and tickles do not seem *prima facie* to be directed towards anything. (4) We often have emotions about emotions. I can be afraid of my own fear, be amused by it, or ashamed of it. We are, it seems, capable of second-order emotions. But are we capable of second order sensations? Can a tickle, a physical pain, a shiver be about a tickle, a physical pain, or a shiver?[68] (5) Qualitative experiences are notoriously things that are difficult to talk about in a philosophically sound manner. The literature recommending definitive abandonment of qualitative experience (*qualia*) talk is fantastically abundant.[69] Defending phenomenalism about emotions would require showing that this recommendation is misplaced.

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that sensations are, according to Tye, and indeed according to the view defended in this thesis, representational states (See Chap 2, sec. III.1 above).

[67] See e.g. Bedford (1957) and Pitcher (1965) for early formulations of this requirement.

[68] See e.g. Kenny (1963, 1989, esp. Chap. 4).

The view that emotions should be conceived solely in terms of distinctive sensations has been seen, in the light of these various objections, as discarded for good.[70] This is true, however, only if the phenomenalist insists on construing sensations as non-intentional states. As argued and illustrated in the first chapter, there are good reasons to believe that sensations are intentional states. If that is so, then many features of emotions – as conceived of by the phenomenalist – might be retained without falling prey to the objections just exposed. This latter move I intend to make in the second part of this chapter.

But, before we do that, we should introduce the family of positions about the emotions that I have called the *cognitive view of emotions*. Psychologists and philosophers have both emphasised the fact that we do not have emotions in a void. To use a neutral term, we can say that emotions have bases. I presently fear Ali on the basis of my perception of her and on the basis of my belief that she is going to hit me. Bases come in many formats: beliefs, desires, memories, perceptions, imaginings, etc. Now the question is the following: in what sense are these base-states involved in the emotions?

The gist of the cognitive view on emotions is very simple. It says that the cognitive bases involved in an emotion belong to that emotion in an essential way, whether or not they are also causally responsible for the occurrence of the emotion. The cognitive bases of the emotions are, thus, necessary ingredients of them. This is the main claim of the cognitive view, but it is also the only one upon which all its advocates agree. It would be a tedious, and most probably fruitless, task to try and produce a taxonomy of these different positions, but it is interesting to list the fundamental distinctions upon which different theoretical alternatives can be constructed. The different trends of the cognitive view can be devised in two big families corresponding to the importance given to the role of conative states (desires, wants, etc.) in the emotions, from a lot of importance to no importance at all. Another division concerns the importance given to phenomenology as an extra element to the cognitive ingredient. Yet another line of demarcation: some claim that emotions necessarily involve states containing evaluative concepts, others deny it. A further distinction, which will

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[69] See e.g. Dennett (1988, 1991).

[70] But see footnote 66 above.

be of direct interest to us shortly with regard to the Davidsonian line of argument presented above, concerns the way one should conceive of the attitudes that build up a cognitive state. One might claim that the attitudinal states involved in emotions are committing their holders to the truth of the propositions towards which they have these attitudes, as beliefs do according to Davidson. But others might deny that, and claim that having an emotion simply involves representation(s) which is (are) (in)correct about their (its) subject matter.

These few distinctions alone generate quite a lot of different positions and more relevant distinctions could be added. Most of these distinctions are, nevertheless, not pertinent to the present discussion. I will therefore speak of the cognitive view in general, mentioning here and there particular trends, relegating attribution of authorship to footnotes.

As mentioned earlier, the cognitive view has two big trends. On the one hand, what we could call, after Tappolet,[71] the *conative view* of the emotions, has it that emotions are nothing but sets of beliefs and desires. On the other hand, what we could call the *standard view* has it that having a particular emotion involves having a cognitive state containing propositions made up by at least one evaluative concept. According to the standard view, the motivational aspect of the emotion is exhausted by the presence in the emotion of an evaluation. There is no need, therefore, to posit any extra desire to explain the motivational force of the emotion by contrast with what the conative view recommends.

According to the conative view, to say that Ali fears the dog, for example, is to say that she believes that the dog is going to bite her, together with the desire that the dog will not bite her. It is, indeed, striking that most emotions can be analysed just in terms of beliefs and desires.[72] If I fear Ali on a particular occasion, it might be because I believe she is going to humiliate me, and I desire not to be humiliated. If regret that I have not met Ali, it is because I believe I have not seen her, and I wish I had seen her. Some emotions might be less straightforwardly analysable in terms of beliefs and desires, but could be

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[71] Tappolet (2000, p. 139).

[72] See e.g. Marks (1982, p. 227).

managed nevertheless. If I hate Ali, it can be because I believe that she wronged me in some way, together with a desire to be treated with respect. Examples can be multiplied.[73]

According to the standard view, fearing Ali on a particular occasion involves, for example, believing or judging that she is a *dangerous*. Being proud of my drawing involves some judgement or belief as to the aesthetic properties of my work. As can be expected, proponents of the standard view disagree on how exactly the relation between the evaluative belief or judgement on the one hand, and the emotion on the other hand, should be understood; they also disagree on whether and how more ingredients should be added to the basic account. One possibility is that the fear of Ali is just the judgement about the dangerousness of Ali[74]; another possibility is that it is this judgement, but one that has a special feel to it.[75] Another possibility would be that the judgement is just an ingredient of the emotion, and that most of the time, it will be accompanied by something else: bodily changes.[76] Someone else might argue that the judgement is both a cause and a necessary condition for the emotion to be had.[77]

We should first notice that both these trends of the cognitive view of the emotions satisfy the constraints formulated earlier, when I discussed the

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[73] The main problem with this view, though, is the existence of too many counter-examples. Many emotions do not seem to require any desires. Classic instances of this kind are amusement and surprise. It is bluntly wrong to analyse my surprise to see you in town in terms of my belief that you were away, and the desire that you would have stayed away. The same considerations apply to amusement. The only serious move open to the friend of the *conative* view is to deny that amusement and surprise are emotions. But this is crude. Any account of the emotions had better accommodate our intuitions about what clearly belongs to the emotions, rather than force the intuitions to accommodate the account. Examples of emotions that do not seem to involve desires can be multiplied. What are the desires supposed to accompany pride or shame? Finally, it is not clear how happy we should be about the fact that considerations about phenomenology or feelings have been put out of the way. It is, after all, one of our stronger intuitions about the emotions that they feel a certain way, and perhaps difficulty in analysing feelings is not a good enough reason for ignoring them. For a philosopher who has developed a quite sophisticated version of this view of the emotions and takes into account this last point, see Green (1992, p. 87).

[74] Both Solomon (1976, pp. 185-87) and Nussbaum (1994) believe that emotions are simply evaluative judgements; Thalberg, (1977, p.34) claims that the evaluative belief is the cause of the emotion.

[75] Cf. Greenspan (1988, p. 4).

[76] Cf. Lyons (1980, p. 207).

[77] Cf. Davidson (1976, p. 288-89).

objections to the phenomenalist conception of the emotions. Especially those concerning, respectively, the necessity of accounting for the possibility of assessing the emotions in terms of (in)appropriateness, and the necessity of accounting for the fact that emotions have intentional objects. If the putative beliefs and desires sets or the evaluative judgement *are* the emotions, then we have no problem in accounting for the fact that they have satisfaction conditions, as well as the fact that they are intentional states. Indeed, these two features are generally thought to be among the defining features of the propositional attitudes. It is in its capacity to meet these latter constraints that the attractiveness of the view resides.

In this and more especially in the next chapter, I develop my own standard view which is at least adequate to explain our basic emotions. That is a view that takes evaluative properties as figuring centrally in the content of the emotions, and by this same token, accounts for their motivational force. It is a view, too, that accords with the basic intuitions of the phenomenalist and her emphasis on the importance of the way emotions feel.[78] Before I expound this view, however, let me pause and look at where we are in the argument. If the cognitive view of the emotion is correct, whether in its standard form or its conative one, then emotions require propositional attitudes. Now, if having beliefs is as demanding as the Davidsonian suggests, then we have to conclude that young children and animals not only lack beliefs, but lack emotions as well. The options are as they were earlier. The cognitivist can reject the Davidsonian analysis of belief and propose something weaker instead, which would accommodate animals and young children having emotions and beliefs. A second option would consist simply of biting the bullet and denying that animals and young children have emotions, and attempting to characterise their affective responses differently. I have already explained why I believe this route to be misguided. A third option, which is the one I will pursue, is to accept the Davidsonian characterisation of belief, but argue that ordinary ascriptions of

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[78] My view of the emotions, I suppose, approximate this of Roberts (1988, 1996) who conceives of emotion in terms of *concern based construal* and possibly this of Greenspan (1988) who conceives of them as "comfort of discomfort directed towards evaluative propositions" (p. 14). I feel in tune with their concern to explain animal emotion, as well as the non–intellectualist manner in which they account for our sensitivity to the evaluative.

them are not limited to that concept as characterised by the Davidsonian. This consists of devising a cognitive account such that it remains distinctively cognitive, but one that does not require competences that animals and young infants are not likely to have.

Although the argument so far does not force us into the option just taken, I will now give another motivation for adopting it, linked to the existence of irrational emotions.[79] The phenomenon of irrational emotions strongly encourages the thought that emotions conceived of on the model of the propositional attitudes are only part of the story that can be told on the emotions – one that should stay away from the demands of the Davidsonian line on belief, while remaining distinctively cognitive.

II.4. Irrational emotions

Montaigne tells the story of a philosopher who has a nasty adventure.[80] Put inside a cage and hung from a large and secure steel chain at the summit of a cathedral, the unfortunate thinker was left to meditate for a few days about his destiny. When brought down and asked if he was afraid, the story continues, the philosopher said that he was terrified all along. When asked if he thought he was in any danger, he answered that he believed he was not, but that he found no comfort in this thought.

There is no need to be suspended at the top of a cathedral to be familiar with the kind of ambivalent states which this philosopher went through. We can call this kind of state an irrational emotion, given that the rational assessment involved in the context of the emotion seems to fit very badly with the emotion. Why would I be afraid if I do not believe that I am in danger, that I am not going to be humiliated, that I am not going to fail my exam, that she is going to love me whatever happens, and whatever else. Apart for a few exceptional (boring?) people, experience of gaps between rational assessment of a situation and the emotions we have is the common lot. It is, I presume, the kind of

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[79] It is Hursthouse (1991) who has made popular in the philosophical literature on the emotions the topic of irrational emotions and the problems it raises for cognitive accounts of them. She speaks of *arational* emotions rather than *irrational* ones, but this distinction will not concern me here.

[80] Montaigne (1588), *Livre II*, Chap. 12.

phenomenon that has been used for the long-standing and very popular conception of the existence of a gap between reason and passion; the kind of phenomenon that psychoanalysis has been based upon, and that any theory of the emotions has to explain. Whereas the theories inspired by the two latter views are not very popular anymore, the modern cognitive conception of the emotions that we have presented might be thought to be in an even worse position. At first blush, it would be incongruous to suggest that the beliefs of our hero philosopher are either the cause or an essential part, or both of these, of his fear. On the contrary, it seems as though his beliefs are notably not part of his emotion. And it is important to emphasise that what I called irrational emotion, as well as phobic emotions, are not strange or extreme cases. Disgust, love, hate, rage, jealousy or shame often take place despite us having no beliefs or making no judgements as to, respectively, the disgusting, loveable, hateable, enraging, enviable, or shameful character of what appear to bring about these emotions. I would go further and say that we very often believe that these properties are not instantiated at all. It is therefore essential that the theory will accommodate this important phenomenon.

I see at least three options for the cognitivist. Firstly, he could try to argue that the fear our philosopher experiences is not really fear, but only some bunch of sensations or perhaps some physiological change occurring in him as the result of a purely causal process, due perhaps to the positioning of his body in being removed from the ground. But it is difficult to see the rationale for this claim, apart from the fact that it fits the cognitivist's theory better. On this picture, the cognitivist will have to postulate this *ad hoc* clause to his theory for the sole purpose of accommodating irrational emotions, and this seems to me not promising as a way of distinguishing what is an emotion from what is not. Indeed, why on earth should we deny that the hero philosopher has an emotion if he agrees and we agree to say that he is frightened? The second option is more promising. It consists of saying that our hero philosopher has two contradicting beliefs with respect to the danger of the situation in which he finds himself, which explains why he is in fear. Perhaps the best way to construct this hypothesis is to view the mind as a compartmentalised entity with not much communication between the compartments, and the inhabitants of these separate

compartments bearing differently on the emotional life of the subject, depending perhaps on how hidden or how deep the compartment is in the subject mind.

The latter proposal is not so much incoherent as very speculative, metaphorical and vague. But it leads us to a third option, which is the one I promise to examine. This to say that, instead of talking of contradictory beliefs entertained at the same time in irrational emotions, we might speak of two different types of beliefs – which ordinary ascription of beliefs fail (not at all unhealthily) to distinguish – that are pulling in different directions. Before we investigate the nature of this second type of beliefs, it is judicious to look at a parallel phenomenon of that of irrational emotion occurring in perception.

The case of irrational emotion has, indeed, interesting parallels in perception. Some conscious sensory perceptions present us with impossible objects: for example, the sensory perceptions we have in front of some Esher figures. Although we know these objects to be impossible, we are not in a position to revise these sensory perceptions in the light of whatever belief in a principle of rationality that commands us not to consciously hold true two contradictory propositions. A more familiar example: despite the fact that I believe the lines of a Mueller-Lyer figure to be of equal lengths, I still experience them, and continue to experience them, as being of different lengths. These kind of sensory perceptions do not seem to be revisable on the basis of stronger evidence – coming either from beliefs or other sensory perceptions. To recast the point in an appealing Fodorian formulation, sensory perception seems to be *informationally encapsulated*.[81] As we shall see, the encapsulation should not be taken too literally. This being said, there is a strong case for thinking that beliefs, those resulting in us reflecting about the world, do not seem to affect the processing of the inputs stimulating our visual systems. In a word, there are strong indications that the sphere of perception might be, in many ways, autonomous from the sphere of beliefs; the whole question being, of course, in what respect they are and in what respect the are not. Before we turn to that question, we should note that something similar could be said of the case of our unfortunate philosopher who is afraid despite his best judgement as to the absence of danger in the circumstances in which he finds himself. The question

is, therefore, the following: can we pursue the analogy with perception a bit further, and possibly learn something about the content of emotions? I think we can.

There is a familiar tradition, perhaps best represented nowadays by Peacocke, Crane and Bermúdez, who have encouraged the thought that perception cannot be construed on the model of the propositional attitudes. Their key idea is that the notion of a mental state with content is not tied with that of propositional content, with all the ordinary implications that being a system with such contents bring with it. A representational system, they suggest, might be capable of entertaining content defined minimally, and ordinary episodes of perception satisfy contentfulness so minimally defined. In other words, none (or most) of the competences required for being endowed with propositional attitudes would be needed for being a perceiving creature. The upshot is that we should distinguish between perceptions on the one hand and beliefs or judgements that perception brings about on the other hand. Although ordinary ascription of perceptual belief does not clearly reflect this difference, philosophical theory might. The objective in the remainder of this chapter is to assess the possibility of exploiting the idea of minimal content in its application to emotions.

In what follows, I shall, therefore, expose in some detail an account of the emotions along the lines suggested by the authors for perception. Drawing on a common distinction in the literature between *perceptual representation* (perceptual judgement) and *perceptual presentation* (perception),[82] I will speak of *emotional evaluation* and *emotional valuation*. As a first approximation of what I have in mind, one should view the latter as emotion proper, while the former is a judgement by a creature as to what emotion it has. The main idea of the account is to say that belief desire psychology, when it tries to reduce emotions to beliefs and desires, refers only to emotional *e*valuation, not emotional *v*aluation. In the rest of this chapter, I will begin to characterise the nature of emotional *v*aluation, focusing solely on the kind of content that it involves. In the next chapter, I give a full characterisation of it; in the fifth

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[81] Cf. Fodor (1983).

[82] See e.g. Crane (1992, Introduction).

chapter I will discuss the ways in which emotional *v*aluation and emotional *e*valuation 'cooperate' in the various ways in which we engage in understanding others as emotional creatures; and in the sixth and last chapter I shall examine how they might interact to produce knowledge of the emotions, if any.

Let us recap the argument so far. We have presented reasons (and accepted them) to the effect that emotions are cognitive states with content. Emotions must be, among other things, openings to a certain kind of information in the subject's environment. We have seen that the traditional way of conceiving of content, i.e. on the model of the propositional attitudes, will not do in this case. Although, I argued, the model of the propositional attitudes does, indeed, capture an essential aspect of our dealing with the world and others, emotions cannot be just a mixture of beliefs and desires, for at least the following reasons. First, animal and young infants have emotions, but do not have propositional attitudes. Second, we are capable of irrational emotions, a phenomenon which does not seem to fit well in a purely belief desire model of the emotions. What irrational emotions suggest is that there are different levels in our emotional dealings with the world. Montaigne's philosopher seemed to be in a position of saying, without contradicting himself: "I am not afraid of dying, but I am afraid of dying". In the light of these considerations I suggested that there might be a route out of this dilemma. If we can find a coherent notion of content that does not require for having it competences that animals and young infants are incapable of having, but is still powerful enough to figure in an account of their emotional capacities, then we do have a possible model of the emotions, or at least a possible model of some basic form of emotional capacities. And more importantly, we shall have all the ingredients for understanding how this more basic form of emotional capacities might, in creatures capable of having full blooded propositional attitudes, be changed, influenced, redirected, so as to produce confused philosophers of the kind Montaigne speaks about.

It is now time to outline the general framework in which I will develop my account of the emotions in the next chapter. That is, I present in broad outline the structure of the content of our basic emotions given the necessary conditions they have to meet for satisfying a genuine cognitive account of them. I have examined the Davidsonian understanding of belief, and suggested that

ordinary ascription of them conflates belief so conceived and belief conceived in another way. It is thus my task to unravel the latter concept.

III. A revised cognitive account of the emotions

III.1. Introduction

As a manner of pursuing the option opened by the parallel made with perception, the cognitivist might simply say that he is not interested in *belief* per se, but in the fact that emotions present worldly state of affairs. What he needs, therefore, is something like the notion of *representation* or perhaps *awareness* of something or other, not the notion of belief that something is thus, or at least not the notion of belief as understood by the Davidsonian. The idea would be to construe the content of the emotions, not as something a subject has to hold true, but as something in relation to which the question of truth and falsity does not arise *for the subject*. It would be a sort of direct opening towards the world. Although, I think this move is ultimately correct, it is, unfortunately, not so straightforward. For, the very reasons for which the Davidsonian regards belief in the way he does might simply resurface at the level of representation. So, at least, Peacocke has argued:

> The representational content [of an experience] is the way the experience presents the world as being, and it can hardly present the world as being that way if the subject is incapable of appreciating what that way is.[83]

In this early book, Peacocke – who, as we will see, later changed his mind – insisted that a subject has to be capable of appreciating the way his representation represents the world as being. He takes this to mean that the subject should be capable of realising what it would take for this representation to end up not doing so correctly. Well, this is tantamount to the Davidsonian's requirement that a subject can have a belief only if he has the concept of truth.

This means that the cognitivist has to do more than simply substitute the notion of representation for that of belief. He has to provide a characterisation of representation which conforms to some basic conditions for being a state with

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[83] Peacocke (1983, p. 7).

intentional content, but which is not as demanding as the Davidson-Peacocke characterisation of it.

The best strategy for the cognitivist at this point is to unfold, as much as he can, the conditions for having propositional attitudes, and demonstrate that a creature not meeting these conditions could still be credited with intentional states with content. This is the strategy Crane has pursued[84]; he suggests that a creature capable of having propositional attitudes needs to manifest three kinds of capabilities linked to the constituents making up a proposition towards which this creature has an attitude. In line with the tradition, he calls these constituents *concepts*. To be credited with the mastery of a specific concept, a creature has to master at least the three following types of relational properties that, in fact, constitute the concept in question: epistemic, logical and semantic relational properties. I master a concept A if and only if (1) I am capable of recognising the circumstances in which concept A is applicable (epistemic relations)[85]; (2) I am capable of appreciating how two propositions in which concept A figures might combine to produce a third proposition in which A figures (logical relations),[86] (3) I am capable of appreciating that if A is instantiated then a whole bunch of other concepts will also be instantiated (semantic relations). Let me illustrate these three kinds of abilities linked with the mastery of a concept. I master the concept of apple, for example, if and only if (1) I am capable of recognising the perceptual circumstances that allow me to apply the concept of apple; (2) if I am capable of inferring from the fact that there is a blue apple on the table, that there is an apple which is blue and on the table; or from the fact that I recognise that A is apple, B is apple, and A is not identical with B, I am capable of inferring that there are at least two things that are apples; (3) if I am capable of appreciating that there is an apple on the table, I should be capable of

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[84] Crane's (1992) aim in his paper is to examine the idea that some mental states have non-conceptual content. Although I am sympathetic to this program, most of the points that he makes (as well as those I make, for that matter) can be brought into the discussion without entering the sensitive and thorny issue of non-conceptual content.

[85] Cf. Crane (1992) "A thinker's beliefs about the world are [...] sensitive to perceptual evidence, and their contents are partly defined by the perceptual evidence that a thinker would take as counting in their favour" (p. 146).

[86] Cf. Crane (1992) "To possess a concept is to be in intentional states whose inferential relations are an appropriate function of their contents. The elements in a thinker's network of intentional states are essentially inferentially related to one another" (p. 147).

appreciating the fact that there is food in front of me or that something is in front of me, etc. Of a system capable of performing these three types of inference I say, after Bermúdez, that it is capable of 'global recombinability'.[87] We will see very soon what this entails.

Although all three kinds of capacity are extensively discussed in the literature on the propositional attitudes, it is not clear to me that attribution of propositional attitudes to subjects or even to other sorts of creatures always presupposes global recombinability. As much, I believe, has been shown in the discussion of Davidson on belief, but at this stage it is beside the point. The question that is relevant here is whether it is possible to construe a notion of content that would not require that creatures having them master all of these capacities. If it can be shown that none of them is needed for a creature to be presented with something being thus and so, but that this creature could nevertheless be endowed with intentional states with content recognisable as such, then a path opens up for a theory of perception, as well as a cognitive theory of the emotions which will not depend on the capacity for having propositional attitudes as characterised here.

III.2. The content of basic emotions

In this thesis, I argue that basic emotions are intentional states understood as *directly motivating bodily responses to features of the environment that the creature values either positively or negatively.* This characterisation of basic emotions, which, as we have seen, I call *emotional valuations*, will be fully cashed out only in the next chapter. Here, I wish to deal solely with the main issue that has occupied us up to now, that is, issues related to the structure of the content of the emotions so conceived. In the light of what has been said so far, what I need is a model of content which is not as demanding as the one required by the propositional attitudes model which could not possibly be ascribed to animals and young infants, but powerful enough to explain their basic emotional capacities. I, thus, present in broad outline the structure of the emotions, given the necessary conditions they have to meet for satisfying a genuine cognitive

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[87] Cf. Bermúdez (1998, p. 92).

account of them. These minimal conditions are the following. Emotions must be structured, must have conditions of satisfaction, a stimulus-response model of them should not be available and, finally, they should integrate with higher-order mental states.[88]

III.3. Content: lawlessness

Appeal to content is needed in the absence of the possibility of explaining the behaviour of a creature by means of a stimulus-response model. Characteristic of a creature satisfying a stimulus-response model we find that its behaviour can be plotted in a law-like fashion. If token stimulus of type *a* causes response token of type *b*, then token stimulus of type *a* will always cause token responses of type *b*. In such a case, there is no need to appeal to the notion of content, for it would do no job at all. It is always open to one to explain the behaviour of stimulus-response system by positing that the system represents the stimulus and reacts to it, in virtue of representing it in this specific way. But this move does nothing more than enriching the ontology of the theory with another entity that has, in fact, no explanatory power. Reflexes, for instance, are such that it is not necessary to postulate content to explain them. The behaviour of an intentional system, however, cannot be plotted in a law-like fashion, and this is when the notion of content becomes handy. As we have seen, both the behaviour of human adults, animals and young infants cannot be plotted in a law–like fashion, and thus appeal to content is required. We want to say that it is in virtue of the various contents of the system, those stored in memory, those that presently affect the system, together with those that the system wants to be realised, that bring about the behaviour of the system. Systems whose behaviour do not espouse the stimulus-response model force explanations that exploit the internal states of these systems which, in virtue of the way these states interact with one another, bring about the behaviour they do. The question becomes

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[88] These are the basic conditions for content, according to Bermúdez (1995b), conditions satisfied by *non–conceptual* mental states. I have argued elsewhere that the label of 'non-conceptual content' applied to this type of content does nothing but distract one from what should be the main concern, i.e. the difference between content as understood by the propositional attitude model, and the minimal notion of content examined here. Cf. Deonna (2000, unpublished).

then, the following: what kind of features does content have to have in order for this interaction to take place?

III.4. Content: structure

Central to the notion of content is the idea of structure. We think that contents are made of constituents that together form a specific content. It is difficult to imagine how a thought of the form '*a* is F' could refer to *a* and say about it that it is F without it being the case that the thought, one way or another, includes the two parts 'a' and 'F'. Although we can decide that from now on we will express the thought '*a* if F' by the one part expression 'd', it is doubtful whether one could ever understand the expression without separating it into the different constituents from which it was construed in the first place. Here is how Evans puts it:

> It seems to me that there must be a sense in which thoughts are structured. The thought that John is happy has something in common with the thought that Harry is happy, and the thought that John is happy has something in common with the thought that John is sad. [...] I should prefer to explain the sense in which thoughts are structured [...] in terms of their being a complex of the exercise of several distinct [...] abilities. Thus, someone who thinks that John is happy and that Harry is happy exercises on the two occasions [one] conceptual ability [...]. And similarly someone who thinks that John is happy and that John is sad exercises on two occasions a single ability, the ability to think of, or think about, John.[89]

Whether we think of constituents of thought as involving the exercise of abilities or not, we want it to be the case that whatever cognitive achievement is involved in having a state with a certain content will be equivalent to the cognitive achievement involved in having another content which we express linguistically by using the same expression. Part of the cognitive achievement realised in thinking "John is happy" should be the same as the cognitive achievement realised in "John is sad" for the simple reason that no cognitive mechanism could support the amount of thoughts they appear to be able to think if each of them required new and separate achievements.

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[89] Evans (1982, pp. 100-101).

III.5. Content: integration

Contents, thus, have to be structured so as to allow interaction between them in the way just mentioned. After Bermúdez,[90] I called 'global recombinability' the full package of inferential relations that such a compositional system of thought built out of recurring constituents would be capable of sustaining, and the three types of which we have had the opportunity to appreciate above. Now, as Bermúdez has pointed out, although global recombinability entails structure or compositionality, compositionality does not entail global recombinability; far from it. What is needed to explain the behaviour, emotional or otherwise, of animals and infants is the capacity to re-identify features of the environment when encountered in subsequent experiences. Re-identification entails the realisation that *a* recurs in '*a* is F' and '*a* is G', and in this very sense their thoughts have to be structured in the sense explained. Similarly, we want it to be the case that the content of a creature's desires will be such that it can *integrate* with the contents of the creature's commitments as to how the world is, and this too requires that the system be capable of detecting in its environment features that figure as constituents in the content of its desires. None of this, however, requires ascribing to them the full range of inferential capacities isolated earlier. In Bermúdez's phrase, "compositional structure can exist in the absence of global recombinability" (p.93).

III.6. Content: correctness conditions

A third fundamental feature of the notion of content is that of correctness, about the conditions of which we have already said a lot. Here is how Peacocke, having changed his mind for the better, characterises a 'minimalist' way of putting the point:

> A state [with content] presents the world as being a certain way only if there is a condition or set of conditions under which it does so correctly.[91]

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[90]Bermúdez (1998, p. 92).

[91] Peacocke (1992a, Chap. 1)

Although very intuitive, the interpretation of this requirement is far from straightforward. It looks very similar to early Peacocke's condition for representation, and might be thought to be very similar to the first condition (epistemic relation) for concept possession (Crane), and – to go even further back – to the Davidsonian analysis of belief. Notice, however, that it is much weaker: it does not mention an agent who should be capable of appreciating the fact that it might or might not be correct.

It is now my duty to unfold, even succinctly, the idea that such a minimalist conception of correctness condition might be applicable to the phenomenon of emotional *v*aluation, even in the absence (for now) of a full elaboration of what the notion covers. As briefly indicated, and as will become fully apparent in the next chapter, I have tied up emotional *v*aluations to bodily responses, and made the object of those responses largely dependent on the current interests of the creature having them. It might be thought, therefore, that the notion of correctness conditions in this instance makes no sense at all. What will, in this scenario, it might be asked, provide the necessary independent elements to make the content of the evaluation correct or incorrect?

Let me, thus, schematically indicate what I have in mind. We are familiar from the literature with two fundamentally different ways of thinking about correctness conditions. The traditional way of individuating them focuses on the relation between thought and world.[92] The content of a belief is individuated *via* the circumstances that would make this content correct. And it is correct in relation to its subject matter if and only if the subject matter is as the content of the belief represents it be. A more recent way of thinking about correctness conditions, in particular in approaches attempting to naturalise the mind, has it that the content of a mental state should be individuated in terms of the normal consequences for thought and action that this content has.[93] Such content is satisfied if and only if the thoughts and/or actions it triggers satisfies

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92 The most representative proponent of this approach is Davidson (e.g. 1973b, 1974b, 1975).

93 In fact this view reaches as far back as the pragmatism of James (1911) and Pierce (1878). In contemporary naturalist philosophy of Mind, Millikan (1984, 1993), Papineau (1984, 1993) and Whyte (1990, 1991) are certainly the authors who have developed this approach the most thoroughly.

the desires of the subject having the content.[94] These radically different approaches to thinking of the ways in which we individuate content are always presented as competing accounts of truth. The former roots truth in a vertical relation between content and the world, the latter roots it in a horizontal relation between the desires and actions of a subject. A proponent of the former accuses the latter of having a circular account of truth whilst priding himself that he can explain action by appealing to beliefs that are independent of the action. A proponent of the latter accuses the former of not having a real account of the alleged vertical truth-relation anyway, and even if it had an account, it would still need action to individuate belief.

Butterfill has recently suggested that, rather than viewing these two conceptions of content as two competing accounts of truth, they might be viewed as two ways in which we think of belief, two ways in which we might become aware of them.[95] He calls the first kind *intellectualist*, and the second *pragmatist*. His view is that, when attempting to understand other people's actions, we might adopt one or the other strategy. In fact, he argues that we are first and foremost pragmatists in the following two senses. First, as young children we are only pragmatists, and little by little we learn to be intellectualists. Second, when we reach adulthood, we continue to be first and foremost pragmatists, and become intellectualists only when the pragmatist explanation fails. It is only when the action does not look like a direct satisfaction of a readily available desire that one then needs to be acquainted with the facts that the subject we are trying to understand knows or does not know.

Butterfill thinks that these two ways of thinking of correctness conditions promotes the view that there are two conceptions of beliefs at work here – rather in the same way that I suggested in this chapter – and suggests that perhaps we had better view it simply as two types of contents, one which would be the content of attitudes conceived on the Davidsonian model, the other conceived on the model of minimal content developed here. This being said, I

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[94] This formulation is close to Papineau's conception of content (e.g. 1993, §3.6, claim '(C)'. Millikan speaks of intentions being satisfied in accordance with *a Normal explanation*, where the notion of 'normal' is rooted in the theory of evolution.

see no urgency in resolving this terminological debate here. Applied to the present characterisation of basic emotions, i.e. of emotional *v*aluations, I suggest that we should think of them as the pragmatist would, while more complex ones, i.e. emotional *e*valuations should be conceived as the intellectualist would. With regard to the former, this would be to say that emotional *v*aluations are directly individuated *via* their normal bodily responses, where normal means bodily responses that affect what a subject values, in ways favourable to the subject from his perspective. The content of an emotional *v*aluation is satisfied when the bodily response that it brings about affects what the creature values, in ways favourable to the creature from his own perspective, and is not satisfied when it is not the case. The content of an emotional *v*aluation that the lion is dangerous is satisfied if and only if running away will satisfy the need to avoid injury, and is not if running away does not satisfy the need to avoid injury.

Traditional objections to the pragmatist here won't bite in the present account, for Pragmatism is not here presented as an account of truth, but as an interpretative strategy; and second, because I am not claiming that the pragmatist strategy by itself is enough for all interpretative projects. Indeed, I suggest, that the way emotional *v*aluations are individuated contrasts with the way emotional *e*valuations are individuated. Attributions of emotional *e*valuations always involve, from the point of view of the interpreter, knowing the facts and knowing whether or not the person to be interpreted knows them. An emotional *e*valuation is based on beliefs and desires which have to be represented by the interpreter for the actions of the interpretee to make sense. This is the intellectualist strategy, which always consists of asking oneself how the world is represented by the person we are attempting to understand, and how those representations might clash with ours – or with the world for that matter. By contrast, ascribing an emotion on the pragmatist mode is simply to see an action as the normal consequence of what is needed or desired in the circumstances, as opposed to what one particular creature needs or desire in the particular circumstances.

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[95] Butterfill (forthcoming, Chap. 2).

These contrastive attitudes, pragmatist and intellectualist respectively, will become clearer as my distinction between emotional *v*aluation and emotional *e*valuation unfolds, the task I now engage in.

III.7. Content: assessing basic emotions

This being said, I need to explain how emotional *v*aluations are going to be assessed in the light of the way I just characterised their correctness conditions. One of the virtues of any cognitive account of the emotions, it has been argued, is that they can be assessed in terms of their appropriateness or inappropriateness in the circumstances in which they occur. Now, I said that the content of an emotional *v*aluation is satisfied when the bodily response it triggers affects favourably the creature *from its own perspective*. The questions are the same as they were a moment ago. First, in what sense can an emotion be assessed in terms of appropriateness if its satisfactions conditions are essentially linked with the desires and needs of the creatures having the emotion? And second, in what sense does my characterisation of correctness conditions of emotional *v*aluations fail to amount to correctness conditions understood in the early Peacocke way, where the creature has to 'appreciate' for herself the way her representation represents the world as being?

Those two questions, it seems to me, can be answered together. One way of unfolding what I have in mind goes like this. Representing agents do not have *claims* as to how the world is represented in their representations, or claims as to how they want the world to be in their represented desires. One way to put it would be to say that the world has, so to speak, *claims* on agents as to how the world is for them or *claims* as to how the world is desired to be for them. This way of formulating the point is more than a rhetorical trick when we think of the kind of error a creature with such content would be prone to. For here, we are tempted to say that he does not *make* mistakes, but has mistaken representations. Correcting the latter kind of mistakes would consist of checking whether the viewing conditions are good, whether the perceptual systems of the creature are in good order, etc. When you 'take the world as being in a certain way' however, it means that you have *reasons* for that, and therefore to be thinking wrongly that such and such reasons are supporting such and such

representations. This way of formulating the issue will have crucial significance in the sixth chapter when I will deal with the epistemological questions concerning the possibility of knowing other people's emotions.

I said that the world makes *claims* on creatures inhabiting it, and that emotional *v*aluation was one such *claim*. The idea here is to subvert the traditional idea according to which any contentful state in which a creature represents the world as being in a certain way is always such that there can be another creature also present to think of it as being in another way. 'I claim this, you claim that!" When this happens, one can always imagine that one of the creatures is going to be convinced by the other – to change his mind, as it were. This happens in cases when the contents involved divide/classify the world in ways that go over and beyond the verdicts of the affective and perceptual systems interacting causally with the environment of the creatures involved. If you and I disagree as to whether there is a barn in front of us, it can be for one of at least two major reasons. Either the perceptual conditions are not good, perhaps because it dark, or we have taken drugs, or I am half blind, etc., or we disagree as to what deserves to be called a barn. The latter kind of disagreement is indeed generally resolved, if it all, when one of us changes our mind, or when we agree that the way I use the word, or the way you use the word is preferable. To exaggerate somewhat, we can say that some *epistemic virtue* has been violated, and it is only after a conference between the protagonists in the dispute that the sin committed (if any) to good epistemic conduct can be redeemed. In the former case, however, nobody is asked to change his mind, no sin is committed. We change the lighting, we wait until the effect of the drug recedes, etc., until agreement comes. When it does come, one of us is likely to say: "Oh, I see now!" I do not change my mind in this case, because it is my mind or the environment in which it is that changes. It is in this sense that the world makes claims on us, rather than we who make claims about the world.

Now, I suggest that emotional *v*aluations are precisely like that: they are claimed on us by the world, given our biology, the environment in which we are, and the acculturation to which we have been subjected. I cannot help but emotionally *v*alue the lion as I do, given the animal I am, and the dispositions

that my history has induced in me.[96] Now, if the considerations we just made are true, they should be reflected in the way we assess emotional *v*aluations, for we recall that one of the main reasons why we felt the need for a cognitive account of the emotions was linked to the fact that we assess them in normative terms. We think that certain objects are not fitted to the emotional responses they trigger. And here, as with perception, there are two main types of reasons we might give for thinking that there is something wrong with regard to some creature's emotional response. Either there is something wrong with the world (i.e. the creature having the emotion is tired, ill, under drugs, visibility is bad, etc.), or we think it is wrong because one *should* not respond emotionally in that way, given the circumstances. In this case, it is some *moral virtue* that has been tampered with. We feel it is wrong, for example, to rejoice at someone else's predicament because we find that some *vice* is at work. Now, I have said that emotional *v*aluations allow only for the first type of error, and the question now is whether the way I construed content for emotional *v*aluation is compatible with what has just been said. An emotional *v*aluation, I suggested, is not satisfied when the bodily response does not affect favourably the creature having the emotion *from his own perspective*. And the consequence of this is precisely what we want. For, if content is individuated from the subject's perspective, than there is no room for criticism from the point of view of what one *should* value, rather than what one does value in particular circumstances. At the level of emotional *v*aluation, therefore, emotions are appropriate or inappropriate in a very trivial non-normative sense. It is purely a question of normal or proper functioning of the system in its environment.

III.8. Emotional valuation and emotional evaluation

I wish now to convey in very intuitive terms what lies behind the contrast between emotional *v*aluation and emotional *e*valuation, which I will develop further in the next chapter. In very crude terms, the former is an *opening* to

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[96] This means, among other things, that, *pace* Geach (1965), emotional *v*aluations cannot be put in the antecedent of a conditional, because emotional *v*aluations cannot be supposed. It means also, *pace* Sartre (1939), that we are not free to choose our emotions. Having said that, the account here defended leaves room for both Geach and Sartre's point. Emotional *e*valuations can figure in the antecedent of conditionals, and there is some freedom to choose to have them.

information that is significant for the creature affected by it in the world for the conduct of its life. Having a basic emotion is to see some aspect of the world as directly requiring some form of action that will improve the position of the creature having it. What is special about emotional *v*aluation is the fact that the feelings and bodily changes that accompany the emotion are not at all *salient* as phenomena affecting the body, but as aspects of the environment which are significant for the creature in terms of action. By contrast, emotional *e*valuation is the perspective we have when we focus our attention on the experience that reveals the world to us in emotional *v*aluation. When I emotionally *e*valuate, and I am successful in the enterprise, both the feelings and bodily changes on the one hand, and what they are directed to on the other hand, become *salient* to me. To have a firmer grasp on the distinction, you can think about the parallel contrast in perception. Seeing is just a case of experiencing features of one's environment, but by contrast, making a perceptual judgement is being sensitive to how the experience in question reveals the features of the environment as being. Although we are very familiar with this distinction in the case of perception, we are much less so in the case of emotions. By this, I do not mean to say that it is an original thought that emotions are often directed at aspects of the world, but the thought that they are fundamentally and primarily so, is. When we start to learn about emotions and theorise about them, it is only then that we become capable of thinking of them independently of their objects, in terms of how they feel, and the bodily changes that accompany them. That is, it is only when we start to emotionally *e*valuate, as opposed to emotionally *v*alue, that we become capable of learning to make full-blown judgements about what emotions we are experiencing, or to make full blown ascriptions of emotions to others. These are the thoughts that I pursue in the next chapter.

IV. Closing the argument

We began this chapter by advancing four claims which, although all plausible, could not all be true together. If emotions require having beliefs, I argued, and having belief requires mastering the concept of truth, then animals end up not having emotions for, presumably, they do not master the concept of truth. This conclusion, I claimed is not acceptable. After exploring the options to get out of

this predicament, I suggested that the best strategy was not to deny that emotions do not have content, or that beliefs did not require the concepts of truth, but to examine the possibility that creatures might have contentful emotions that did not require having beliefs of the kind that requires the mastery of the concept of truth. I then motivated this strategy – the upshot of which is a picture of the mind that does not welcome a unified account of belief – by examining the case of irrational emotions, which suggests that we are capable of simultaneously entertaining emotional attitudes towards contents that pull in different directions. In order to articulate this thought, I borrowed from the literature on non–conceptual content, and I showed that there is a logical space for a notion of content that does not require, in order to entertain them, the full baggage of competences associated with the capacity for belief traditionally conceived. This logical space, it has been argued, is the natural home of perception. In this chapter, I have shown that, likewise, basic emotion – what I called emotional *v*aluation – was a potential candidate for occupying this logical space, as it satisfied – in a manner akin to perception – the conditions for minimal content. If this is correct, we now understand how animals and young infants can have emotions conceived on a cognitive model without having beliefs on the model of the propositional attitudes.

CHAPTER 4: FROM HAVING EMOTIONS TO BECOMING AWARE OF THEM IN OTHERS

I. Introduction

In this chapter, I formulate and defend the claim that the emotions of others are sometimes transparent to us. Intuitively, this is to say that if someone is experiencing fear just in front of me, if this person's face and body is fully "in view", if the lighting is good and I am attentive to what is happening in front of me, then becoming aware of this person's fear is not more difficult, not more complicated, not less obvious, not less immediate, not less direct, etc., than becoming aware of this person's skin colour, texture of hair, etc. That this person is frightened is as obvious to me as the fact that this person is, say, tanned. This is what I mean intuitively by the proposition that the emotions of others are often transparent to us. Moving away from intuitions a little, I take the transparency thesis, if it is going to be an interesting thesis, to imply at least the two following claims. First, if your fear is transparent to me, then there must be a sense in which what you feel now is something that I can feel myself. Second, if your fear is transparent to me, then there is a minimal sense in which I am aware of, or I am sensitive to, or I recognise, or understand, that you are experiencing or feeling fear. With regard to the first claim: that there should be a sense in which I feel your emotion, is meant to capture the idea that if the emotion of someone else is transparent to me than the apprehension of the other person's emotion is not mediated by something else, especially not something fundamentally different in nature to an emotion. With regard to the second claim: that there must be some kind of understanding on my part that the other person is undergoing a certain emotion, captures the idea that there must be a form of registering on my part that this is the case. The emotion of the other person must figure in some way in the content of the psychological episode I am going through. In this sense, the emotion is transparent to me, not because I can see through it, but because there is no obstacle in the way to my seeing it.

Why should one bother to defend the transparency thesis? A first obvious reason is simply to try and clarify and to possibly explain an intuition that we all have. Most of us agree with the fact that the boredom, sadness, annoyance, joys, excitement, fear, etc. of others often strikes us as obvious, even though, of course, it does not always make sense to us, and even though we often feel that the way we feel about others should be altered in the light of other evidence. In this sense, transparency does not entail infallibility or incorrigibility. Secondly and more importantly, if the emotions of others are transparent in the sense just outlined, then learning to apply emotions to one's self and others ceases to be a mystery. The mystery in question is, of course, entirely philosophical, for common sense uncorrupted by philosophy has never been particularly aware of a mystery. It just happens that the way most accounts of the mental in philosophy make use of a distinction between the 'inner' and the 'outer', for example, between feeling a certain way and the expression of this feeling, or, say, between a belief and its manifestation, etc., makes the learning of mental concepts, and in particular those concepts that refer to states having a qualitative aspect to them like the emotions, quite unintelligible.[97] When the transparency thesis is articulated, however, the distinction between the inner and the outer ceases to be a threat to the possibility of learning the concepts of the emotions, as well as hopefully explaining our day to day emotional interaction with others.

The reader will have, I hope, taken the right turn in the dialectics of this dissertation. Let me, however, make the way as clear as possible. I have argued in the first and second chapters that two intuitions concerning the perception of other people's experiences, respectively, the *transparency* and the *ownership* intuition, needed reconciliation if they were to live happily together. I have shown what strategy I believe could achieve this reconciliation, in particular how the idea of *integrated* perception and the distinction between *vehicle* and *saliency* were key elements in the pursuit of this strategy, with respect to its application to the case of sensation. In this chapter, I shall attempt to apply the same strategy to the case of emotions, for which some important preparatory

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97 Of course, the interpretationist tradition about which we already had the opportunity to talk (Chap. 3, sec. II.2 above) is not prey to such a complaint, although its way out of the problem is,

work has been accomplished in the preceding chapter. I wish, however, to draw your attention to the following. In the second chapter, whilst examining Shoemaker's and Bermúdez's debate with respect to the necessary capabilities implicated in perception, recall that recognitional capacities in general involved at least a reference identification component and a property identification component.[98] And in the case of the perception of other people's emotions, it is tempting to assimilate the property identified with the emotion perceived and the reference identified with the creature experiencing the emotion. This, in turn, raises the question as to which of these two components I have in mind when claiming that *transparency* implies *recognition*. Is it the case that both the reference identification component condition and the property identification component condition have to be met for recognition to take place? And if the reference identification component condition has to be satisfied, does it have to be satisfied in such way that it satisfies the ownership intuition as well? My answer to this will be the following: both conditions have to be met – to that much I am of course committed, as I have admitted that it is necessary for perception – although I shall claim that the satisfaction of the reference identification component condition is not such that that the ownership intuition will be fulfilled.

I.1. The possibility of learning to recognise emotions in oneself and others

As we have seen in the introduction of this thesis, the old 'reflection+analogy' theory on the one hand, and the Wittgenteinian attack and suggested alternative on the other hand, which can both be seen as constituting rival accounts of emotion recognition, fail because the former makes learning logically impossible – this is generally known as the conceptual problem of other minds – and the latter portrays learning in a way which is psychologically implausible.[99]

I argued, at the expense of giving any role to the 'inner' in their account of the mental.

[98] See Chap 2, sec. II.3 above.

[99] See introduction, sec. II above.

Brewer has recently proposed a solution to what he calls "another minds' problem" which should be of special interest to us.[100] Brewer's focus is the conditions of possibility of one's capacity to apply emotional concepts to one's self and others in the light of the traditional conceptual problem of other minds. Although he does not place his account in this framework, this amounts to providing a story about how we learn emotional concepts which does not terminate either in the logical *cul-de-sac* of the 'reflection plus analogy' theory, or in the psychologically implausible picture of learning offered by the theory-theorist. This project is of particular interest to me as it is precisely this middle route that I am pursuing, although, it should be emphasised, the picture I am about to put forward as to how we perceive emotions in others does not, as we have seen in the previous chapter, require the mastery of any concepts whatsoever. In the story I am going to tell, applying emotional concepts to oneself and others is an achievement that comes much later and requires capacities far greater than those needed for the capacity to perceive emotions in oneself and others. This being said, the structure of Brewer's solution does not rest on these premises. His main idea is to exploit the model of "A's having a specific emotion" to understand "A's understanding that B has a specific emotion". More specifically, the idea is that when I learn, for example, to feel frightened of some frightening item in the world, by the same token I learn to recognise fear in others. The claim I want to defend rests precisely on this strategy, and we shall now see how Brewer proposes to pursue it.

It is only if access to emotions is radically different in one's own case than it is in the case of others that learning to apply emotional concepts is forever impossible. If I know what being angry means from how it feels to be angry in my own case, and if I can never feel that you are angry, than how could I possibly ever know that you are angry. Conversely, if I know that you are angry on the basis of what you look like when I am watching you, then how can I know that I am angry in the absence of the possibility of watching myself? Brewer's strategy is, therefore, to show how those things that are supposedly accessible only on the first person mode (feelings) are such that they are or get, in fact, glued with those things that are supposedly accessible only in the third

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[100] Brewer (forthcoming, 2001).

person mode (expressions of these feelings) in such a way that the above dilemma does not bite. The question 'How can I ascribe an emotion to someone else on the sole basis of how this emotion feels to me?' will not carry through in an account that glues experience and its expression in the right way. What Brewer is looking for is the glue between feeling a certain way and the expressive behaviour attached to this feeling. What is it, he asks, that unifies all experiences of fear into this conjunction of feeling and expressive behaviour?

Like Wittgenstein before him, and perhaps the contemporary theory-theorists, Brewer's answer is that the unifying factor, the "glue provider", should be something public, accessible to everybody, or as Brewer would put it "some mind-independent item". But, rather than pointing to the behaviour itself as the main candidate for constituting the gluing factor, as Wittgenstein possibly did, and certainly the theory-theorist does, Brewer points towards what elicits the behaviour. In the case of fear, for example, it would be *the frightening*. But let us elucidate this idea in more detail.

Rather than starting right away with emotions, Brewer wonders what it is that makes the experience of a certain colour an experience of *that* type of colour. He begins by asking what it is that unifies all experiences of red – both yours and mine. What is it about a token experience of red that it is a token of just the type red? The difficulty here is to provide an account that is non-circular, an account that would not presuppose a prior understanding of the concept of red. Saying, for example, that experiences of red are just those experiences that are caused by red things is a non-starter, for it is not something we could learn to identify without prior grasp of what it is to have red experiences. Drawing on what Brewer calls the Strawson-Evans strategy to resolve this puzzle, he claims that it is by means of indexical reference to a mind-independent worldly item that red experiences can be something that we can learn to individuate from other types of experiences. And in the case of red, the worldly mind-independent item is the colour that presents the world as being *like that* (pointing at red patch). The indexical provides the necessary independent item for getting outside the circle that would make learning the concept of red impossible.

Now, it is the same strategy that Brewer tries to pursue with emotional experiences. He begins by pointing out that James's account of the emotions in terms of collections of sensations is tantamount to the account of experiences of red, in terms of that which causes red-experiences. It would make the learning of emotional concepts impossible. Although he reckons that James was absolutely right to think that feelings are an essential component of the emotions, he believes James has failed to appreciate the fact that emotions present mind-independent worldly states of affairs.[101] If James had taken that into consideration, only then would he have had a complete account of the emotions, one that would make acquisition of emotional concepts possible. The move is apparently quite straightforward. If red experiences are those experiences that present the world as *that* colour (pointing at red), says Brewer, then experiences of fear are those experiences that present the world as *thus* (pointing at the frightening). The strategy employed for observational concepts applies to emotional concepts, as fruitfully, or at least so it seems, until some marked difference emerges. And as we will see, it is precisely this marked difference that will ultimately provide the necessary glue between feeling and expressive behaviour. Whereas we might think that red items in the world cause red experiences, because red items all have in common some essential physical properties,[102] it is clearly not the case with what is frightening. Nobody believes that the frightening is a physical property shared by all frightening things, a fact clearly brought home by noting that I might be afraid of something whereas you might not, and that this cannot always be explained away by the fact that you are blind to frightening things. This is why the indexical involved in emotional experiences is of a more complex nature than the kind of indexical involved in colour experiences. The frightening, says Brewer, is that which elicits a characteristic kind of behavioural response while genuinely being afraid of some worldly item. The indexical is, thus, ultimately a demonstrative directed at characteristic behaviour whilst experiencing the frightening. The original

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101 See Chap 3, sec. II.3 above for the expression of similar worries concerning James' type accounts of the emotions.

102 Brewer is certainly too optimistic here as to the possibility of reducing colours to physical properties. See Hutto (2001) for a defence of the idea there might be much less difference

puzzle, which was to provide an account which would make it possible for a child to learn emotional concepts, is here resolved, as in the colour case, by appeal to a mind-independent indexical, but by contrast with the colour case, one that would be ultimately referring to expressive behaviour:

> [...] the child learns simultaneously to categorize behaviour of just this type, thought whilst performing some appropriate exemplar, and to recognize various items as eliciting behaviour of that type in him. Thus, as his response develops into one of genuinely feeling afraid of the relevant worldly phenomena, say, he also acquires a determinate identification of his, now expressive, behaviour in terms of which the feeling is itself to be individuated.[103]

Again, what this line of thought achieves is a middle route between two pitfalls: the old 'reflection+analogy' thesis on the one hand and one common application of Wittgenstein's 'private language argument' to the case of attribution of emotions on the other hand. The progress, we are led to suppose, is, first, that we are not faced anymore, as in the former account, with a picture in which the child learns about the relation between feelings and their expressions all by herself; and secondly, we are not faced either, as in the latter account, with a picture of the emotions in which feelings, either construed phenomenologically or as physiological bodily changes, play no role whatsoever. Reference to mind-independent items which are available to both child and caregivers and which ultimately refer to genuine expressive behaviour of feelings, allows Brewer to avoid falling into either of the two pitfalls, the mentalist one, or the behaviourist one.

The problem, however, is that, unless we are told more about the relation between the feeling and its expression, the account might still be read on either of these two interpretations. That is to say, nothing at this stage prevents us, as Hutto rightly notes, from formulating the conceptual problem of other minds anew.

> For the fact is that in the example provided [the example is that of Brewer just quoted] the experience and expression of fear both belong to a single subject. Given this, we can ask how can 'that type' of genuinely expressive behaviour also apply to others? If the behavioural demonstratives in question are of an essentially self-referential kind our conception of experience would remain unacceptably first

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between colour perception and emotion perception than Brewer seems to believe (cf. Hardin (1990, pp. 560-2, pp. 564-6), Dretske (1995, p. 89).

[103] Brewer (forthcoming, 2001).

> personal, despite making essential reference to our own expressive behaviour. On the other hand, if the referent is the behaviour of others how can it apply to us? Starting from this position, we cannot help ourselves to the idea that the behaviour of others is genuinely expressive, unless we have somehow already solved the conceptual problem of other minds.[104]

It is not so much that the account is wrong-headed, Hutto continues, it is that it does not go far enough. The first worry is the following. Although we are told that there is some essential relation between feeling a certain way towards some worldly item and having a certain expressive behaviour on that occasion, we are not told from the perspective of the experience of the child how these essential components are for her glued together. The second worry is that, even if we were told that, we would still need a story that would tell us how this could be of any use for the ascription of emotions to others. Brewer is right to insist on cases of triangulation between child, caregiver and worldly items; however, it is significant that in his example the caregiver's sole function is to point to the adequate worldly items of the emotions, whilst the caregiver's own emotions seem to play no role at all in this learning process. The outcome, I believe, is that we need to supplement Brewer's account on two fronts.

First, we have to explain how it is that from the child's perspective her feelings and their expression get glued together, and second, why this should be of use to explain the perception of emotions in others. My answer to the first question, which is surely compatible with Brewer's, is that emotionally experiencing some worldly item as so and so is neither particularly first personal nor particularly third personal. This idea might be contained in Brewer's solution, but certainly not in an explicit way. To make the idea explicit it is necessary to go into the nature of emotions, which is something that Brewer does not do. My answer to the second question, as should become apparent, derives directly from the proper understanding of how the first person vs. third person distinction is articulated in my first answer. When those answers are provided, we shall understand how other people's emotions are transparent at a basic level, and how this, in turn, allows for the learning of emotional concepts and their application to particular individuals, others or oneself. It is crucial to have an appreciation of why it is important to get a grip on the kind of relation

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[104] Hutto (forthcoming, 2001).

that holds between feeling something and the outward manifestation of this feeling. Let us first look, in attempting to answer our question – What does it mean for someone to experience the expressive behaviour of his or her own feelings? – at the kind of considerations Brewer could have brought in to clarify the nature of this intimate relation, and second, let us see why he owes us such a clarification.

The sort of considerations I have in mind emanate first from results in developmental psychology and second from reflection on the phenomenology of the perception of other people's emotions. Research in developmental psychology – although Brewer does not touch on this in his article – suggests strongly that learning emotional concepts does not involve looking at one's behaviour in mirrors or such like devices when experiencing some particular feelings. Meltzoff *et al* have convincingly established through experimental work on imitation in infancy that this is not the case.[105] If the phenomenon of early imitation shows anything, it shows at least that there is no need for children to have any outer awareness of their bodily movements – in the sense of purely exteroceptive awareness – in order to have knowledge of the relation between bodily feelings and those bodily movements.[106] Of course – and this leads us to the phenomenological considerations – we did not need to be shown this by developmental psychology in order to believe it. We think we know that bodily experience is both experience of what we feel and of what we do! Although it is true that neither experimental data, nor phenomenological facts are commonly thought to be considerations of any strong weight in philosophy, nor are transcendental arguments of the kind Brewer relies on to make his point particularly in favour.

But an explanation of how feelings and their expressions are connected in such an intimate manner from the point of view of the subject is needed, and this is so because of the same old powerful reasons. First, the need for explanation arises from reflection on examples in which we seem to have the feelings without the corresponding expression, a fact comparable to examples in

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[105] E.g. Meltzoff (1993) Meltzoff & Moore (1977, 1995); Meltzoff & Gopnik (1993).

[106] See Appendix I for a discussion of the significance of early imitation to the present discussion. See also Campbell (1995).

the domain action, in which we have the desires without the corresponding actions. But, second, and more importantly, not only do we think that those entities are separable, but also that the feelings *explain* the expression, the desire *explains* the action, etc., and if these explanations are to be non-circular, then the *explanans* and the *explanandum* had better be two separate entities.

What we need, therefore, is a means (1) to reconcile a phenomenological fact backed by developmental psychology, i.e. that we experience, as it were, always from the inside and the outside at the same time, with a seemingly incompatible logical claim according to which (2) we can have the experience without its outward manifestations, the desire without the action, etc. But if it can be shown that the entities referred to in these two claims are, in fact, different entities despite bearing the same names, then we will at least have shown that there is no incompatibility between the two claims.

The apparent incompatibility, I believe, arises from confusing the relation between *feelings* and the *expression of the feelings* on the one hand, with the relation between *bodily response* and *its manifestation* on the other hand, and similarly, confusing the relation between *desire* and *action* on the one hand, with the relation between *motive* and *bodily activity* on the other hand. What the worries show is that we do *not*, indeed, experience directly our feelings as coupled with their expressions and we do *not* experience directly our desires as tied to our actions. The reason for this is that any one feeling is compatible with any number of different expressions, and any one desire is compatible with any number of different actions. That is to say that there is always scope for interpretation when the time comes to make sense of an emotion or an action from the perspective of our everyday concepts as they exist in natural languages. Deciding what emotion I have, or deciding what action I perform requires a *reflective* or *introspective* attitude of classifying what I feel or what I do, and this activity of classification involves adopting what I have called the *intellectualist* strategy towards our emotions. It involves inference and cannot, thus, be just experienced. This is why one can be at pains to explain what one feels, why one is doing something, or what one is doing. This requires making sense of what one feels and what one does in the broader context of functional folk-psychological explanations. Now although this is true when adopting the *intellectualist attitude*, there is no reason to deny that there is a

sense in which we do experience the 'outer' manifestation of what goes on 'inside' when experiencing an emotion. I will claim that experiencing a bodily response towards something 'from the inside', as it were, is also experiencing the manifestation of this bodily response 'from the outside'.

These few remarks are, at this stage, only gestures at the solution I am aiming at. They are only gestures because it is only by going into some details into the nature of emotions, which Brewer does not do, that the metaphor between the inner and the outer will be understood. The program should be clear enough, however. If I am right, and if developmental psychology is right, then we start to understand why emotionally experiencing some worldly item might not be more first personal than third personal.

II. Basic emotions

Let us now step back a bit, and recap the argument as we left it at the end of the last chapter. We have presented reasons (and accepted them) to the effect that emotions are cognitive states with content. Emotions must be, among other things, openings to a certain kind of information in the subject's environment. We have seen that the traditional way of conceiving of content, i.e. on the model of the propositional attitudes, is only part of the story that can be told about the emotions. Although, I argued, the model of the propositional attitudes does, indeed, capture an essential aspect of our dealing with the world and others, emotions cannot be just a mixture of beliefs and desires, for at least the following reasons. First, animal and young infants have emotions, but do not have propositional attitudes. Second, we are capable of irrational emotions, a phenomenon which does not seem to fit well in a purely belief/desire model of the emotions. What irrational emotions suggest is that there are different levels in our emotional dealings with the world. In the light of these considerations, I suggested that there might be a route out of this dilemma. If we can find a coherent notion of content that does not require for having it competences that animals and young infants are incapable of having, but is still powerful enough to figure in an account of their emotional capacities, then we do have a possible model of the emotions, or at least a possible model of some basic form of emotional capacities. It is, thus, high time to fulfil my promises, and elaborate

on the contrast I made between emotional *v*aluations – and cognate notions such as **v**-values and **v**-contexts – on the one hand, and emotional ***e***valuations – and cognate notions such as **e**-values and **e**-contexts on the other hand. To recall, on a first approximation the latter should be conceived on the model of belief/desire psychology and require the capacity to adopt the intellectualist attitude, whereas the former should not be so conceived. In this section, I explain what emotional *v*aluations are, and in the next I suggest why these are such that access to them in other people is what I call *transparent*, and why this very fact makes learning emotional concepts possible.

Basic emotions, I will argue, constitute *sui-generis* types of cognitive episodes of *direct motivating bodily responses* to something [a creature presently *values* in her environment, (either because she has always valued it or because she values it in the specific current *circumstances*)] that affects favourably or adversely the creature *from her own perspective*. This is the gist of the type of standard view I wish to defend. It is an account of what I called the standard type because the content of the emotion involves essentially values.[107]

In somewhat more detail: Emotional *v*aluations are intentional contentful states. This incorporates the idea that they are cognitive states. These states present something that the subject cares about (the *object* of her emotion, as opposed to its *target*). The *content* of an emotional *v*aluation is satisfied if the bodily response specifying this content affects what the creature cares about favourably from her own perspective. The content is not satisfied if the bodily response affects what the creature cares about adversely from her own perspective.

My task now is to unpack this general characterisation. Among the key points of this characterisation that this account of our basic emotions should contain, we find the following key elements: (1) the notion of a *motivating bodily response* to what a creature values, (2) the notion of *what* a creature *values*, (3) the distinction between the *target* and the *object* of her emotion, (4) the idea that the bodily response is *direct* (5) the question of how the content of these states should be *individuated*, (6) the notion that these responses are

claims that the world makes on the creature, (7) the question of the circumstances (or *context*) in which those emotional episodes take place, (8) the question as to how the different elements of this context interact to produce the emotional episode in question, (9) the question of how these emotional states will *integrate* with higher order thoughts, notably emotional *e*valuation, a creature with propositional attitudes has.

In the previous chapter, we had the opportunity to expand partly on points (5), (6), (8) and (9). In what follows, I shall focus mainly on the other points and how what I am going to say bears on those we have already had the opportunity to look at. This I shall do, of course, in the perspective of the establishment of the transparency claim with respect to basic emotions in others and how this allows for the learning of emotional concepts.

II.1. Motivating bodily responses

The notion of a *motivating bodily response* is not very happy, although it is one that I have carefully chosen. Emotion has been alternatively thought of as a special type of *desire*, a special type of *perception*, a special type of *action*, or some combination of these. Emotions might be thought to form *desires* of a kind because they are enough to motivate one to do something. Her anger seems enough to explain why she threw her coffee at him. Although we sometimes want to say that, not only was she angry at him, but also that she wanted to show him that it was the case, we often do not think that we need to appeal to any further desire of that kind to explain why she acts the way she does. On reflection, however, one might think that the *action* itself is part of the emotion, or even the emotion itself. When we say that "she threw her coffee at him in anger", we might be thinking that what we do is precisely report her anger in this specific case. And that might prompt us to think of emotions as actions. But anger, one might object, is more a re-action, than an action. Getting angry is a case of *registering*, in a specific 'feely' mode, that something we care about has been tampered with in ways that displease one, and this is why we might be

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[107] See Chap. 3, sec. II.3 above.

prompted to think of emotions as perceptions, as cases of registering that something is going or not going in the way one wants it to go.

None of these particular identifications, however, will do, at least for two reasons. First, because it seems totally arbitrary to identify emotions with either one of these three ways of thinking of emotions, and second, and more importantly, because although we think of desires, perceptions, and actions as being ingredients implicated in the emotions, it is very easy to find examples where we want to distinguish between any of these three ways for one to be engaged with the world, and the emotions that one might have in these occasions.[108] There is always a possible gap between getting informed of something, desiring something, acting upon this desire on the basis of this information on the one hand, and the emotion that one might have in the circumstances on the other hand. This is the reason why, in the previous chapter, we concluded that emotions couldn't just be a combination of propositional attitudes, and this is the reason why I concluded that Brewer owed us an explanation of how the different ingredients of the emotions got glued together in the ever-present possibility of gaps existing between them.

Despite all that, however, I want to argue that emotional *v*aluations can only be understood as a mixture of all these ingredients. Although an emotional *v*aluation constitutes a *sui-generis* cognitive ability that is fundamentally a capacity to care about what happens to one, it can only be conceived of as involving these three ingredients. The fact that, in numerous cases of attempting to understand someone else, we are likely to find gaps between motivation, perceptual input and behavioural output, should not deter us from thinking of emotional *v*aluations as being fundamentally a case to be identified with all these ingredients. The gaps, I will argue, are in general to be explained by further beliefs, desires, or emotional *e*valuations, of which the interpreter might not be privy; and when this is the case, we are not facing emotional *v*aluation

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[108] Although my fear of falling in the water might be thought of as a strong desire not to be eaten by the crocodiles, we can always think of the fear separately from the desire. I might have the desire in question without the fear. She might be angry at him, but not throw the coffee at his face. Here it is the action that we can think of independently of the anger. And the same goes with perception. We want to say that I can perceive the danger, the aggression, the admirable qualities of someone, without respectively, being in fear, getting alert, or admiring the admirable person. Those considerations are, of course, of the kind that is always brought up against hardcore cognitive theories of the emotions.

only, but emotional *e*valuation as well. When motivation, perception and action come apart, we are forced into what I called the *intellectualist* strategy for understanding others (more on that soon), and this is precisely what animal and young infants are incapable of.

The notion of a *motivating bodily response* to what one values is supposed to capture precisely this idea of a conjunction at the level of basic emotion of motivation, action and perception. It is a *registering* of how the environment is (with respect to what we want to do with it); bodily responding is also *acting* on this environment in ways profitable to one; and it is also a case of *being motivated* that some aspect (what one values) of this environment should be different in ways suitable to one, and in this sense, constitute a motivational state too. It is because these three aspects go essentially together at this level, as we will see, that being informed of one of these is being informed about the two others.[109]

Now, as shall become clear, I am not bluntly contradicting myself. That is, I am not saying that emotions cannot be a mixture of beliefs, desires, and actions, but nevertheless insisting that they are. There is no contradiction, for the ingredients I am claiming are found together in basic emotions are primitive forms of desire, perception and action. What we do *not* find in basic emotions is the propositional attitudes corresponding to each of these. We should, thus distinguish between *being motivated to* do something and *desiring that something be so and so*, between *perception* and *perceptual judgement*, between *bodily activity* and *action*. The first member of each of these distinctions is the name of a type of *natural* and *personal* response a creature might have vis-à-vis her environment, which contrasts with, first, the corresponding propositional attitude she might have which always involves classification and choice, and second, which contrasts with the corresponding *'mere'* behaviour, i.e. the

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[109] There are two interrelated worries here that are, as a matter of course, brought in any discussion of the emotions when those are broadly understood on a cognitive model. What about emotions without definite objects? What about emotions not linked with any particular action? These worries are related, since it is precisely those emotions that do not seem to present the specific items as tampering with one in specific ways (e.g. varieties of anxiety, joy, restlessness, excitement, etc. might have this feature of absence of focus) that are only weakly linked to action. I do not think I have to answer these worries here, given that my aim is to defend the transparency claim, which has limited scope, and not a full–blown and totally immune cognitive

behaviour looked at from a neutral scientific viewpoint, the non-personal point of view, which is always a possible way of looking at the creature's response to her environment.

II.2. What we v-value and context

Anything whatsoever, in a suitably complex context, could be something that a creatures values, and therefore might be the object of a creature's emotion. What a creature emotionally *v*alues in my sense (or *v-values* for short), i.e. the possible object of an emotional *v*aluation is more definite, however, and this is central, as we shall see, if I want to keep my triad of primitive forms of action, perception and motivation together. Before I expand on what it is to v-value something or other, let me say a few words about the general picture I have in mind.

It is familiar enough, if only because of the *emotivist* tradition, to think of the emotions as being connected with values in a very intimate way. That admiration is intimately connected with the admirable, or that irritation is intimately connected with the irritable is hardly controversial. The harsh disputes have always been about the way in which this connection should be understood. One of them revolves around the question as to whether the emotions in question, which seem to be directed towards values, should be viewed at all as cognitive states assessable in normative terms (true or false, correct or incorrect, fitting or unfitting, appropriate or inappropriate, etc), or whether these emotional states are just expressions (exclamations, screams, etc.) of internal feelings and, thus, not at all assessable in normative terms. A second, and related, dispute revolves around the question as to whether those values are in some way projected onto the world by their corresponding emotions, or whether they rather serve as detecting mechanisms of their corresponding values.[110] A third, and related, dispute concerns the question as to whether

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theory of the emotions. For a discussion of possible answers to these kinds of worries, see e.g. deSouza (1987, pp. 134–139).

[110] The emotivist tradition represents the epitome of the projectivist view (Ayer 1976), whereas Tappolet's *Experientialism* constitutes the epitome of the realist view (Tappolet 2000). Most contemporary accounts, however, try to construe the connection between emotions and values dispositionally, on the model of the secondary qualities, and constitute, thus, a middle-ground position between these two extremes. McDowell (1985a), Wiggins (1987), Smith (1989),

emotions so conceived are sufficient in themselves for motivating the subject to act in ways corresponding to the way the subject appears to value some aspect of his environment, or whether we have to appeal to an extra desire to explain why the subject starts moving.[111] As to the first dispute, I have already insisted on the necessity of a cognitive account. Concerning the second dispute, we have already seen when unfolding the notion of a bodily response, that I take it that at the level of emotional *v*aluation, motivation and action are fundamentally connected. The third dispute belongs to a greater debate about the metaphysics of values. Although a resolution of this debate would figure nicely in this thesis, I believe the bulk of what I wish to say about the emotions can be done without presuming anything about the reality of values. The reason I believe I can bypass the metaphysical debate at this stage resides in the fact that the object of an emotional *v*aluation – what I will call a *v-value* to distinguish it from what philosophers might or might not mean by 'value' in general – is wholly dependent on the creature experiencing it. The content of emotional *v*aluations, as I argued in the previous chapter, is wholly individuated *via* the interests, needs, wants of the creature having the bodily response in the specific circumstances. We will see now what this means, but it is clear that the account does not presuppose either a realist or a projectivist account of values.[112] In what follows, I will use realist formulations of the kind 'emotions present values' or 'emotions detect v-values', etc. By this, I claim only to describe the phenomenology of these episodes, not to offer an accurate account of what happens from the third person perspective.

Now the core of the thesis. A property of an object, a state of affairs, a process, an event etc. is a *v-value* if it brings about *directly* a certain bodily response in the creature detecting it in the particular circumstances in which she

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Johnston (1989), Lewis (1989), Mulligan (1998), have all explored different ways of construing dispositionalism about values.

[111] This debate rages in ethics under the general question 'should we be internalist or externalist in ethics?' See e.g. Smith (1994, Chap. 3). The internalist believes that valuing something positively is also a case of being motivated to act positively toward it; the externalist (or *Humean*) believes that valuing something positively is one thing, and wanting to act positively with regard to it is another. This debate I believe is not irresolvable if we do distinguish between different levels of emotions. The distinction I operate between emotional *v*aluation and emotional *e*valuation I hope dissolves the dispute.

is. By direct, here, I mean that the bodily response is not mediated by any further occurrent beliefs or further occurrent desires that the detector might have, or at least no beliefs or desires as conceived on the model of the propositional attitudes, as it has been understood in the third chapter. This does not mean, however, that the bodily response is entirely non-mediated, for this would be a non-starter. Emotional *v*aluations, like all our cognitive states, take place in contexts. They take place in contexts that include many different components. Among them, we find such things as the long standing character traits (fearful, excitable, irritable, callous, impulsive, perverse, etc.) of the subject, his long-standing interests (particular fancies, tastes, dislikes etc.), his present interests (finding shelter, protecting his progeny, etc.), his present mood (excited, nervous, restless, contented, etc.), the state of his body (hot, cold, hungry, tired, ill, etc.), and of course, his present perceptual awareness of his environment, etc. All these constitute states of the creature which are going to be causally significant in whether or not some emotional *v*aluation is going to take place. Those states will interact causally to bring about a particular motivating bodily response. A state with content 'grass is edible' is sufficient for being an emotional *v*aluation, and thus an episode of a detection of a v-value if, given the context in which it occurs, it triggers a definite motivating bodily response. But note that none of the states basing the emotional *v*aluation are propositional attitudes. A context that does not include propositional attitudes, I call a *v-context*, a context that brings about emotional *v*aluations. A context that involves propositional attitudes, I call an e-context, a context that brings about emotional *e*valuations.

Consider the following example. If I am told to jump each time I see a patch of yellow, this bodily response is mediated by the belief that I am supposed to jump each time I see a patch of yellow, and the desire to follow the instruction. Yellow in this context is, therefore, not a v-value, and seeing yellow is therefore not an emotional *v*aluation. This is not to say that in some other context this could not be the case. A childhood trauma linked to yellow might prompt me to run away each time I face a patch of yellow. In this case, I experience an emotional *v*aluation and yellow is a v-value. Compare with this more complex example. Imagine I emotionally *v*alue a lion as dangerous. This state, together with the other states in which I am, motivate my running away,

together perhaps with the judgement that the lion is dangerous. At the last second, however, I succeed in controlling my fear, i.e. controlling my running away; I manage to look in the air calmly as I have been told to do in such circumstances. This action of looking in the air is not directly linked to my registering the roaring lion, for it is mediated by the procedure I have been told to follow in the situation. This further mediation, I want to argue, rules out on the present account the resulting bodily response from being an emotional *v*aluation. It is only because I am endowed with inferential capacities linked with the application of principles relative to the correct behaviour in the presence of lions, that I succeed in remaining calm in the situation. Most probably I continue to emotionally *v*alue the lion as dangerous, whilst I *e*valuate that the lion is not dangerous as long as I do not move. This example reminds us of course of Montaigne's philosopher.

Now, it is important to realise that the notion of a v-value is much too coarse, i.e. is much too encompassing, to account for the complexity of the structure of the emotions, even at the basic level with which I am concerned. A familiar and important distinction in the literature on the emotions between the *target* of the emotion (what causes the emotion) and its *object* or *formal object* (what the emotion is about) should be brought to bear on the present exposition if we want to be faithful to the phenomena.[113] In fact, more often than not, our emotions are triggered by *signals* or *cues* of what we v-value (the target of the emotion), and not directly by what we v-value (the object of the emotion). *That* noise might trigger my fear, but my fear is about the elephant that makes that noise, not the noise itself; *that* smell triggers my joy, but my joy is about the lasagne, not its smell; that face of yours might make me feel uncomfortable, but my discomfort is about us being unwelcome at the party, not about your

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[113] In fact, distinguishing between the *target* and the *object* of the emotions is only a first step in the possible relevant distinctions that might be brought to bear on the discussion. One can distinguish between the *proximal* target and the *distal* target, between the *illusory* target and the *real* target. Second, one can distinguish the object of the emotion, e.g. my friend Jeremy, and the *focus* of my emotion, e.g. his eating habits. One can distinguish between the focus of the emotion, e.g. his eating habits, and the *formal* or *evaluative property* this habit instantiates, e.g. the disgusting. The notion of a v-value attempts to capture the latter notion. But v-valuing, rather than being the application of a formal concept, e.g. 'this is disgusting!', is to be in a specific motivational state prompting one to act in certain ways, e.g. 'expressing disgust'. See e.g., de Souza (1987), Chap. 5, for a full layout of the complexities associated with the objects of the emotions.

grimace. Even more problematically, unrest or fear might, for example, be triggered by the absence of what we care about. When the wild-beast notices that her offspring is not under the tree where she left it, her unrest is triggered by an empty space, whereas her unrest might be thought to be explainable only by reference to her progeny. In all these cases, it might be argued, the formal object of the emotion (what I called v-value) is different from its target (the causal factor signalling the presence or absence of what is v-valued). What is important to note is that cues or signals do not have, from the point of view of the creature experiencing the emotion, an existence independently of what they are cues for, or signals of. Cues and signals are internally related to what they are cues for or signals of, and certainly in human creatures, both the cue and what the cue is a cue for are *salient* to them. If this is correct, the content of an emotional *v*aluation always contains their v-value in the sense of being *salient* to creature having the state with this content.

II.3. From emotional valuation to emotional evaluation

In the previous section, I have suggested that what is *salient* to a creature experiencing a basic emotion is some object, event or process as having a v-value. When I experience hate towards someone, what is before my mind is a hateful individual. Many aspects of the basic emotions are *not salient* to me. The bodily changes that I experience while the episode of hate occurs are, in fact, chief among the aspects of the emotion which are *not salient* to me. In this respect, ordinary language is particularly deceiving. For most properties which are presented to us *via* our emotions bear names that refer implicitly to the feelings accompanying the emotions that reveal them. "Hateful", "admirable", "funny", "amazing", seem to be, in ordinary language, the evaluative properties corresponding respectively to the emotions of "hating", "admiring", "having fun", "being amazed at", etc. But those, I wish to argue, are only the concepts corresponding to the v-values of these emotions, not what is *salient* to the creatures experiencing these emotions. When I experience hate, the bodily changes I go through are not part of the content of my present intentional state. Hate is the perception of the possibility of a violent action, admiration is the perception of the possibility of reverence, etc. "Fear" is the perception of the

possibility of avoiding a danger, not the perception of the frightening, as Brewer seems to believe. This is to say that ordinary language registers the concepts corresponding to the emotions, what I call the e-values, i.e. the objects of our emotional *e*valuations, and not the v-values, the objects of our emotional *v*aluations. Growing up, we learn to pay special attention, or reflect upon what reveals the object of our emotions. We learn to pay special attention to, or reflect on, the *vehicles* of our emotions, i.e. the special feel of hate, the bodily changes accompanying fear, etc. By doing this we make *salient* what is not at the level of emotional *v*aluation. We also learn to apply special abstract labels to the objects of those emotions, labels whose linguistic roots ("hateful", "shameful") remind us of the feelings that reveal them. We are taught about the typical causes of such episodes, and we learn to discriminate the interests, needs, and wants, which have to be present for the emotions to take place. Learning this is learning to be a creature capable of emotional *e*valuation, that is, learning to be a creature capable of learning about her mental states themselves, and how they present the world to be. This is the first step in the learning of what Brewer has in mind when he talks about learning to apply emotional concepts to one's self and to others, the first step that will lead to the capacity of, more generally, becoming a competent Folk Psychologist. It is also the first step in learning to control our emotions, and inhibit the natural bodily reactions accompanying them.

I will soon return to this line of thought. For now, let me just say that this capacity for emotional *e*valuation, I conceive of as the capacity to adopt what I called the *intellectualist* attitude towards emotions, i.e. the capacity to discriminate between the different ingredients involved in emotions, the capacity to reason inferentially on the basis of these discriminations for the planning and the execution of specific projects involving negotiation or interaction with our fellow human beings, and much more. This contrasts with another capacity that infants and higher animals also have, the pragmatist attitude, which does not involve the capacity to make any of these discriminations, but that, nevertheless, allows for a transparent awareness of other creatures' emotions, or so I shall argue in the second part of this chapter. If I am right, the conceptual capacity that Brewer has in mind, therefore, is

based on a more primitive capacity that alone allows for this conceptual capacity to emerge in human beings.

III. The transparency of emotions

Case study 1:

Barnabé and his wife Kunégonde are on the beach, sitting on the sand, facing the sea. They are talking departmental politics. In fact, Kunégonde's upper body and head is turned toward her husband. She sees his profile only, for he keeps an eye on their child, Anatole, who is crawling in the water some thirty yards away. A drama is about to unfold. Anatole's little head disappears from the surface of the water. Barnabé's whole body suddenly stiffens with fear, something his wife notices immediately. Her arms are already lifting her body from her sitting position when her eyes reach the sea and start to scan the water for a sign of little Anatole. When, one second later, she is up on her feet, she can see her husband entering her field of vision; he is running towards the water, and jumping in order to have a better view of the surface of the water. She herself is already running and jumping.

Case study 2:

Kunégonde is a single mother on the beach watching on her son, Anatole, who is playing in the water. Raymond is the local resort 'geezer' determined to have a good day with female tourists. He spots the lonely Kunégonde on the beach and, without asking permission, sits next to her. As he sits down, he sees fear on her face. He immediately turns his eyes in the direction of the water, and spots the little Anatole in deep waters. Right away, not believing his good luck (opportunities for being a

hero are rare), he runs to save the little child from certain drowning.

Case study 3:

Gwendoline is Barnabé and Kunégonde's babysitter. While distractedly watching the little Anatole playing in the water, she lets herself be courted by Raymond. Suddenly she can't see Anatole anymore on the surface of the water. Immediately she feels Kunégonde's panic even though Kunégonde is not even present.

III.1. From sensations to emotions

It is now time to bring together the two themes developed so far in this chapter, i.e. the structure of emotion learning and the structure of the emotions on the one hand, with the main claim of this chapter concerning the transparency of the emotions at the level of basic emotions on the other hand. I will argue that it is because emotional *v*aluations of others can be transparent to us that we can learn to be competent in the capacity of emotional *e*valuation, the capacity to apply emotional concepts to ourselves and others. Our first task is, therefore, to argue for the transparency claim. To that purpose, I will attempt to exploit the strategy developed in the second chapter concerning sensations and apply it to the emotions as conceived here. For those readers who have the second chapter still firmly in mind, it should be apparent how the notion of *a motivating bodily response* as not being in any way constituted by either uniquely first or uniquely third person access to them on the one hand, and the distinction between *vehicle* and *saliency* on the other hand, will now be put to use for the defence of the transparency claim with regard to the emotions.

Let us remind ourselves of the bare bones of this strategy. I started by insisting that perception in general was *integrative* in at least three ways: first, perception is sensitive to and acts upon *invariants* of the sensory field, second, perception is *cross–modal*, and third, perception delivers both world and self specifying information. I then argued that *the objects of such perceptions so construed included sensations.* I remarked as well, that whether or not we accept

that perception in general is integrated in this sense, there is *prima facie* a marked difference between the perception of my own sensations on the one hand, and sensations of others on the other hand. For, whereas the possibility of seeing a tree from a different angle from that which I actually see it is a real possibility, the possibility of seeing your sensation from another angle from that which I actually see it, in particular the angle you have on it 'from the inside', is not a real possibility.[114]

In the second chapter, I argued that this is, in fact, only a *prima facie* difference, which is wholly dependent on a specific view of the perception of our own sensations – a view that is certainly questionable. This view, often attributed to Wittgenstein and explicitly defended by Shoemaker, has it that there is a necessary relation between the sensation and its perception on the first-personal case, which makes it a very eccentric case of perception, if perception at all. And if, the argument continues, this is the canonical way we get to know about our own sensations, then it is difficult to see how it can be of any help for the perception of other people's sensations.[115] By contrast, however, if it can be shown that there is no such intimacy between perception and sensation, i.e. that the structure of first-person and third-person perception is the same, and that integration of these two angles, or poles of the perception of sensations is the canonical way we get to know about them, then there is absolutely no reason why it cannot be used to perceive other people's sensations. In fact, if this is so, I remarked, we face somewhat the converse problem. It appears now that the sensations of others can be felt by me as if they were my own, or perhaps more alarmingly, as if they did not belong to anyone.[116] The solution to that, I suggested, consisted of bringing to bear an important distinction between what is *salient* in such perceptual episodes, and the *vehicle* of such episodes. I remarked that we can learn to pay special

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[114] This is what prompted Husserl at the last moment to re-introduce the notion of analogy. See Chap. 2, sec. III.2 above.

[115] See Chap. 2, sec. II.3 above.

[116] This was the main worry against Scheler's account of empathy. See Chap. 2, sec. III.2 above.

attention or reflection to the vehicles of these perceptions, i.e. their sensory basis, and that questions of ownership got resolved in that way.[117]

If the premises of this argument are correct, i.e. (1) there is no structural difference between first and third person perception of sensations that makes such perceptual episodes uniquely first-personal in such a way that they cannot be accessed to from the third person point of view, (2) that ownership can be, nevertheless, accounted for by distinguishing between what is *salient* in having a sensation and the sensory *vehicle* of this sensation, then we have supplemented Brewer's account with the necessary glue between 'inside' and 'outside' which alone can account for the way my own experiences (reinterpreted as integrated perception) can be the basis on which I learn to ascribe experiences to others, without compromising irrevocably the distinction between having a sensation (first person perspective) and observing one (third person perspective). But, Brewer is talking about emotions, not sensations. My duty now is to convince you that this strategy can be applied to emotions as well.

The basic difference between sensations and emotions is to be found in the location of their typical objects. Whereas sensations are only felt in bodies, either in one's own body or, as we just reminded ourselves, in the body of someone else, the object of an emotion can also be felt outside the body. In fact, the objects of the emotions are to be found mainly outside the body; however, this is just a statistical fact, not a logical one. If the object of an emotion might be anything that one v-values, then it can be anywhere, and of course there are a lot of things that I might v-value in my body or in other's people bodies. *Chief among the objects that I v-value, we find the emotions of others or the v-values these emotions signal or are cues for.*

So emerges the intriguing thesis, according to which basic emotions in others are typical objects of our basic emotions. Basic emotions, the phenomenon I cashed out under the label of emotional *v*aluation is, I claim, a means by which I get informed about someone else's emotional *v*aluations. This merely follows from what has been said so far. Let us recap. Emotional *v*aluations are responses to what one v-values. Emotions of others are typically

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[117] See Chap. 2, sec. III.4 above.

things that one v-values. But a basic emotion, as construed here, is a motivating bodily response. So chief among the objects of basic emotions we find motivating bodily responses. For A to v-value B's emotion is for A to be aware of (to bodily respond to) the motivating bodily response B is undergoing. If this is true, an episode of A's v-valuing B's emotion is for A to be aware of a great deal of B's current psychological life. Or is it? I take it that if the two conditions for transparency are met, then A will, indeed, be aware of great deal of his current psychological life, although of course, this will not amount to a full-blown conceptual capacity with respect to the emotions. It is possible to say, though, that A's motivating bodily response to B's is both a case of *sharing* and *recognising*.

Let us now turn to our case studies for purposes of illustration, which I take to be typical examples of v-valuings of other people v-valuings. First, these stories illustrate why other people's emotions are typical objects of v-valuings. This is the case for many reasons: (1) interactions with others involve expectations as to how we want the immediate or less immediate future of our dealings with them to progress. Keeping an eye on the figure and posture of others is to be informed about what happens to them relative to what we need from them. For, we might want to keep them happy, we might want them to feel threatened, guilty, etc. (2) It is a means by which we can gather information about those bits of the environment that we v-value and of which we are not directly aware, for example, because it is not directly in our visual field as in the first case study. Kunégonde can watch the sea, where she knows little Anatole is, by watching her husband. (3) It is a means by which we can gather information about bits of the environment that we might potentially v-value, even in the total ignorance of what this environment contains with respect to our interests. Raymond, in the second case study, appears to become aware of a danger just by looking at Kunégonde even though he doesn't even know about Anatole's existence. (4) Gwendoline, in the third case study, appears to ascribe an emotion to Kunégonde, although in her absence, just by realising that Anatole has disappeared.

Most of these cases, at the level of description they have been presented, I will argue, can be explained by means of our capacities for emotional *v*aluation alone. That is, those examples are typical cases in which the emotion

of someone else is transparent to one in the sense defended here. In most of these stories, although at varying degrees, the other person's emotion is both *shared* and *recognised*. I will argue that it is shared in the sense that, for each of the two protagonists involved in each of these scenarios, the *object* of their emotions, what they v-value, is the same. I will argue that it is recognised by the witness protagonist in each of these stories because the *target* of their emotion, what triggers it, is the motivating bodily response of the protagonist in which they witness the emotion. The rest of this chapter should make this complex claim clear.

What I have done so far is outline the key elements that we should focus on in our attempt to exploit the argument concerning the transparency of other people's sensations in order to defend the same argument in the case of the emotions of other people. What we have seen is that, given the complex structure of the emotions even at the basic level with which we are concerned, the perception of those in others is going to be even more complex, as we have just seen. Despite that, however, I believe emotional *v*aluation alone can explain what happens in these different stories, or at least in the first two. I shall focus on the first case study first.

III.2. Barnabé, Kunégonde and Anatole: dissecting the drama

Let us see how an account of our little tragedy (first case study) would be accounted for in terms of emotional *v*aluation. A friend of explanations in term of emotional *v*aluation will say that Barnabé directly bodily responds in the way he does because something he cares about and of which he is perceptually aware, Anatole, has been affected in a way that, to say the least, displeases him. The first element that we should sort out is the context in which Barnabé finds himself. Now this question does not make sense in the abstract. A context is always a context relative to an answer to a specific question; it depends crucially on what we want to explain. Although the brand of the towel on which Barnabé sits might be part of a description of the situation in which he is, it might not be relevant to why he jumps to his son's rescue. But even when we exclude obviously irrelevant parameters in the explanation of Barnabé's response, we might still wonder whether, for example, the fact that he is a

responsible father, or the fact that he lost his mother at sea should figure in the explanation. The only possible way of answering this question is by determining further the question we are looking for. In accordance with my account of emotional *v*aluation we should only appeal to minimal content in terms of *saliency* – that which *directly* explains his emotional response as a satisfaction of a motive. Those elements that are going to be appealed to, I claim, are also the minimal ingredients needed for making sense of the way his wife will bodily respond to his motivating bodily response. In short, these are the minimal conditions for adopting the *pragmatist* attitude toward Barnabé. These ingredients will form what I called the v-context, and is the only thing we need consider. In this perspective, the context in which Barnabé's reaction of fear takes place is one that involves the perceptual awareness of the surroundings in which his son chiefly figures. It includes, too, the fact that he is responsible for the safety of his son. Barnabé emotionally *v*alues the situation in which his son is as fairly dangerous. This is what is *salient* for him. And this is all we need take into account to explain, again on the pragmatist mode, his emotional *v*aluation. Moreover, I will argue, it is all that is needed to explain Kunégonde's emotional response to that of her husband. For the relevant context that explains her emotional response is the same as the relevant context that explains hers. Let us see why.

Her perceptual awareness before the drama reaches its climax is one in which the posture and figure of her husband chiefly figures. By hypothesis, she is as much as her husband concerned with the safety of her son. Now, things get a bit complicated, for we have here three possible descriptions of her emotional state. First, we can describe her, during this lapse of time, as emotionally v-valuing her husband's bodily posture and figure as one of v-valuing his son's situation as fairly dangerous. Second, we can describe her as v-valuing the face and posture of her husband as fearful. Third, we can describe her, as her husband, as being in a state of v-valuing the situation of her son as fairly dangerous. The first description ascribes to her a meta-representation, she represents to herself the way her husband represents to himself his surroundings. In the second description we avoid such ascription. Both the *target* of her emotion and the *object* of her emotion are different from the target and the object of his emotion. In the third description, we account for the difference

between their two situations simply by noticing that their respective emotions have *different* targets, despite having the *same* object. If I were forced to describe her situation in the first way, then my account fails, for reasoning from meta-representations entails exercising inferential capacities, i.e. entails adopting the intellectualist attitude. If I were forced into the second description, my account would fail for a different reason. For, how could I say that she feels his emotion, i.e. shares it, when both the target and the object of her emotion are different from the object and the target of his? Hopefully, I am not forced into either of these descriptions, for the third description, one that neither requires meta-representation, and thus inference, nor excludes the possibility of Kunégonde genuinely sharing her husband's emotion, while also recognising it, is available to me. That this option is open to me should be made clear in the remainder of this chapter.

III.3. The transparency of emotions

The questions we now have to answer are: First, how can the argument for the transparency of sensation be exploited for the development of the same argument concerning the emotions, given that the objects of the emotions, as opposed to the objects of sensations, are v-values outside the body? Second, how will the transparency claim resolve Brewer's problems concerning the possibility of learning to be competent attributers of emotions?

In the first place, we ask ourselves whether emotions are such that they allow the two steps argument leading to the favourable conclusion reached for sensations. In other words, first, can it be said of emotions that access to them is not uniquely first personal to the extent that third-person access to them is impossible? Second, does the distinction between *saliency* and *vehicle* apply to basic emotions in the relevant way? Most of the material needed to answer these questions has already been expanded upon. But let us see now how it compares with sensations. We remember that our chief reason for denying that part of what it is to be a sensation was for it to be perceived in a uniquely first person way, was that we saw no reason why sensations like regular perceptions should not be construed as intentional states. Now, although there might be controversies as to whether sensations can be construed as intentional states, this

is not the case with emotions that are generally regarded as intentional states, as we have argued at length in the third chapter. We might be concerned, however, for another reason. If we think that the emotions we experience are directly dependent on the particular beliefs and the particular desires we have, then there is a clear sense in which emotions are first personal in a sense that sensations are not. For, whereas your pain is in general there for me to see, your belief, for example, that all the croissants have been sold, which is why you are now sad, is nowhere to be seen. The first thing to note is that the sense in which emotions might be thought to be first personal in this instance has nothing to do with the sense in which sensations might be thought to be uniquely first-personal. Although, of course, you might lie to me about your beliefs, there are no reasons why I should not be, in principle, capable of knowing about your beliefs in the same way that you know about them.[118] So the difference with sensation here remarked upon is not the relevant one. Second, if there are such things as emotional *v*aluations, which, to recall, do not involve any propositional attitudes, then the objection is anyway outside the scope of my claim. My claim is about emotional *v*aluations, not about emotional *e*valuations, which are clearly not things one can perceive directly. The upshot is that there is no *prima facie* reason, at least not on the line pursued here, why the way I have conceived of first and third person perspective on the emotions should in any way constitute a barrier for the development of the parallel argument I am seeking for emotions. It remains to be seen, however, whether and how both the *recognition* and *sharing* components of transparency are satisfied by episodes of v–valuations of other people's v–valuations, and, in particular, whether the recognition is such that, as in the sensation case, other people's v–valuations do not present themselves as *owned*, i.e. do not present themselves as mine rather than yours?

Basic emotions are motivating bodily responses to some v-value that is presently salient to a creature. These responses are cases of integrated perception in the sense of being both a proprioceptive and exteroceptive

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[118] This statement presupposes that not only have I no immediate knowledge of the content of my beliefs, but that I do not have immediate knowledge of my beliefs either. That is, I can lie to myself about what I believe. This is not to imply, however, that I do not have immediate knowledge of what I currently believe I believe.

awareness of what one is doing with respect to some perceived v-value of an object or situation. Reflection on the phenomenology of these episodes, what is *salient* in them, shows that the content of these episodes does not seem to make any explicit reference to the creature having the emotion. Reference to the creature experiencing the emotional *v*aluation, as in the case of sensation, seems, in the ordinary case, only implicit. Fear, for example, is the experience of '*that* danger to be avoided' not the experience of '*my* motivation to avoid the present danger', nor 'this is a danger to *me*'. Of course, what is *salient* to the creature appears to have a direct effect on the creature's behaviour – it is *her* body that she moves away when in fear – but this behaviour and its motives are not represented explicitly by the creature *as being her own*. To convince oneself of this phenomenological claim, one should think of how it feels to experience someone else's emotion, e.g. fear, in the ordinary case. Witnessing the fear of someone else in the ordinary case is also a case of v-valuing the situation as being potentially dangerous. The object of both creatures' emotions, the one experiencing the emotion in the first place, and the one witnessing it, is the same v-value. It is an experience of '*that* danger to be avoided', not '*your* motivation to avoid danger' or 'this danger *to you* to be avoided'. Describing Kunégonde's emotional response to the fear of her husband in the first case study as an experience that refers to Barnabé's motivation to avoid danger just misrepresents the content of her experience. What is *salient* to her is the danger to be avoided. Her emotional *v*aluation is, in all relevant respects, qualitatively the same as that of her husband. This, I suggest, is reflected in the following description of the climax of our little drama. Although the TARGET of their respective emotion is different, the <u>object</u> of their respective emotion is not. Barnabé's bodily response (triggered by ANATOLE'S DISAPPEARANCE) is – and strikes Kunégonde as such – a motive <u>to keep Anatole safe</u>. Kunégonde's bodily response (triggered by his BODILY RESPONSE) is a motive <u>to keep Anatole safe</u>.

The second case study – where the witness protagonist, Raymond is ignorant of what the second protagonist, Kunégonde, v-values – can be described in more or less the same way, although the degree to which they share the emotion is less. Although the TARGET of Kunégonde's and Raymond's

respective emotion is different, the object of their respective emotion is not. Kunégonde's bodily response (triggered by ANATOLE'S DISAPPEARANCE) is a motive to keep Anatole safe. Raymond's bodily response (triggered by her BODILY RESPONSE) is a motive to keep someone or something safe. Raymond, not knowing of Anatole's existence, of course, cannot share completely Kunégonde's emotion, but can certainly share its main ingredient, which is a danger to be avoided, or something to be kept safe.

If this is a correct description of what happens when Kunégonde responds to her husband's response, or when Raymond bodily responds to Kunégonde's bodily response, then I have shown that the first step of the two steps strategy that applies to sensations, applies to emotions as well. That is, I have shown that at least one of the two components which I claimed constituted *transparency*, namely, the *sharing* component, is present in the case of awareness of others people's basic emotion. If their respective emotions have the same object, they v-value the same object or the same aspects of a situation, then they clearly have the same emotion type, or more or less the same emotion type, even if, of course, they are numerically different.

It will be objected, however, that the second condition for transparency is not met, i.e. that there is no clear sense in which Kunégonde *recognises* her husband's emotion. That this is the case can be illustrated by the following thought experiment. If it were a mirror, rather than her husband's motivating bodily response that was the target of Kunégonde's emotion, i.e. it was a mirror that was *signalling* to Kunégonde the disappearance of her child as opposed to her husband's bodily response, then again we would have a case where the targets of Kunégonde's and Barnabé's respective emotions are different, but the object of their respective emotions is the same. In this instance, however, we would not be tempted for one second to say that she recognises his emotion, even if their emotions have the same object, – i.e. even if they would be sharing the same emotion type – for by hypothesis in this case, his emotion is in no way part of her field of consciousness. But where is the difference, the objector will ask, between the normal case and the mirror case? In other words, what is it that makes Kunégonde's emotion not only qualitatively identical to that of her husband, but makes it also a case of recognition of her husband's emotion.

What the objector presupposes is that for it to be a case of her recognising his emotion, she has to recognise it *as his* emotion. In Shoemaker's terms, what the objector wants is not only the satisfaction of the *property identification component* condition – in this case the identification of Barnabé's bodily response as indicating danger, but also the satisfaction of the *reference identification component* condition, in this case, Barnabé *as* Barnabé, however we need to cash that out. In other words, the fact that it is *his* emotion should, according to the objector, be *salient* to her. Is that true? I do not see any reasons why this should be the case. It is sufficient that she bodily responds to his motivating bodily response for it to be a case of her recognising his emotion. This is enough for the satisfaction of the reference identification component condition, and the fact that the referent is Barnabé's bodily response as indicating danger is sufficient for distinguishing this case from the case where she bodily responds to Anatole's disappearance *via* the mirror. For although his motivating bodily response is not salient to her *as belonging to him*, as *owned* by him, the motivating bodily response itself is certainly salient to her, not the mirror. Again, the objection would go through if it were the case that experiencing a bodily response was fundamentally either first personal or third personal, for in this case, we would want to say that Kunégonde does not have at all Barnabé's first person perspective on the danger. But, as I hope to have shown, this distinction so understood is not available. If that is correct, then the second component of transparency, i.e. *recognition*, is now satisfied, and we therefore have an understanding of what it means for someone else's emotion to be transparent. Both the sharing and recognition conditions are met in emotional *v*aluations of other people's emotional *v*aluations, although the recognition component is such that the ownership intuition does not get decided at that level. But remember, this is exactly what was expected if the emotion recognition case is, indeed, parallel to the sensation recognition case.

As for the third case study, the situation is more complex, as Kunégonde is not experiencing any emotion to which Gwendoline might be said to respond. At the hour of the drama, Kunégonde is yet ignorant of what happens, and the case can only be described as Gwendoline imagining Barnabé's motivating bodily response. The issues of sharing and recognising here of course do not

make sense, as there is no emotion to be shared or recognised. The interesting question here is, in the hypothesis that Gwendoline herself does care about the fate of Anatole outside of her awareness of his parents caring for him, there is a sense in which her panic is also the panic of Anatole's parents. She might be said to share their concern in the sense of having made it hers, but without representing this concern as being Barnabé's or Kunégonde's. This kind of case deserves much more attention than can paid to it here.

III.4. Transparency and learning to ascribe emotions

If the objector accepts the argument about recognition of emotions not having contents representing explicitly their owners, she will still want to know how we end up ascribing emotions to specific people. In the story told so far nothing seems to explain that practice. Here, we reach the second step of our two steps argument; it is the point where we should bring to bear the distinction we made between *saliency* and *vehicle* in the case of emotions, as we did for the case of sensations, and use this distinction to explain the question of the *ownership* of the emotions. It is also the point in the discussion at which the distinction between emotional *v*aluation and emotional *e*valuation should become completely clear, and the point where a final explanation of the general structure of the process by which children learn to apply emotional concepts to themselves rather than to others, or the reverse, should be given. We remember as well that this was Brewer's chief concern.

Basic emotions are direct bodily responses to what a creature v-values. But it is equally true that, as far as humans are concerned, we are taught to pause and pay special attention or reflect on these basic v-valuations. We are taught to pay special attention to the *vehicle* of the emotion: the sensory basis that discloses to us the world as being inhabited by v-values. That is, we can adopt the intellectualist attitude and attempt to decompose the different elements of the situation that might explain, alter, refocus the emotion we are experiencing. We can focus on how it feels 'from the inside' or 'from the outside' by shifting our attention to the one or the other. If I am frightened, I might focus my attention on the knot in my belly in order to relax, or focus on the expression on my face in order not to betray my state to an enemy. By the

same process of attention, I will learn to label what I v-value by reference to the *vehicle* of the emotion. I now am capable of labelling the lion as *frightening*, although what was *salient* for me in the first place was just a danger to be avoided. One of the many aspects that might now become salient, apart from those aspects just mentioned, when paying special attention to the sensory *vehicle* of my emotional *v*aluation is the *owner* of the emotion. Although Kunégonde recognised the emotion of her husband, his emotion was not *salient* to her *as his* in the first place. In this scenario, questions of ownership did not arise at all, for both Kunégonde and Barnabé generally share the same motives in respect of their son. She did not perceive him *as* a full–blown centre of consciousness with his own perceptions, with his own agency, with his own emotions. But, learning to ascribe emotions to others or to oneself in the full-blown sense is precisely to learn that different people have different interests and motives. In the ordinary case, questions of ownership of emotions emerge when it is realised by the witness, reflecting on the situation, that she does not have, or should try not to have, the same interests, motives, as the person she witnesses. That is, to make an attempt at making an emotional *e*valuation of the situation, distinguishing between the desires and the beliefs that are in play in the circumstances, and ultimately making full-blown attributions of emotions to oneself and others, the contents of which will then explicitly represent the owner of the bodily response as a distinct psychological being from oneself. Learning to appreciate horror movies, for example, is the process of getting the balance right between who has what motives. As a spectator, if I take the motives of the protagonists on the screen as being systematically my own motives, the fear I experience is simply intolerable. If, by contrast, I manage total detachment, i.e. if the result of paying special attention to or reflection on my situation as opposed to that of the protagonist in the film results in my separating completely what *my* motives of *my* mental set are by contrast with the motives of the protagonist's mental set on the screen, then I won't experience the thrill for which I was in the cinema in the first place.

Reverting now to the question of learning and the concerns of Brewer that started this discussion, I wish to close this chapter with the following concluding remarks. Brewer was right to point at what the emotions are about,

i.e. what elicits the emotional response as the mind – independent ground upon which depends the capacity to ascribe emotional concepts to oneself and others. This was to constitute the first step in a strategy that was to provide a public condition for the application of emotional concepts, a condition that was not either fully first-personal and therefore logically not sharable, nor a condition that was fully third-personal and therefore resulting in a psychologically implausible picture of ascription. I expressed doubt, however, as to whether Brewer's analysis of the emotions as indexical thoughts referring ultimately to the expressive behaviour of the emotions was by itself capable of providing that public condition for our capacity to learn to ascribe emotional concepts which were not ultimately as faulty as the mentalist and behaviourist picture it was meant to supplant. I argued that it is only by showing how this emotional response was not more pure feeling than pure behaviour, i.e. not more something defined purely in terms of first personal access than something defined purely in terms of third-personal access, that these two pitfalls could be avoided. When this was understood and established, however, we seemed to loose one important component of what we set ourselves to explain, i.e. the manner in which we appear to be ascribing emotions to specific creatures. Blurring the distinction between the first-personal and the third-personal we succeeded in extracting ourselves from the conceptual problem of other minds, but potentially at the cost of not being in a position to say *who* has which emotion. I suggested, however, that the distinction between emotional *v*aluation and emotional *e*valuation, between what is *salient* to us in our basic emotions and what might become *salient* when paying special attention to the vehicles of these basic emotions, questions of ownership could be (and generally do) become resolved.

CHAPTER 5: EMOTIONAL VALUATION AND THE UNDERSTANDING OF OTHER PEOPLE'S EMOTIONS

I. Introduction

I concluded the first chapter of this dissertation by postponing the very important question of the 'richness' of the deliveries of our so–called direct perception of other people's experiences. The worry was that, although one might admit that 'some' information might be gathered by perceiving an emotion conceived on the perceptual model defended in this thesis, this information so gathered cannot be equated with a full–blown attribution of an emotion, i.e. it is not 'rich' enough. One way of putting the point is to say that perceiving an emotion is not *understanding* it, and *understanding* is what we should be after. It is now time to take up this worry.

Goldie has recently considered head on the question of what it means to understand someone else's emotion.[119] This chapter uses his conception of *understanding emotion* as a starting point, shows how emotional *v*aluation falls short of counting as understanding emotion *à la* Goldie, but how it does meet the conditions of a conception of understanding emotions which is less demanding, although I argue, no less cogent, than that proposed by Goldie.

The more general aim of this chapter is to assess the importance of emotional *v*aluation as conceived in this thesis in the broader context of the literature on mind reading. In philosophy, questions surrounding the nature of mind reading take place in the very fashionable theory-theory vs. simulation debate,[120] after having been the object the 'problem of other minds' for a few decades. Most of the protagonists of the contemporary debate appear to agree that the debate is ill defined. This is the case for at least the two following general reasons. First, it is not obvious that the two theoretical alternatives are,

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[119] Goldie (1999).

[120] For introductions to the mains issues of the debate, see Davies (1994), Davies & Stone (1995a), Introduction; Heal (1994); Stich & Nichols (1992); Stone & Davies (1996).

in fact, competing explanations of the same phenomena. Someone else's sensations, feelings, sentiments, emotions, propositional attitudes, dispositions, character traits, moods, behaviour, action, etc., might all come into play in an episode of mind reading, and might all be things that we 'read' in others; and second, the two theoretical alternatives seem to subdivide in so many sub-theoretical options where the differences between them seem often much more interesting than their commonalities. Goldie, for example, is one such philosopher who has shown how *simulating* other people's minds and actions[121] can take many different forms and shapes. He individuates not less than the following: *emotional contagion*, *emotional identification*, *emotional sharing*, *central imagining*, *acentral imagining*, *peripheral imagining*, *in-his-shoes imagining*, *empathy*, and *sympathy*, and he articulates why these different ways of simulating are not necessarily competing accounts, but different ways of 'getting in touch with', or 'thinking of', other people's mental states suitable in different contexts for different interpretative projects. This chapter proposes to go over these different alternative interpretative projects and how they relate to emotional valuation.

A more specific problem with the literature on mind reading, and the one which is going to occupy my attention in this chapter, is not so much related to the kind of phenomena it tries to cover, but the kind of interpretative feat an account of mind reading should sanction. Awareness of, recognition of, attribution of, prediction of, explanation of, and understanding of, other people's mental states can all be conceived of as mind reading feats. Which of those is a theory of mind reading supposed to account for? My view is that mind reading theory should not force itself to choose between those, but recognise that although related in interesting ways, these are variously called for depending on the real context of interpretation. Now, the context of interpretation is precisely what is not taken into account in the literature on mind reading. Philosophers choose one sort of example, stick to this sort, and use them to test the alternative theories. As I shall try to illustrate, the example chosen, naturally and without

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[121] The early and best-known formulators and advocates of Simulation theory are Gordon (1986, 1992, 1996, 2000); Goldman (1989, 1992a), Heal (1989, 1996, 1998a, 1998b), Currie (1996). The discussion of Simulation theory to come will follow closely Goldie's paper, and will only tangentially touch upon the contributions of the philosophers just mentioned.

further questioning, establishes which kind of interpretative achievement among those possible is the central focus. I presume Goldie would follow me in this diagnosis, but he, nevertheless, appears to privilege the notion of *understanding* construed in a specific, particularly demanding, way. This I shall challenge.

In the first part of the chapter, I illustrate how the choice of examples constrains arbitrarily the way we theorise about mind reading by looking at the theory-theory side of the debate, and the manner in which the responses that this side of the debate – be it from simulation theory, or from more ecumenist approaches – fail to question what kind of interpretationist achievement a theory should sanction. Although independent of my argument against Goldie, this first part of the chapter helps explain where I am coming from. In the second part of the chapter I set up my case against Goldie.

He argues that the means – associated, one way or another, with the various trends of simulation theory – by which we might be said to recognise that someone else is experiencing a given emotion are, taken by themselves or together, neither *necessary* nor *sufficient* for *understanding* that someone else is experiencing a given emotion. In other words, simulation, however construed, is neither necessary nor sufficient for understanding emotions. In this chapter, I argue that both the necessity and the sufficiency claims have two possible interpretations. On the first of the two possible interpretations of Goldie's theses, both the necessity and the sufficiency claims are trivially true, whereas on their second non-trivial (interesting) possible interpretations, both claims are false. That is, I shall argue that emotional contagion and empathy, two of the main ways which might be thought to yield understanding of others people's emotions are respectively necessary for the *acquisition* and the *manifestation* of the capacity to understand other people's emotions (the non trivial necessity claim), and sufficient in themselves to count as instances of genuine, even if limited, *understanding* of someone else's emotion (the non-trivial sufficiency claim). Not surprisingly, I conceive of understanding – as it figures in these claims – on the model of the transparency claim I developed in the previous chapter.

I.1. Explaining, predicting, attributing and being aware

Imagine you are told, without any more particulars, that some soldier fled away in the course of battle. On hearing this, you might decide that he fled out of fear. In this example, obviously not a perceptual one, it is not clear that you came out with an *attribution* of emotion rather than an *explanation* of a piece of behaviour, or both. It is a matter of controversy here which of the two comes first – if any. You might think that it is a case of explanation rather than a case of attribution. You explain the flight of the soldier by recourse to the fact that he was afraid. Alternatively, you might think that it is a simple case of attribution. Flight is the expression of fear, a bit like perceiving a table is a sign of its presence. No explanation takes place, you just establish what is the case by means of signs which you know are reliable indicators of what is the case; which of course, might now serve as the beginning of an explanation, if one were needed. But whether or not we want to call this a case of explanation rather than a case of attribution, the reverse or both, the point is that the very example chosen favours the explanation/prediction model over the attribution model. One is told *via* some description of a certain behaviour what is the case in the *physical* world, and one is then, so to speak, asked to deliver an informed guess as to what *mental* episode lies behind the physical facts. Those examples whereby one is told that a certain behaviour, for instance, looking outside from a window, rubbing one's arms energetically, or perceiving a snake, is followed by, respectively, taking one's umbrella, closing the window, running away, etc., render the "theory" approaches to psychological interpretation almost irresistible. These simple examples have prompted philosophers to propose complex but neat hypotheses as to how we reach psychological interpretation of the agents figuring in them. A reminder of these complex hypotheses can be profitably summed up with the following dialectical intention in mind. First, I hope to illustrate how a theory which is set up for the sole purpose of explaining phenomena as they appear in a very limited set of examples should not be thought to be extendable to account for other phenomena it cannot explain, and second, why this very fact has generated so much dissatisfaction with these theories, a dissatisfaction, in fact, unrelated to any inherent flaws in the theories themselves. Here is an early version of a hypothesis – which might not have

many partisans nowadays[122] – devoted to the explanation of the sort of examples listed above:

Theory-theory (personal): It is the hypothesis according to which human beings internalise a theory for the purpose of the interpretation of other people's mental life and actions. The theory consists of rules connecting bodily manifestations and behaviour with their typical mental causes, rules that are used by subjects for understanding and predicting behaviour and/or mental states of their fellow con-specifics. On this hypothesis, the subject is thought to be particularly active in the process of building up the theory, and thus has full access to its content. The useful metaphor here (although how much those endorsing this theory really think it is only a metaphor, I am not sure), is that of the scientist testing theories generated by her observations and refining them in the face of their respective verdicts.[123] Three main features characterise the central version of this hypothesis: (1) The theory is thought to be exploiting concepts that are mastered by the subject (those of Folk-psychology), even though the subject might not be very good at articulating the theory. (2) The theory is, by and large, acquired thanks to a subject actively involved in experimenting with the psychological and social world around her. (3) The theory is non-modular in the sense that it uses ingredients that are handy for purposes other than psychological explanation. Consequently, it is open to information and modification emanating from other capacities the subject uses in its interaction and negotiation with her environment.

Without reviewing the battery of specific objections against the theory-theory (personal level) hypothesis as an account of how we come to be aware of other people's mental states or action,[124] it has from the start been thought to be badly wrong, because it appears to concern itself with the life of creatures and

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[122] But see in particular Gopnik &Wellman (1992, 1994), Gopnik (1993, 1996), Wellman (1990, 1993).

[123] "Indeed, we would say, not that children are little scientists but that scientists are big, and relatively, slow children. The historical progress of science is based in cognitive abilities that are first seen in very young children" (Gopnik & Wellman, 1994).

[124] See e.g. Hobson (1991), Morton (1991, 1996), Russell (1992, 1995).

their development that are just not those of the animals we are familiar with. Whereas it is true that we sometimes systematise our psychological knowledge for the purpose of understanding, explaining or predicting the mental states/behaviour of others, the hypothesis seems to be just the wrong description of the manner in which we access other people's psychological states in ordinary cases. Before I say what sort of interaction with other people's psychological states seems not to be accounted for by this model, and why this might be due to the set of examples that motivate the theory, I wish to present another version of the theory-theory which is altogether different, given that it situates itself at a completely different level. This is the sub-personal version of the theory-theory.[125]

Theory-theory (sub-personal): the hypothesis according to which human beings are naturally equipped with, or naturally internalise (or both) a theory for the purpose of the interpretation of other people's mental life and actions. The theory consists of rules connecting bodily manifestations and behaviour with their typical mental causes that are used by subjects for understanding and predicting behaviour and/or mental states of their fellow con-specifics. In contrast with the personal model of the theory-theory, the three following features characterise the central version of this sub-personal version: the concepts used by the internal(ised) theory are not those of any natural language mastered by the subject once she has reached adult life, and consequently, the subject has very little access to the main rules building up the theory; (2) the theory is 'hard-wired', either as a totally inborn mechanism or as a mechanism that reaches full capacity after suitable maturation of the brain given normal stimulation by the environment; (3) the theory is modular in the sense that it is domain-specific: the theory cannot be used for purposes other than the interpretation of others, and is not penetrable by higher cognitive states.

The general dissatisfaction with this version of the theory-theory[126] is that it just does not address the question that philosophers of an *interpretationist*

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[125] See e.g. Perner (1991, 1992), Fodor (1992), Carruthers (1996), Leslie (2000).

[126] The distinctions between modular –vs.– non-modular, innate –vs.– non-innate, conceptual –vs.– sub-conceptual are all orthogonal to one another. This means that there are, in fact, many

bent are concerned with.[127] An interpretationist will not content herself with an exclusive focus on the sub-personal level.[128] Unless told and convinced that the sub-personal level is the implementation of the personal level, and that there are nomological relations holding between the two levels, these philosophers are bound to be dissatisfied. For, if there are no nomological (or quasi-nomological) relations between the two levels, then these philosophers will not be happy to consider the one as an explanation, or even an illumination, of the second.[129] This being said, some philosophers and psychologists are confident that an illuminating bridge between the two levels is bound to be found, and thus are happy to view the sub-personal version of the theory-theory as the systematisation of Folk Psychology.[130] It is not the place here to argue against these hopes. In the rest of this thesis I will presuppose, with a good proportion of the philosophical community, that the normativity of everyday attribution, explanation and prediction of mental states remains unaccounted for in computational models of the mind of the kind Leslie and Fodor encourage us to endorse.

This being said, at a more general level, the dissatisfaction with both versions of the theory-theory can be put down to the fact that they both ignore that we are creatures with feelings, emotions and imagination, all elements that appears to us to play a role in the ways we notice and come to view others as psychological beings. This is perhaps the main motivation behind the simulationist attack on theory-theory. Although varying importantly in many

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more possible theories–theories than the two presented here, and some of them are actually defended. It is the case, however, that these two options exemplify the main combinations of views in the literature.

[127] See Chap. 3, sec. II.2 above.

[128] Here is how Goldie (1999) expresses the same idea: "When we think third-personally about another person, we can do it in at least two ways. First, we can think of him as a person, like me having a point of view, capable of feelings like me, and like me capable of thoughts and actions that are guided by normative principles. Secondly, we can think of him objectively without any special point of view, to be considered as an appropriate object for scientific study, having responses that are subject to causal laws of the sort usually appealed to by the theory-theorist of a functionalist bent"(p.399). Whilst Goldie sees himself as defending a resolutely normative third-personal approach, as the *interpretationist* would do, he rejects what he calls the objective approach endorsed by the theory-theorist (sub-personal level), and I follow him on this.

[129] For the best known attempt to reconcile interpretationist concerns with physicalist ones, see Davidson (1963, 1970). For important worries with regard to Davidson's program, see e.g. Stoutland (1986), McDowell (1985b).

respects, the central thought underscoring the family of theories grouped under the umbrella term of *simulationism* is the following. Far from being natural scientists applying theories of the mental to understand our fellow human beings and pets, what we actually do is just to wonder how it would be for us – how we would feel, what we would think, how we would reason, how we would act, etc. – were it the case that we were in their circumstances and not in ours. It is interesting to note that early Simulationists who were fundamentally dissatisfied with the theory approach to interpretation felt, nevertheless, compelled to discuss the same examples, probably with the intention of being seen as devising an alternative explanation of the same phenomena. It took a long time, and a massive quantity of articles, books and reviews defending the respective merits and superiority of the two rival explanations of the empirical data, before most came to the conclusion that the two approaches were not necessarily competing accounts, but different tools that we have at our disposal to make sense of other people psychologically. It took as much time to agree on the fact that we do not face two competing accounts, but a plethora of different ones on both sides of the debate. I have already presented two possible theory-theories, and I am now going to present a number of means by which we might be thought to simulate others.

The ill-defined nature of the debate has prompted some, and Goldie is a prime example, to turn away from the one–dimensional examples that have generated the explanation/prediction approaches to Folk psychology, as well as its simulationist answers which saw themselves as addressing the same questions linked to explanation and prediction, to consider much more sophisticated and complex ones. This is how some have started to look at examples of the type psychoanalysts or literary critics tend to discuss. Why on earth did Raskolnikov react the way he did at that stage of his life? Why did Lucien de Rubempré commit suicide in his cell? Was Tess seduced into sinning with d'Aubervilles, or did he rape her? Why does Rick (Humphrey Bogart) let Ilsa (Ingrid Bergman) leave with her husband, Victor Lazslow (Paul Henreid), at the end of *Casablanca*? These kind of questions, because of their complexity, that is, because the amount of parameters of a very different nature that will

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[130] E.g. Fodor (1988, 1992) and certainly Leslie (1993).

have to be factored in for any satisfactory verdict to come out, are hard to answer on either the theory-theory model or the simulationist alternative, and thereby tend to suggest how neither of these models can ultimately be the answer to the way we come to interpret others. But most remarkable, if we look at Goldie's take on this issue for example, is that the notions of explanation and prediction have been dropped as being apparently ill-suited for what is at stake when answering the questions raised by those examples, and have been substituted by the single notion of *understanding*. Again, it appears to me that the choice of examples here determines what it is that we are doing when attempting to interpret others. The all-encompassing notion of understanding seems to match the complex and varied things that we seem to be doing when interpreting others. Understanding is potentially reached at *via* different routes, so are the ways in which we interpret others: the notion of understanding others, and the idea of *folk-psychologising*, in the light of the examples chosen, seem to be made for each other.

The danger with this different and much more open way of approaching the question of mind reading in general is that it is not clear anymore which interpretationist feat we are trying to account for. We have stepped away, and rightly so, from the explanation/prediction model, and replaced it with the all encompassing understanding model, and it is not clear now where progress lies. In particular, I cannot see how this move will help with getting a grasp on how we do ascribe emotions in the perceptual case. Whilst I agree that taking into account the examples mentioned above is interesting and complex, that it requires many different practical and theoretical capacities, as well as the gathering of different types of information, I do not see how providing an answer to the question raised by those examples can be a substitute to questions concerning the simple attribution of an emotion in the perceptual case. After all, in most day-to-day attributions, we either do not know the history of the person we are interpreting, or if we do, we just do not have the time to take it into account.

The notion of *understanding* is very vague. For example, what is cognitively required to understand a person, in contrast to what is required to understand, say, a word or to understand Gödel's theorem, are in all likelihood very different things that the mind (or some minds) may achieve. One pressing

question, among others, is whether understanding should be conceived on the model of knowledge, i.e. on a model that views truth and/or justification as central to the question of whether one might be said to understand something,[131] or whether we should think of the notion of understanding more as the psychologist would do, i.e. with a crossbreed conception according to which, in our interpretations of others, there are a lot of things that we do that fall short of truth and justification, but that we, in fact, use for the purpose of interacting fruitfully with others. The philosopher is trained to favour the first approach, but the question is whether she would not gain by separating clearly the two issues: the psychology of interpretation on the one hand, and questions related with our knowledge of other's psychological states on the other hand. As a general strategy in this thesis, I have abided by the principle that we should separate the two issues as much as possible, and as long as it is theoretically sound to do so. In what follows, I shall argue that while Goldie is right about the descriptive psychological aspects of emotion interpretation, the way he ultimately construes the notion of understanding is too close to that of the knowledge model. That is, he arbitrarily, and without argument, mixes up the psychological waters with the epistemological ones.

To sum up before we move ahead, I wish to stress the following: whereas the move away from the over rigid examples that have fostered the popularity of theory approaches to psychological interpretation should be welcomed, we should avoid going to the other extreme of choosing very complex examples which might occlude the fact that very different capacities might be at stake in the general endeavour to understand others psychologically, and that these different capacities help to achieve very different goals, among them, the *perception* of emotions in others.

II. Understanding other people's emotions

In his recent article, Goldie justifiably moves away from the simplistic examples of early theory-theorists, but I believe that he ultimately falls into the trap I just warned against. Goldie defines his project in the following way: "I want to show

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[131] See e.g. Evans (1982, pp. 305–42) who believes that 'understanding' is like 'knowing'

here that there are a number of distinct ways in which we are able to think about other's emotions which are often not properly or sufficiently distinguished in the debate between theory-theory and simulationists [...]"(p.395). Although I think that this project is valuable in itself, as I just emphasised, and although I believe he is doing a very good job at carrying it through, he fails to see that these "distinct ways" correspond to distinct activities, with different end-results. Attribution, explanation, prediction and understanding are distinct things that we can achieve, and the category of "being able to think about other's emotions" which encompasses all these feats is too liberal to be of real interest – or so I shall attempt to show.

II.1. Understanding another person's emotion

The main candidates associated with the theory of simulation that Goldie individuates for the understanding of emotions in others include: emotional contagion, emotional identification, emotional sharing, central imagining, acentral imagining, peripheral imagining, in-his-shoes imagining, empathy, and sympathy. Prior to any inquiry into whether Goldie is correct in stating that none of these are necessary or sufficient for emotional understanding, we first need to have a grasp of what he means by *understanding emotions*. Let me reconstruct, in a schematic form, Goldie's 'understanding' of what understanding someone else 's emotion involves:

Understanding another's emotion: this is done from a non-objective third-personal point of view.[132] Three fundamental stages are involved in emotion understanding, though in a non-specific temporal order. (1) a. We read the facial expression/expressed behaviour of the interpretee which is recognised as one aspect of an emotion. b. This prompts us to look for the object of the emotion by roaming into the interpretee's perceptual field for salient features of the

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inasmuch as they are both 'success' verbs.

132 'Objective' in Goldie's terminology covers those theories that view the relation between mental states and their manifestations as a causal one, as theory-theory conceives of it for example. 'Non-objective' theories view the same relation as a normative one. By 'third-personal', Goldie means that he is not buying into any Cartesian picture of the mind, that is, understanding emotions is not a process that starts from what a creature feels to how these feelings manifest themselves, as conceived by the 'reflection analogy' theorist for example.

environment; (2) a. We try to decide what general state of mind he is in (moods) and how they could contribute to his emotion. b. We bring to memory the person's long-standing character traits, or dispositions, and we consider what is distinctive about his history. c. We consider whether or not our own moods are possibly interfering with our interpretation; (3) The manifested behaviour/facial expression, the possible objects of the emotions and the procedures described in (2)a to (2)c create a token narrative of the person who is being interpreted, as well as a token characterisation of this person[133]; these then constitute inputs into the knowledge we have of paradigmatic narrative structures of emotion types; if everything goes well the 'function' delivers a value: the emotion the interpretee is in. The final understanding can be enriched during or after the process in many ways, using some of the capacities (soon to be examined), namely, emotional contagion, emotional identification, emotional sharing, central imagining, acentral imagining, peripheral imagining, in-his-shoes imagining, empathy, and sympathy.

The schematic fashion in which I present Goldie's view on understanding emotions is unfair, as he is very careful not to present it as a strict procedure, a formula or a recipe that we apply (he speaks of *hermeneutic circles*). Nonetheless, I believe it captures well the thrust of what he has in mind: going through this complex 'procedure' yields *understanding* of other people's emotions. 'Understanding', we agreed, is a loose term, and as Goldie does not specify precisely what it amounts to, we should try to gather what it means from his rich and lengthy description. Understanding is clearly richer than simple *attribution*. It appears to be orthogonal to *prediction*, and perhaps quite close to what we would do if we were to look for an *explanation* of what is emotionally happening in front of us. I am saying this for, from reading Goldie, it appears to be the kind of project that we engage in voluntarily at a conscious personal level. Indeed, it requires taking into account as much information as is available

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[133] On the distinction between *characterisation* and *narrative*, Goldie writes: "Although there is not necessarily a sharp dividing line between characterisation and narrative, the essential distinction can be captured as follows: facts which form part of the characterisation will not also be part of the narrative unless the narrator [the person interpreted] is to be imagined as himself currently conscious of those facts"(pp.411-412).

about the interpretee's life, his narrative situation, the narrative and characterisation of oneself as interpreters, as well as the capacity to indulge in different interpretative techniques. All this appears to be necessary for reaching understanding. Although Goldie never says it, it strongly suggests that *understanding à la* Goldie is an epistemological project, in the sense that nothing less would yield a situation in which the interpreter could be said to have *knowledge* about the other's emotion. It is difficult not to read Goldie as saying that; for, although any step in the procedure might yield verdicts, the truth of which the interpreter might feel pretty confident about, nothing else than the whole package will place her in a position where she cannot be said to be a reckless folk-psychologist from the point of view of the theory of knowledge.

Whereas I believe that understanding as conceived by Goldie is the kind of project people often indulge in, especially for those of us who have had the privilege of superior education in the Arts, it will not do as a description of day-to-day attribution of emotion in the ordinary case. It is interesting to note that Goldie does not devote more than a paragraph to attribution of emotion in the perceptual case. Here is what he says:

> There is often an apparent immediacy and reliability with which we grasp another's emotions, and to a lesser extent, their mood or character, through observation of their expressions of emotion, including facial expressions and intonation of voice, and of their observable bodily changes and states; these are often the first elements of the narrative which we grasp. On such occasions, it is natural to think and say that we perceive embarrassment in the blush, fear in the trembling, anguish in the sob, and so forth .[...] This phenomenological point seems to me to be uncontroversial, and J.L. Austin is quite right to say that we do not speak of expressive actions or bodily changes as 'symptoms' or 'signs' of anger, except when meaning signs of rising or suppressed anger. To talk of a bodily change as a 'symptom' is thus not to talk of the symptom of feeling, of something about which we observers can make inferences but to which we have no access.[134]

This passage, apart from stating that Goldie does not view emotion attribution as an inferential process from publicly observable effects to unobservable mental causes, falls short of being a characterization of what it consists of, for example, to see the embarrassment in the blush. Whereas I agree with his

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[134] Goldie (1999, p. 400).

endorsement of Austin's remarks, I wonder why he seems to think that this is unworthy of elaboration.

Furthermore, Goldie's far-reaching and subtle characterisations of other means by which we 'get in touch' with other people's emotions, as I will discuss below, cannot be seen as other ways by which we realise the first stage (1 a) that will eventually lead to *understanding*, for he explicitly says that they are not necessary.[135] Nor are they sufficient for that matter, as it is clear enough that it is only by going over all the stages described above that an interpreter might be said to reach understanding. Whilst I think that this last point is correct, I also believe that it is a trivial consequence of the far too demanding conditions he puts on understanding. Of course, simple perception of emotion, as empathy or in-his-shoes imagining – whatever that means at this stage – is not necessary for emotion understanding. For example, I could understand the emotion of someone by examining the report of his psychoanalyst, and exercise none of these capacities while yet having been said to understand what this person emotionally experiences. (It is interesting to note in passing that Goldie's main example is, in fact, based on understanding reached through fiction reading. Of course, my judgement as to Prince Andrew's emotions in *War and Peace* does not rest on my capacity to perceive emotions in his face or in his behaviour. As we will see, Goldie's exploration of how we think about other people's emotions seems to always take place in the absence of the interpretee.) The non–necessity claim, interpreted strictly, is therefore trivial. The interesting question is the role those capacities have in the development of our ability to understand other people's emotions. Are they necessary in the genetic sense?

A structurally identical argument applies to the sufficiency claim. Of course, none of the means described by Goldie, or emotional *v*aluation as I elaborated it in the previous chapter, are enough for understanding emotion if the conditions for meeting the latter are as demanding as Goldie suggests. Most of those means by which we think of other people' emotions are rough and ready, and will not meet the conditions for understanding *à la* Goldie. I shall

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[135] A possibility here is that none of them are necessary in isolation for the realization of the first stage of the procedure leading to understanding, although Goldie might say that at least one of them has to take place to realize this first stage of the procedure. This is an open question, as nothing in the text suggests that this may be one way or the other.

conclude therefore that the non-sufficiency claim is trivial. Is there, however, a less demanding, but still interesting, notion of understanding that those capacities exemplify such that we could argue that these capacities are sufficient for understanding emotions?

To anticipate the dialectics of what is to follow: I agree with Goldie on the following: (1a) None of the means that he describes (emotional contagion, emotional identification, emotional sharing, central imagining, acentral imagining, peripheral imagining, in-his-shoes imagining, empathy, and sympathy), are necessary for the *exercise* of *emotion understanding* as he conceives of it. This, I explained, is trivially true. (2a) None of the means that he describes are sufficient for the *exercise* of *emotion understanding* as he conceives of it. This, I argued is the trivial consequence of the too demanding constraints he puts on what counts as an instance of understanding.

In the remainder of this chapter, I wish to argue for the following. (1b) Some of the ways distinguished by Goldie through which we come to think of other people's emotions are necessary for the *acquisition and the manifestation of the capacity* to understand other people's emotions, as opposed to understanding in a particular case. More specifically, I will argue that some of those ways presuppose emotional *v*aluation, or consist of emotional *v*aluation, and that emotional *v*aluation, therefore, is necessary for the acquisition and the manifestation of emotion understanding. (2b) Emotional *v*aluation is enough for understanding, conceived of on the lines of the transparency claim defended in the previous chapter, and as opposed to understanding *à la* Goldie. If that is the case, then the ways by which we think of other people's emotions that presuppose emotional *v*aluation are enough for understanding in my sense as well.

Let me now substantiate these claims by examining in turn the main means characterised by Goldie by which we can be said to 'think of' other people's emotions.

II.2. Emotional contagion

Here is how I comprehend Goldie's conception of emotional contagion:

Emotional contagion: instances in which a subject is 'catching' or being 'infected' by the emotional state in which someone or some people are in, in the vicinity of the subject. This, Goldie says, certainly exists, but is neither necessary, nor sufficient for understanding other people's emotions.

Given Goldie's owns constraints on *understanding*, he is surely right to think that emotional contagion is neither necessary nor sufficient for counting as an episode of understanding someone else's emotion. We have already seen why that is the case. Gordon, making more or less the same point, gives the following example: "If a mother is smiling because she is pleased about her promotion, the sight of her smile might produce a smile in her infant, which may in turn produce pleasure in the infant. But it will not be pleasure about anything in particular, certainly not about her mother's promotion".[136]

Goldie distinguishes two other phenomena which are often confused, according to him, with emotional contagion, which he calls *emotional sharing* and *emotional identification*:

Emotional sharing: instances in which a person has the same emotion as someone else towards a numerically identical object, event, process, etc., or numerically distinct object, event, process, etc. In emotional sharing, the fact that the other has the same emotion as me is wholly independent of my having the same emotion.

Emotional identification: I emotionally identify with someone else when the sense of my own identity merges with the identity of the other in a way that seems to blur my own cognitive and emotional identity.

That none of these is necessary for the exercise of understanding other people's emotions in a particular case is, as already argued, trivially true. Is it non-trivially true, however? That is, is it the case that those capacities are necessary for the acquisition and manifestation of the capacity to understand other people's emotions? Second, is the exercise of these capacities sufficient

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[136] Gordon (1996, p.167).

for being episodes of understanding other people's emotions in my conception of what understanding means?

Let us start with the sufficiency claim. It will allow me to introduce what I mean by a non-trivial conception of understanding, and will, therefore, put the necessity claim in context. That is, we will be in a position to wonder whether emotional contagion, sharing, and identification are necessary for understanding, conceived on either of the two conceptions of understanding at issue in this chapter.

In the previous chapter, I argued that any account of our direct perception of other people's emotions – my version of which is emotional *v*aluation – was non trivial only if it involved both *recognition* and *sharing*. Now, at first blush, it appears that neither emotional contagion, nor emotional sharing or emotional identification instantiate both sharing and recognition. Emotional sharing lacks the recognition component (think of the 'mirror case' in the fourth chapter), and so does emotional identification where it would be stretching our intuitions too much to say that the interpreter is aware of someone else's emotion.[137] Things are more complicated with emotional contagion, however. In this case, we want to say that both sharing and recognition takes place, but that the recognition component is so 'poor' that it cannot count as a genuine case of recognition. It is 'poor' for potentially two reasons. First, as in Gordon's example, the object of the emotion, i.e. the fact that the mother has been promoted, is not part of the content of the child who is being infected by her mother's pleasure. Second, it is feeble because the sense in which the daughter recognises the emotion of the mother as being that of her mother is not clear at all. Is the child aware of her mother as a different centre of consciousness to herself, and/or as being affected by qualitatively but numerically different emotions?

Are those considerations enough to dismiss the case as not being one of recognition as Goldie would have it? In line with my elaboration of the *transparency* claim in the fourth chapter, I am committed to say that it is enough. To refresh your memory: although the child is not aware of the *target* of the emotion, she might very well be aware of its *formal object*. Although she does not know which object, fact, event, etc., is pleasurable, she is aware of the

fact that it is about the pleasurable. It is indeed perfectly sound to imagine the child wondering as to *what* her mother is happy about after having been 'contaminated' by her happiness, and this, I claim, is only possible, if she has recognised the emotion of her mother as a case of happiness. As to the second question, I argued at length in the fourth chapter that although, in this case the child might not be aware of her mother *as* a different centre of consciousness, *as* a creature being an agent with her will, perceptions and emotions, the child's emotional *v*aluation has her mother's bodily response as *target*, and this is enough to distinguish this case from the mirror case.[138] To recall the end of my argument in the previous chapter: although the satisfaction of the *reference identification component* condition is not such that it fulfils the *ownership intuition*, it is sufficient for being a case of recognition of her mother's emotion.[139]

Now, if I am right to think that emotional contagion is, in its most ordinary manifestation, both a case of sharing and a case of recognition, – and that, therefore, it can be construed on the model of emotional *v*aluation – the question remains whether it constitutes a case of understanding someone else's emotion in any interesting sense. For, of course, recognition might still not be enough for understanding. We have already agreed that it will not constitute a case of understanding in Goldie's sense, but we will see very soon that it does so on a perfectly respectable sense of understanding. As for the non-trivial necessity claim, given that I identified emotional contagion with emotional *v*aluation, the question becomes whether emotional *v*aluation is non-trivially necessary for understanding that someone else is experiencing a given emotion. With a bit more patience the reader will get an answer to both questions.

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[137] See Scheler's problem, Chap. 2, III.2 above.

[138] Note that I do not mean to say that all episodes of emotional contagion are, in fact, episodes of emotional *v*aluations. In particular, very early in life, being infected by someone else's emotion does not put the infant in any intentional state, and thus cannot count as a case of recognition of anything.

[139] See also Chap. 4, p.148 ff above, and Appendix 2, particularly the discussion of the empirical evidence on imitation on p. 225 below.

II.3. Empathy and *in-his-shoes imagining*

Goldie devotes a section to the clarification of the difference between *empathy* and *in-his-shoes imagining*, two distinct ways by which we can come to think about other people's emotions, ways that simulation theory has systematically confused[140]:

Central imagining (empathy): enacting in imagination a psychological 'narrative' from the point of view of a certain person other than yourself of which you have a certain 'characterisation'. Central imagining necessarily involves awareness of a centre of consciousness other than you, a substantial characterisation of this centre of consciousness, and a narrative (perceptions, thoughts, feelings and emotions) that you imaginatively, in a non–propositional (imaginistic) manner, enact. In central imagining, the crucial point is that it is impossible for the imagined narrative to include something of which the creature doing the imagining is not aware. If I centrally imagine myself walking in a Bavarian forest at night, it is not the case that the narrative can include a troll unseen by me hiding behind a tree, even if of course I can centrally imagine in this narrative that a troll is going to appear from behind a tree.

In-his-shoes imagining: the fact of enacting in imagination the train of thoughts and feelings of someone other than you by putting yourself in his situation. The

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140 To be more accurate, Goldie distinguishes between four types of what he calls 'imaginative projects' (*Acentral imagining* and *Peripheral imagining* in addition to the two mentioned in the core of the text) which can be used for the purpose of getting in touch with other people's emotions. He believes that one of these four means by which we think about other people's emotions is generally and arbitrarily elected as being what simulation consists of, thereby neglecting the other means. Though I recognise these forms, I will not discuss them here.

Acentral imagining: enacting in imagination a psychological situation from no specific point of view of a person other than you, of which you have a certain characterisation. By 'no point of view' here, I mean that there is no specific centre of consciousness in the situation (i.e. the person imagined, or some other person in the situation) through which the situation is imagined. In Acentral imagining, there is no obstacle to the possibility of imagining something happening to the person imagined unbeknownst that person.

Peripheral imagining: enacting in imagination the psycho-physical situation of a certain person other than you of which you have a certain characterisation by centrally imagining it from some other specific point of view of the situation.

difference between this kind of imaginative enactment and central imagining is that the way in which you are the other person during the enactment is limited to the pre-fixation of certain parameters of the other's situation, be it the specific physical/environmental of the other, or some desires and beliefs you know the other to have. But when this is done, you run the enactment by letting yourself be the initiator of and reactor to the imagined elements populating the imagined scene. In-his-shoes imagining is the sort of project one would engage in as an attempt to answer the question "What would I do if I were in Bush's situation?" The difference with empathy lies, therefore, in the type of 'characterisation' of the creature one enacts, characterisation of which we can say that it will include a mixture of 'information', some of which is related to the creature imagined, and most of which will simply be the parameters one would take into account were one in the situation.

I wish to offer some general comments on how I understand Goldie's characterisation of these two cognitive capacities with which we are endowed, in relation to what I called emotional valuation, before carrying my argument against Goldie to an end.

Goldie introduces his section on *empathy* and *in-his-shoes imagining* by saying that he "will indicate the place empathy and in-his-shoes imagining have in the prediction of the emotional responses of others" (p.408). Empathy, according to Goldie, as an enactment of a non-propositional imaginistic project, can lead to prediction when the project is carried over from the initial characterisation and narrative of the person empathised with. But, it seems to me that empathy, perhaps by opposition to in-his-shoes imagining, is not naturally associated with prediction at all, and is not an activity we indulge in to achieve prediction. Whereas I agree with Goldie that "there is little agreement amongst psychologists and philosophers as to exactly what empathy is", and that thereby a degree of stipulation in defining the concept is unavoidable, I cannot see any theoretical gain in seeing empathy as being, first of all, an imaginative project with prediction as its goal. On the contrary, the focus on empathy as a project leading to prediction severs an intuitive association existing between empathy and perception. It seems to me that one is not stretching the concept of empathy too much – I would even claim that it is a

central case of empathy – in putting forward the idea that I can empathise with someone who is in my field of vision and the focus of my attention in a process which is entirely perceptual and not at all imaginative, at least in some standard acceptance of the term 'imagination'.

Again, it is possible that Goldie's characterisation of empathy is constrained by his choice of examples and the literature he consults, rather than drawn from any intuitive grasp of the meaning of the term. Wollheim (1984) and Walton (1990), from whom Goldie extracts several distinctions, are interested in the process by which humans come to have aesthetic experiences as a result of engaging with the representational arts. In all the examples chosen by Goldie, empathy always takes place *in absentia* of the people that are empathised with. From trying to understand experiences undergone whilst reading books, going to the cinema, or thinking imaginatively about how someone else would react were that person present, it is not surprising that distinctions involving different types of *imaginings* are likely to be at the core of any such understanding. Though these classifications are certainly illuminating, it is perhaps a mistake to start assessing what empathy is by considering our attitudes only towards fiction. This narrow focus results in the overemphasis of the idea that we need a 'narrative' and a 'characterisation' of the person being empathised with.

In any case, the worries I just raised are likely to be answered by saying that the disagreement is verbal; and again, I partially agree. I do not wish to deny that there is a certain type of thinking about other people's emotion which involves central imagining, and I believe that central imagining is what Gordon has in mind when he speaks of *radical simulation*[141]: "[It] typically involves an imaginative shift of the reference of the indexicals. There is a character in the *dramatis personae* who becomes in imagination the referent of the pronoun 'I', and his time and place become the referents of 'now' and 'here'".[142] A bit later, he insists, as does Goldie with reference to what he calls empathy, that the shift is a radical one, involving imagining being someone else "as if this person was me": "What triggers the action or the emotion is the lion coming towards me,

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[141] Gordon (e.g. 1995b, 1995b, 1996).

[142] Gordon (1996, p. 171).

the meeting I am supposed to be at now, the insult directed to me, the award being given to my child" (p.172). The important point here is that empathy *à la* Goldie, or radical simulation *à la* Gordon do not involve a two stage process whereby an inference is being made from one's own case to the interpretee's case. And this contrasts with another type of simulation, let's call it *standard simulation*, which is particularly associated with Goldman,[143] and that Goldie calls *in-his-shoes imagining*. Radical simulation should be distinguished from standard simulation, because the latter, as opposed to the former, "does involve an inference from me to you", to borrow an expression from Gordon.

This being said, whereas I recognise that these phenomena, whatever we call them, exist as distinct phenomena, and that they can, indeed, be used in prediction, they should not be confused with another phenomenon which shares with the former – but not the latter – the property of *not* being a two-staged inferential process, but which is not, as opposed to both of them, an imaginative project. Of course, I have in mind the phenomenon of emotional *v*aluation. Before I discuss these two phenomena in the context of emotional *v*aluation, let me close one of the doors I opened earlier in this thesis: it will be useful at this juncture to recall Stein's theory of empathy or perception of *foreign* experience. For, as we have seen, she is as anxious as Goldie to distinguish between imaginative projects in which the creature imagined in the imagined scene is such that the person doing the imagining fuses with it – in Stein's terminology, the creature imagined is given to the person doing the imagining *primordially* – and imaginative projects in which the person imagined remain *foreign* to the person doing the imagining, i.e. is given to this person *non-primordially*. And the latter is, according to Stein, and by contrast with Goldie, empathy. Moreover, the description she gives of the empathetic experience as involving typical sequencing of which the second stage she calls 'fulfilment of the tendencies of the content of the experience' appears to confirm that what she calls empathy is what Goldie calls in-his-shoes imagining. The tendencies of the scene imagined that are fulfilled are the different elements in the narrative which guide the empathiser in his enactment until, in the last and third stage, he comes up with a verdict as to what experience the other creature has been

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[143] Goldman (1992a).

undergoing. I have little doubt, therefore, that Stein would be today considered a *standard simulationist.* But, as I said in the first chapter of this thesis and re-emphasise here, whether we follow Goldie or Stein in their respective characterisation of empathy, there are, I claim basic ways in which we 'think of' other people's emotions which are not covered by either phenomena.

Pursuing the dialectics of this chapter, the questions are now the following: is emotional *v*aluation necessary for the acquisition and manifestation of empathy and in-his-shoes imagining as characterised by Goldie (the non-trivial necessity claim), and is it the case that either of them is *sufficient* for understanding in the non-trivial sense (the non-trivial sufficiency claim)? I shall proceed to answer these questions in the following way. I will argue, first, that emotional *v*aluation is necessary for the acquisition and manifestation of empathy (as opposed to in-his-shoes imagining); and, second, that emotional *v*aluation is sufficient for understanding in the non-trivial sense. If both these claims are correct, then, by transitivity, empathy is sufficient for understanding. By contrast, in-his-shoes imagining, I will claim, is not rooted in emotional *v*aluation, and in agreement with Goldie, I will claim that it is not necessary for understanding in the non-trivial sense.

As we have seen, empathy is a non-propositional imaginistic project. This, I presume, roots empathy *à la* Goldie in perception. This is to say that it is hard to conceive of a creature devoid of any perceptual capacities being capable of learning to indulge in any imaginistic project of the kind ordinary human beings normally indulge. Being capable of imagining a creature other than oneself in particular circumstances on the radical simulation model, that is, being capable of going through the feelings and thoughts of someone else in imagination, must be learned one way or another *via* past experiences of being perceptually acquainted with creatures in circumstances similar to the imagined one. As we have seen in the previous chapter, being capable of basic emotions, i.e. emotional *v*aluation, is the route by which we learn to ascribe emotional concepts to ourselves and others, i.e. the route through which we learn to become competent in emotional *e*valuation. And there is even more reason to believe that for biological organisms of our type, the learning of these emotional concepts is reinforced by our capacity to re-enact in imagination episodes of emotional *v*aluation. Empathy *à la* Goldie should be, therefore, genetically

explained partly by means of a perceptual model of awareness of other people's emotions, and I have argued at length in the previous chapter that the model of emotional *v*aluation is the best available. Whether or not this last point is true, I believe I have said enough in favour of the view that something along the lines of the transparency claim which emotional *v*aluation instantiates is necessary for the acquisition and manifestation of empathy *à la* Goldie.

In the third chapter, I said that for a system to master a concept was for it to be capable of entertaining a content in which this concept figures as one of its constituents (Peackoke, 1983). I argued that this capacity was instantiated in a system when this system is such that all of the combinatorial properties of the constituent were exploited by the system to negotiate its environment. Of the possible combinatorial properties of the concept I have distinguished the *epistemic*, *logical* and *semantic* types (Crane, 1992). I insisted, however, that 'global recombinability' (Bermúdez, 1998), i.e. the operation of all the combinatorial properties of a given constituent, was not necessary for being a system with this constituent as part of its content. I emphasised the fact that only those epistemic relations underscoring the recognitional capacities of the system, that is, the capacity for detecting a feature of its environment in subsequent experiences of this feature as being the same as the ones encountered previously, was enough for crediting the system with an operational mastery of it. The question is, of course, whether this mastery of the epistemic relation characterising a concept is sufficient for crediting the creature with an understanding of it. Let me formulate this same point in more intuitive terms. What we are after is an answer to the question as to whether it is sufficient to have only the recognitional capacities associated with a given concept to be credited with an understanding of it. The answer, I believe, is positive for the following reason. It is sufficient because the capacity to recognise the conditions of what we would count as the central case of a range of possible evidence in favour of its instantiation – and in the case of a observational concept, the recognition of being 'here' and 'now' acquainted with its instantiation – is precisely, on the *interpretationist* approach that has been mine throughout this dissertation, the kind of evidence a witness would use to credit the creature with an understanding of the concept.

And I believe that this thought is particularly cogent in its application to the case of emotional *v*aluation. Although there are many means by which I can come to make a judgement (an emotional *e*valuation) as to the fact that someone instantiates a certain emotion – reading about it in a novel, seeing traces of tears on a letter, listening to my patient, indulging in some in-his-shoes imagining, etc. – emotionally *v*aluing someone as being in a certain emotion is the most basic/central means by which I do it. That is, the capacity to *share* and *recognise* which is involved in becoming aware of someone else's emotion in emotional *v*aluation constitutes the central/basic ability that a creature has to be able to manifest in order to be credited with understanding a given emotion in a specific instance. Of course, this capacity by itself is not enough for a full mastery of the concept, which would also require emotional *e*valuation, i.e. the capacity to assess the emotional situation with all the parameters – most of which figure in Goldie's description of what understanding emotion consists of – that might be relevant in a claim to knowledge concerning the emotion of someone else. But if we resist the identification of understanding and knowing, then it seems to me that there is no reason to deny that emotional *v*aluation, and consequently the exercise of emotional contagion and empathy, are sufficient for understanding another person's emotion in my restricted sense! And this puts an end to my appraisal of Goldie's general conception of the role of the different means by which we think of other people's emotions for *understanding* emotions. But, before parting with the psychological aspect of our awareness of other people's emotions to investigate, in the next chapter, its bearing on its epistemological aspects, let me briefly comment on another fascinating phenomenon we might be thought to be very similar to my emotional *v*aluation.

II.4. Sympathy

The last capacity Goldie distinguishes is *sympathy*:

Sympathy: an instance of reacting emotionally to a recognised negative emotional situation of someone other than yourself by an emotional reaction characterised by the desire to alleviate the negative emotional situation of the other. Sympathy is an emotional experience, not an imaginative project, and

does not involve an emotion akin to the emotion experienced by the person there is sympathy towards.

Goldie takes on board a very intuitive aspect of the ordinary notion of sympathy; he writes: "Sympathy involves recognition that another person is, in some way, in difficulties", and further in the text, "[sympathy involves] desires whose content will also have reference to the alleviation of the other's difficulties" (p. 419). Goldie is certainly correct in his characterisation of the concept as it is usually understood. I am not sure, however, how it fits in with the rest of his classification.

Here are the two main issues arising from this characterisation. First, note that this characterisation of sympathy excludes the following case as being an instance of sympathy. My reacting happily to your happiness cannot be a case of sympathy, for obviously your happiness is not a 'difficulty', and thus would not be – notwithstanding some perversity on my part – something I would want to alleviate. This consequence, however, might be undesirable, since there are good reasons to think that there is a phenomenon which closely parallels the sympathy model, but which involves the recognition of positive emotion. That is, many would want to regard the 'happiness case' on the basic model of sympathy. A second, related and more pressing issue, is the following: Is sympathy a primary or a secondary means by which we come to get in touch with other people's emotions? If the latter, then sympathy starts to operate only in a second stage, i.e. only after the emotion of the other person has been recognised; if the former, however, then sympathy is a genuine means of recognition of other people's emotions in itself. The natural reading of Goldie's suggestion is that one first recognises the emotion and in a second stage one sympathises with the person having it. If Goldie, indeed, favours this route, then he has to tell us what recognition of the emotion in the first stage consists of. Is it *emotion understanding*? As we have seen, understanding emotion is a complex, conscious and voluntary process according to Goldie, and so much should not be required for coming to sympathise with someone, or the latter would be very rare.

I see two possible alternatives to conceiving what *understanding emotion* as a component of sympathy consists of. One possibility is that the first step of

the procedure yielding *emotion understanding* (1a), i.e. the step which consists of reading an emotion into someone's face/behaviour, is sufficient in itself to trigger sympathy. That Goldie might have this in mind is supported by the fact the he explicitly says that "it is associated with facial expression and expressive action" (p.419). If this is what Goldie has in mind, then again, he owes us an explanation of the nature of this first step in the procedure, which I argued in this chapter, was less than satisfactorily given. The second possibility is the one already envisaged: sympathy is a fundamental and primary means by which we recognise other people's emotions. One way of unfolding the idea in the perspective of Goldie's characterisation goes like this: sympathy is a direct means through which I get acquainted with someone else's negative emotion. The recognition of the others' negative emotions would be an integral part of the fact that I sympathise with this person; or perhaps it is even through my sympathising with this person that I recognise her emotion – I recognise her suffering through my pity. Apart from the fact that there is very little trace of this position in Goldie's paper, it would be inadequate. There is no empirical data to suggest that we have special direct means to get acquainted with other people's negative emotions, rather than positive ones. If there is a case for the direct perception of emotions – and, of course, I think there is – there is no reason to think that it has anything in particular to do with the phenomenon of sympathy as a desire to alleviate others' difficulties.

Here are the lessons we should draw from this brief discussion of the phenomenon of sympathy. Sympathy is either primary or secondary. If it is the latter, i.e. if it takes place only after recognition of the other person's emotion, then it has no direct bearing on the nature of our awareness of other people's emotions. Indeed, the criteria that will ultimately differentiate between a case of compassion towards someone's suffering (clearly a case of sympathy according to Goldie) and a case of anger towards someone's suffering (clearly not a case of sympathy according to Goldie) will have to draw on issues unrelated to the domain of our becoming aware of other people's emotion. The conception of sympathy as secondary is interesting because of its links with ethics and perhaps the philosophy of sociology, and not because it constitutes a special means by which we become aware of other people's emotions. If, by contrast, sympathy is primary, in the sense that it is a means by which we can recognise someone

else's emotion, then the fact that the concept is naturally associated with 'sensibility to other people's suffering' should be viewed as a side-issue at best, or at least a side-issue when concerned with the question of our awareness of other people's emotion. For, if there is something like direct access to other people's emotions, it will be access to positive as much as to negative ones, and consequently we had better drop the label all together, as it is naturally associated with compassion towards other people's difficulties.

In conclusion, Goldie's brief section on sympathy suggests that he conceives of sympathy as being divorced from the most pressing questions in the domain of the ways in which we become aware of other people's emotions, and is fundamentally a notion that belongs to ethics. But it seems clear to me that there is an aspect of my second interpretation of what sympathy consists of that is left out of Goldie's paper; and that is our capacity to directly and emotionally recognise that someone is in a certain emotion, a picture that can be seen to be inspired by the sympathy model.

III. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have tried to assess the role emotional *v*aluation plays in our multifarious capacity to 'think of' other people's emotions. The idea was to calm the worries of someone sympathetic to the idea that we might be capable of emotional *v*aluation, but doubtful about the scope or richness of this capacity in our daily interaction, negotiation and co-ordination with others, insofar as they are subject to emotions like ourselves. In other words, emotional *v*aluation could be to understanding other people's emotions what eyes are to seeing: necessary but far from enough.

I began this chapter by observing that there are many aspects that could come into play when thinking of other people's emotions that we might want to privilege. Being aware, attributing, explaining, predicting, understanding, are all such that one of them might be thought to be of central importance in our dealings with other people's emotional lives. I have tried to illustrate the manner in which the emphasis on any of one of these aspects is likely to derive from the choice of examples we test our theories against. While this is not dangerous in itself, I argued, it can become so when the devised theory is then claimed to be

true across the board. For example, I showed how some examples made the theory-theory very attractive, even if not at all compulsory, but that it made very little sense when applied to other cases where explanation or prediction were not at stake. I argued that, although it was possible to explain simple awareness or attribution of emotion on the theory-theory model, those capacities should be first analysed in their own right, separated from epistemological concepts such as explanation and prediction.

I introduced Goldie's approach to issues concerning our approach to other people's emotional life as being one that has sidestepped the narrow focus of previous attempts to deal with these issues in the framework of the theory-theory versus simulation debate. In particular, I praised Goldie's way of enlarging the pool of cases and examples to be accounted for, as well as his careful classification of the various means by which we might get in touch and react to other people's emotions, all of which might come into play to explain what happens in these cases and examples.

Now, although encouraged by the shift from epistemological concerns having to do with explanation and prediction to descriptive psychological concerns having to do with understanding, I expressed worries that understanding *à la* Goldie was still very much embedded in the theory of knowledge. More particularly, I suggested that Goldie's conception of what understanding someone else's emotion consists of is so demanding that this conception justified itself only if the ultimate aim was to set the conditions under which someone might be said to know that someone else experiences a certain emotion. If, however, we separate questions related to understanding from questions related to knowledge, it becomes possible to think of understanding in a much more psychologically hospitable and realistic way.

In this light, I have argued that most of the means by which we think of other people's emotions according to Goldie, in particular emotional contagion and empathy – and by contrast with his own view on the matter – were sufficient to count as instances of understanding other people's emotions on a conception of understanding parallel to that which I developed in the fourth chapter with regard to emotional *v*aluation. Although falling short of being the sort of understanding that emotional *e*valuation or understanding *à la* Goldie provides, notions that are both rooted in the theory of knowledge – as we shall

discover in the next chapter – emotional *v*aluation of someone else's fear, for example, counts as understanding fear, because being capable of emotionally *v*aluing fear *is* the recognitional capacity associated with the concept of fear. Now, because being capable of emotionally *v*aluing someone's emotion is the core of the mastery of the concept of that emotion, I argued that emotional *v*aluation is necessary for acquiring and manifesting understanding of the concept of the emotion in question

CHAPTER 6: EMOT IONS AND KNOWLEDGE

I. Speculative anthropology of the 'epistemological problem of other minds' debate

Awareness of other people's emotional states has always constituted a privileged terrain for philosophers interested in the theory of knowledge and a particularly fertile one for those keen to vent their sceptical tendencies. Their mantra: "I never know what is really behind the surface of this body". This slogan has generated a fair deal of literature under the label the 'problem of other minds' which is, in fact, the 'epistemological problem of other minds' and, of course, it has succeeded in setting for itself some real opposition that keeps the issue alive and thriving. Needless to say, the acute concern with the intricacies of the epistemological problem of other minds has always been proportional to the lack of concern with the intricacies of the detailed working of mind. At the risk of caricaturing a little, the grounding and little challenged assumption of the whole debate has always been that whatever else emotions may be, they are primarily and constitutively things that are privately felt. Until very recently, Dummett and Wright,[144] working with this same assumption, would have been regarded as the contemporary heirs of the sceptical branch of this debate concerning other minds, despite having re-framed the questions in terms of their own general agenda, and despite their acute awareness of what the opposition had to contribute to the debate. In their theoretical framework, statements concerning other minds would be typically seen as forming a 'domain of discourse' particularly receptive to questions regarding verification transcendence, bringing about worries concerning bivalence, and thus a welcoming terrain for an *anti–realist* kind of scepticism

The leadership of the opposition to the sceptical side of the debate has been occupied by Wittgenstein[145] and his followers[146] from the forties to the

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[144] See Dummett (e.g. 1976); Wright (e.g. 1987, Introduction; 1992, Introduction).

[145] Wittgenstein (1969).

fifties, as well as – although to a slightly different tune – by Austin[147] during the same decades. These philosophers, like those they opposed, have not added much to our understanding of the emotions and their perception. Instead they have developed – I am thinking particularly of Austin – the use of the 'problem of other minds' as a paradigmatic example, a way of thinking of knowledge that shifted the focus of the main worries in epistemology. Instead of asking 'Can I really know that?' Austin asked 'When is it that I can say 'I know of S' or 'I know that *p*' and have people around me feeling happy with my claim to knowledge?' These kinds of questions and the answers offered to them in the last decade or so have been prevalent in a sub-domain of the theory of knowledge known as *contextualism* where the key focus has been on the pragmatics of knowledge attribution, the concept of relevance, the idea of 'right contrast', etc. Interestingly enough, those philosophers who inherited Austin's sensitivity to the importance of contextual and pragmatic issues in the philosophy of knowledge are also those philosophers who have insisted on the need to integrate the theory of knowledge with the natural world, a move that certainly neither Wittgenstein nor Austin ever made. In short, and jumping quickly to the conclusion, contextualists today are also externalists with respect to the theory of knowledge and have, thus, severed quite radically their ties with their ancestors, whose preoccupation was chiefly with the 'grammar' of knowledge talk. Externalism also amounts to fighting 'chauvinism' with respect to knowledge, i.e. opens the door to the possibility of creatures without linguistic abilities and, thus, without sensitivity to the 'grammar' of words, being such that they can know things.[148]

Despite the appearance to the contrary, there is not much real controversy between the two camps of the debate, since, although both camps appear to reach contradictory verdicts concerning the possibility of knowing something about other people's emotions, this apparent contradiction simply arises because

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[146] E.g. Malcolm (e.g. 1958, 1971).

[147] Austin (1946).

[148] This marriage between *contextualism* and *externalism* is in no place more apparent than in the choice of articles made by Dretske and Bernecker in a reader they edited together (*Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology*, 2000). Austin is introduced in this

both camps construe knowledge in radically different ways. As far as I can see, they are both right in their conclusions assuming the truth of their respective premises concerning the nature of knowledge. Making real headway in the area, therefore, requires taking up directly issues concerning what we want a theory of knowledge to do. This is not, however, something that can be done in a thesis that is not about knowledge, but about the nature of our awareness of other people's emotions. Having said that, it is impossible to truly engage with the epistemological problem of other minds, but more importantly to defend the claim that knowledge of other people's experiences is possible, without, at certain key points in the discussion, taking sides or making background assumptions in the theory of knowledge. I shall, thus, not refrain from that, as I will defend two claims, the second of which requires getting one's feet wet. I shall argue that (1) the perception of the 'psychological' and the perception of the 'physical' pose the same sceptical threats, no more and no less (if any) for epistemology, irrespective of one's own inclinations in the theory of knowledge. And I shall argue for the stronger claim that (2) knowledge of other people's experiences is possible.

I start by contrasting the views an internalist and an externalist approach to knowledge is likely to take towards perceptual experience of the external world in general. I go on to contrast these two views and to show how, with some key externalist assumptions in the theory of knowledge, together with some semantic assumptions with respect to the individuation of the content of experience, it is possible to defend a *non–classical foundationalism* with respect to perceptual experience. The foundation in question is semantic rather than epistemic, but given the externalism, I suggest it has epistemic consequences as well.

Before turning to the application of this epistemological model to the case of emotional valuation of other creatures' experiences, however, I argue for my first claim, i.e. that emotional valuations of other people's emotions do not pose any special sceptical threats which ordinary perceptions of physical objects do not pose, whatever standpoint one occupies in the theory of knowledge. This is

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reader as the father of epistemological contextualism, and seems to mingle there pretty well with most contemporary externalists about knowledge.

the outcome, I shall claim, of construing access to the inner and the outer in a similar fashion, i.e. the outcome of the structural parallel we have found to hold in the second and third chapters between first and third perspective at the level of emotional *v*aluation. In the second half of the chapter, I argue for my second claim, i.e. that knowledge of other people's emotions is possible. I begin by showing how non-classical foundationalism, with respect to experience in general, applies to the case of emotional *v*aluation of other people's emotions in the framework of two remaining epistemological problems associated with the awareness other people's psychological states. I first show how non-classical foundationalism dissolves the problem of *deception*, which is, of course, a problem specific to the case of the perception of other minds. Second, I deal with the question of how *justification* should be understood in the epistemological picture I am putting forward. Having adopted a broadly externalist strategy, and this being the case, having taken on board the possibility that young infants and animals are entitled to knowledge, I argue that the internalist preoccupation with justification has to be taken into account when knowledge is attributed to human adults. This is to say that we would doubt that someone knows that someone else experiences a certain emotion in cases where this person was entirely incompetent with respect to all the possible ways in which support for such attributions might be gathered, i.e. incompetent with respect to emotional *e*valuation. For this reason, together with the fact that many aspects of a full-blown emotion ascription are not resolved at the level of v-valuation – *in particular the question of ownership* – I argue that the reflexive level of emotional *e*valuating is part of the evidence package – together with one's emotional *v*aluation – one might bring in support of one's final emotional *e*valuation that someone is currently experiencing a given emotion. This is to say that when the context is such that the level of justification required for knowledge is very high, for example in a seminar on scepticism, I argue that Goldie's model of 'understanding emotions' construed as a quest for knowledge constitutes the right model.

II. Non–classical foundationalism

Those who have read the four chapters leading to this one will have realised that I have been interested mainly in reconciling two intuitions concerning the psychology of emotion perception, which appear to pull in opposite directions: what I called the 'transparency intuition' and the 'ownership intuition'. The first intuition has it that there is absolutely no problem is seeing that someone other than me is angry. The second intuition has it that it is awfully hard to see that someone is angry. People we deal with often strike us as open books which are very easy to read, but they also often strike us as hermetic shells whose inner 'feely' content is forever inaccessible. Of course, we do not have these intuitions together. The general line I have tried to press is that these radically opposite intuitions concerning our possible access to others was to be attributed to fundamental structural differences in the different kind of focus or attention exhibited by our constant endeavour to be in touch with what other people feel and think. I distinguished between what an experience might reveal to us about other people's emotions, i.e. what is *salient* in v-valuing some one else's v-valuation, from what might be revealed to us when paying special attention to the experience that reveals this emotion to us, i.e. what might become *salient* when focusing on the bodily changes that have revealed the other person's emotion in the first place. The latter practice and its verdicts, which are grounded in part in simple v–valuation, I called e–valuations.

Now I hope it is clear how and why emotional v-valuation sides with the first intuition and how and why e-valuation sides with the second intuition. Those intuitions cease to pull in different directions when the kind of phenomena they appeal to are seen for what they are, two very different things that minds do, v-valuing (which explains, among other things, *transparency*) and e-valuing (which explains, among other things, *ownership*). To refresh your memory of the fourth chapter: at the level of v-valuation, I argued, emotions do not present themselves to those who experience them as belonging to anyone, and, as such, it is difficult to see what kind of obstacle would prevent me at this level to recognise angriness: hence the transparency. At the level of e-valuation, however, i.e. on occasions in which I focus my attention upon all the ingredients involved in an emotional situation in the hope of assessing by means of folk

psychological tools who-feels-what-towards-what and for what reasons, then issues of ownership arise, and serious obstacles seem to obstruct the way to sound and easily reachable verdicts. Focusing my attention upon my bodily changes has the consequence of revealing to me that I cannot do the same with anyone else, i.e. I cannot focus my attention upon the bodily changes of anyone but me.

Hopefully the dialectics of my argument are already apparent. I want to show how philosophical sensitivity to either one of these two human practices, as opposed to the other, will have a strong bearing on how much of a sceptic one ends up being about the possibility of knowing about other minds. Let us see why this is at least *prima facie* the case.

(1) The epistemological problem of other minds, with its sceptical conclusions, stems from philosophical reflection on the practice of emotional e-valuation. This should not come as a surprise. Traditional epistemology, with its emphasis on the key notion of *justification from the point of view of the individual whose entitlement to knowledge is in question* (henceforth *Justification* with a capital "J"), what is known nowadays as *internalism* with respect to knowledge, will, with good reason, not see how issues concerning the possibility of knowledge might arise at all at the level of v-valuation. For, at this basic level, creatures do not reflect on the ways the world is revealed to them in experience, rather their focus is entirely directed at what those experiences are about. This is the reason why the internalist will focus his attention solely on emotional e-valuation. And emotional e–valuation is, at first blush anyway, the terrain of the sceptic; he will emphasise the point I drew attention to above: "Focusing my attention on my bodily changes has the consequence of revealing to me that I cannot do the same with respect to anyone else, i.e. I cannot focus my attention on the bodily changes of anyone else but me", which is enough, it seems, for generating the epistemological problem of other minds and its sceptical conclusions.

(2) If, however, one relaxes the conditions for knowledge, in particular by shifting the emphasis away from the notion of justification, which is known in contemporary epistemology as an *externalist* move, then v-valuation might be thought of as a domain in which epistemology can have a hold. In this trend of the theory of knowledge, creatures incapable of e-valuation, young children or

animals for example, might be now credited with knowledge. The level of v-valuation would strike the externalist, at first blush anyway, as 'fit' for knowledge. The externalist might motivate her view in many different ways, one of which would be simply to point out that she does not see why one has to know that ones knows in order to be a knowing creature. She might motivate this attitude by adding that in the ordinary world, as opposed to the epistemology class, we do not wait for a subject to have justified the rules of justification she is using to confer knowledge to her. She might also draw our attention to the fact that each context sets its own standards of justification. Very little justification is needed in some contexts for us to be prepared to confer knowledge to someone who claims it, and some contexts require more justification and of a different kind – in the sciences, for example. But what is sure, the externalist might say, is that she does not see why the level of justification demanded by the sceptic should be the one imposed on her. In other words, an externalist of that kind believes that issues of justification are interesting and should be studied in the different contexts in which they occur, but that it is an issue quite separated from the study of the circumstances in which creatures are so positioned towards the world that knowledge to these creatures cannot but be conferred to them, even if they are totally incapable of even conceiving about the idea of justification.[149] This line of thought canvasses the way in which externalists and contextualists in epistemology become bedfellows.

As my introductory remarks to this chapter have emphasised, I do not believe that there really is much of debate between the externalist and the internalist. For example, one might be very sympathetic to, and even accept, all of the externalist points about the importance of context in setting up standards of justification, and nevertheless insist that the context that should be of chief concern to the epistemologist is the one advocated by the sceptic. This interesting controversy I will not explore any further here, as my chief concern in this chapter is to show that scepticism with respect to the psychological is not less acute than scepticism about the physical, and this point, I claim, is

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[149] For standard sources on contextualism in epistemology, see e.g. Lewis (1996), de Rose (1992, 1999).

independent of how the dispute between the externalist and the internalist is going to be resolved. Having shown, however, that perception of the psychological does not pose more of a sceptical threat than perception of the physical, I propose to show that, from a broadly externalist approach to perceptual experience, together with a particular view on how the content of experience should be individuated, it is possible to defend a non-classical foundationalist view of the perception of other people's emotions.

III. From experience grounding judgment to v-valuation grounding e-valuation

So, let me spell out the way in which an epistemologist might want to exploit the structure of my picture of the psychology of the perception of other people's emotions for his own purposes. The overall structure of my account is likely to be viewed, at least from the point of view of traditional epistemology, in the following way. I have experiences of other people's emotions, what I called v-valuations. Those experiences are the basis on which, together with perhaps other ingredients, I come to the conclusion that these people are presently instantiating a certain emotion, a kind of assessment that I called an e-valuation. The metaphor of 'v-valuations *basing* e-valuations' invites us to regard the relation as, among other things, an epistemological one. There is nothing particularly original in this, as the idea that our experiences of the world constitute the main reasons, justifications, and evidence for our judgements about the world, has always been at the centre of the theory of knowledge – whatever sub-theory of it one might endorse. Traditionally, disputes start when the question shifts to: are we justified in our thought that these experiences justify, are evidence for, constitute reasons for, etc., the judgements based on them? In truth, this question is likely to be at the centre of the internalist concerns, given his preoccupations with justification. As we have already seen, the externalist might want to offer arguments to bypass this question.

Let me try to explain this more fully: imagine that v-valuings are such that it is reasonable to question whether or not they have what I will call *epistemic import*. By something having epistemic import, I mean that it is the kind of object that can confer the status of knowledge to a mental state. Note the modal element here. I do not mean to say that an object that has epistemic import

confers knowledge to a mental state, only that it might, provided that it is the suitable kind of object. For example according to Davidson[150] and McDowell,[151] 'raw' experiences, i.e. something devoid of intentionality – the retinal image for example – are not the kind of things that can have epistemic import, for they are simply not the kind of objects that can serve as *justification from the point of view of the individual whose entitlement to knowledge is in question.* The best way to understand this is to compare it to something that definitively has epistemic import according to these philosophers. The kinds of objects that are undisputedly thought of as having epistemic import, according to them, are beliefs. Beliefs have epistemic import because they are the kind of things that can Justify my judgements. The relevant property that beliefs have, but that raw experiences lack, according to Davidson and McDowell, is that they can enter into inferential relations to which the subject whose entitlement to knowledge is in question might have access. For these philosophers, the only criterion for epistemic import is, in fact, the capacity to enter into inferential relations in that way. Of course, there is no *a priori* reason for thinking that other properties of objects might not confer epistemic import to raw experiences, even from a Justificationist point of view. And, of course, it will be the point of the externalist that experience has epistemic import independently of the question as to whether or not experiences Justify, or even justify, judgements. Now, there are two possibilities: either perceptual experience has epistemic import or it does not. Depending on whether one answers positively or negatively to this question, one will be naturally drawn towards two traditionally opposed families of views in epistemology, both on the slippery slope leading to scepticism, respectively, *coherentism* and *foundationalism*.

If experience is regarded as having no epistemic import, for example because experience is thought of as not having correctness conditions, or not the right kind of correctness conditions, or because it does not have an inferential structure, or because it is not something that can be accessed from the point of

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[150] Davidson (1986).

[151] McDowell (1994b).

view of the subject having the experience,[152] then coherentism becomes the natural fallout option. Coherentism, in one way or another, forgets about the world and the possibility of the content of our thoughts corresponding to what is in it. It swaps the vertical correspondence relation thought-world for the horizontal coherence relation thought-thought. For the coherentist a belief is a piece of knowledge at time *t*, if it holds the right kind of inferential relation – logical, semantic, 'grammatical', etc. – or, in other words, if it *coheres* with other beliefs that a subject having it also has at time *t*. Experience of the world in this picture, because it does not have epistemic import, gives rise to beliefs that have exactly the same status as all the other beliefs that a subject might have.

Imagine, however, a philosopher who does believe that experience has epistemic import. Philosophers of this bent are likely to favour a foundationalist approach to beliefs grounded in experience. A classical foundationalist will say that experiences are such that they can confer knowledge to the judgment made on their basis because they are apt to provide the kind of justification a sceptic is looking for. This is because the mental states that are rooted in perception, according to the foundationalist, have the special status of being self–justificatory. All beliefs a subject might have ultimately answer to the 'tribunal of experience' that have the special power of justifying 'for good' all other beliefs than one might have.

I will not dwell here on the classical problems encountered by these two families of views, nor will I dwell on the sceptical fire with which they play. What I wish to do is to explore the possibility of a foundationalism that is not internalist in spirit, what I will call *non–classical foundationalism*. Imagine for a moment coherentism and foundationalism coupled with a disjunctivist[153] individuation of the content of experience.

Picture a disjunctivist coherentist. A strange animal? A coherentist of this kind is no more optimistic about what can be done with the vertical

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[152] The reader should recognise here the crucial issues regarding *content*, which I explored in the third chapter. There, I argued, with Peacocke (1983), that a state can have content in the absence of the bearer of this state being capable of appreciating how the content of this state represents the world as being. See Chap 3, sec. III above.

correspondence relation between thought and world for the purpose of epistemology than the simple coherentist is. Rather than abandoning the world completely, however, he proposes to do the best he can, provided experience does not have epistemic import. The disjunctivist has a particular view on the manner in which the content of experience should be individuated that he can exploit for the purpose of staying in touch with the world. According to him, veridical experiences, as opposed to illusory or hallucinatory ones, are direct openings to the world, hence its disjunctivism: there is nothing in common between the veridical on the one hand, and the hallucinatory or illusionary case on the other hand, that should encourage us to specify the contents of these respective kind of states in the same way, as the *conjunctivist* would have it. The content of veridical states is specified, at least in part, and by contrast with hallucinatory or illusory states, by what they are about. In the lucky case of a veridical experience, says the disjunctivist, although I cannot be said to have knowledge – for that would require experience to have epistemic import – there is a sense in which I am really in touch with how the world really is; and this is at least part of what we are after when we are asking whether or not we know about some aspect of our environment. Note, however, that for a coherentist to be a disjunctivist is no help at all for the purposes of epistemology, as far as he is concerned. Indeed, there is no way to tell from the point of view of the subject having the experience whether she is hallucinating or not. And this is the reason why the coherentist became a coherentist in the first place.[154]

Now, what if our foundationalist becomes a disjunctivist? Well he is likely to be a non-classical foundationalist. The non-classical foundationalist believes that experiencing something entails being in a state with veridical content, this is his commitment to disjunctivism. Now, like our coherentist disjunctivist, the non-classical foundationalist does not believe that there are any independent means, from the point of view of the subject, to establish that she is in a veridical state. The difference, however, between the non-classical

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[153] On disjunctivist theory, cf. Hinton (1974), Snowdon (1988), McDowell (1982) and Child (1994, esp. Chap. 5).

[154] I mention this position because I believe it is McDowell's. Although by no means a coherentist, McDowell is a internalist with respect to knowledge (1994) and a disjunctivist with respect to content (1982). This is how he finds himself in this bizarre position.

foundationalist and the coherentist disjunctivist is that the former does not believe that this clause concerning what or what not the subject is capable of establishing from her point of view, is necessary for crediting the subject with being in a state with knowledge.

Let us remind ourselves the reason why our coherentist disjunctivist would not believe that v-valuings have epistemic import whereas our non-classical foundationalist would. The coherentist disjunctivist will emphasise again that experiences are not such things that can enter into inferential relations with other experiences or with beliefs – or at least not such things that can enter into the relevant kind of inference – and, thus, cannot by definition constitute justification for our judgements. This is because, for the coherentist, inference is the only model we have for justification, and justification is the central issue a theory of knowledge has to account for. The non-classical foundationalist will certainly agree with his opponent's diagnoses about experiences, that is, he will agree with her that experiences do not have the kind of inferential structure upon which we can construct an epistemological theory based on the inferential knowledge model, but he will deny that it deprives experiences from having any epistemic import. The non–classical foundationalist will typically have, in an externalist spirit, either a *counterfactual* analysis of knowledge[155] or a *reliabilist*[156] one. If the former, he will say that an experience is a piece of knowledge if, were it not for the world being the way it is, the creature would not be having the experience he is having. If the latter, he will say that an experience is a piece of knowledge if the causal circumstances are such that the worldly circumstances that brought it about are normal (i.e. normal lighting, normal perceptual system, etc.). I should add that there isn't much of a difference between these two accounts for my purposes, as the counterfactualist will sooner or later have to tackle issues concerning 'normal circumstances', or the meaning of 'right kind of causal processes', etc.[157] The important point is that neither the counterfactualist nor the reliabilist are likely to insist that it is

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[155] Cf. Dretske (1971); Nozick (1981), for early characterisations of knowledge in counterfactual terms.

[156] Cf. Goldman (1979), for an early version of *Reliabilism*.

[157] See Gettier type counter-examples below.

necessary, in order to credit the creature with knowledge, that the creature have any power to ascertain that the causal circumstances which brought about her experience are normal. That would be a non-starter for obvious reasons. The latter point is the expression of the non-classical foundationalist's externalism with respect to knowledge, but is not yet the expression of his motivations for thinking that experiences have epistemic import. The externalist, unfortunately, does not have much of an argument for his motivations in this area. She just points out that she does not see why inference and justification should be the only model of knowledge, and why, for example, the counterfactual analysis could not be cashed out in terms of the idea of 'right kind of causal processes'. She might also try to motivate her views, as we have seen, by appealing to the contextual and the pragmatic determinants of what should constitute the right level of justification in varying circumstances, and attempt to discredit, on the basis of these considerations, epistemologists' fascination with the kind of justification prevalent in undergraduate seminars in the theory of knowledge. The reason our non-classical foundationalist is non-classical, therefore, is to be traced back to the fact that she has given up the Justificationist perspective that characterised her position in the early days.

Before going into more details into how my account of the relation between v-valuing and e-valuing could be exploited by the non-classical foundationalist, let me conclude this section with the following. The coherentist might have lots of reasons as to why he sticks to the model of inference in the knowledge business, but chief among these reasons is the claim that inference is surely something that at least *can* be such that creatures might be indulging in at the personal level. Sticking to inference is a way of sticking to the internalist key intuition. When we give up the internalist intuition, reasons for sticking to the inferential model are much less compulsive. And the wish to abandon it might be reinforced by the reckoning that the coherentist has not much to say about the relation between the world and the thoughts we might have about it. The inferential model, after all, has the only consequence of severing the link between world and thought, and this is the beginning of the slippery slope to scepticism.

In what follows, I show how the broadly externalist, non–classical foundationalism outlined here can be applied to the case of v-valuation of other

people's emotion in the framework of the classical epistemological problems associated with it. I start by showing how our awareness of other people's emotions poses no more and no less a sceptical threat than our awareness of ordinary objects, irrespectively of any assumptions made in the theory of knowledge, and go on to argue for the further claim that knowledge of other people's emotions is possible in the framework of non–classical foundationalism.[158]

IV. Those feelings that lurk behind the body

It is now time to tackle head on the issues that made the awareness of other minds so popular a topic for the theory of knowledge in the first place. My exposition of the different options in the theory of knowledge concerning perceptual knowledge so far was divorced from my picture of the relation between v-valuation and e-valuation. Experiences of other people's psychological properties have always been thought of as adding a layer of problems on top of the problems we have already looked at concerning experience.[159] We are familiar with the thought that the only thing I can experience when I see someone else in an emotional state is how she looks when having it, i.e. I cannot experience the emotion itself. One typical way of understanding this thought – to which we have already alluded in this chapter – is by thinking of emotions as referring to the bodily changes affecting those having the emotion, or as referring to the phenomenology of the emotion, the 'how it feels like' to have it. Understood like this, although not a compulsory reading, it does not come as a surprise that philosophers have thought that emotions of others are not such that we can experience them. Similarly, if we were to have a more sophisticated or/and a more contemporary understanding of the emotions, for example, as cognitive states whose object(s) are constitutive of the emotions, then again, it might be thought of as something I cannot experience. For the objects of other people's emotions are rarely there in front

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[158] My non–classical foundationalism finds its original sources in the writings of McDowell (1982), Bonjour (1985), Plantinga (1993) and Audi (1999), although I would not want to hold them responsible for any of the particular claims I make here.

[159] See especially Dretske's (1973) excellent characterisation of the 'extra problem' that other people's minds is alleged to create for the theory of knowledge.

of me to be seen, and other people's cognitive states, i.e. propositional attitudes, are not obvious candidates for my direct experience of them.

We have seen in the third and fourth chapter why neither of these ways of understanding emotions is satisfactory, although they certainly capture some typical features of what is involved in experiencing emotions. The first way of understanding the nature of emotions just mentioned, I have argued, just misrepresents the phenomenology of emotions by artificially drawing a line between first and third person experience of the emotions. I will not return to this argument here, but once this premise is shown to be unwarranted, then the conclusion concerning the impossibility of experiencing other people's emotions no longer follows. The second way of conceiving emotions, as cognitive states made up of propositional attitudes, and the sceptical conclusion naturally following from it can also be put into question when it is understood that what is in question in this case is the experience of other people's v-valuations, not the perception of their e-valuations. I accept the conclusion of the sophisticated and contemporary approach to the epistemology of emotions as far as emotional e-valuations of other people are concerned. Those are the kind of things that I cannot experience (as opposed to trees, say).

I take it that these few remarks, together with my elaboration of the distinction between v-valuation and e-valuation in the fourth chapter, are enough for concluding that the epistemological problem of other minds in its simple form does not get off the ground in my picture of the basic perception of other people's emotions. The relevant first and third person asymmetry on which the 'problem of other minds' industry rests is not available at the level of v-valuation. As long as we admit that the level of v-valuation has epistemic import, then there is no reason to think that access to the psychological aspect of others poses more of a challenge for epistemology than access to the physical aspect of the environment. This is the first important conclusion of this chapter and is wholly independent from the considerations I made so far.

What I still have to do, however, is show in more detail how this psychological picture might translate to the framework of the theory of knowledge in the light of the following problems: (a) Although one might accept that there is no sharp distinction between first and third person access to emotions, it is still the case that people *deceive*, lie, hide, etc., in ways that trees

do not. Is it not the case that nothing so far in the discussion addresses this important feature of our dealing with others? (b) Full–blown emotional e–valuation of other people's emotion ascribes emotions to particular individuals. That is, at the level of e-valuation, questions of *ownership* are resolved in a way that they are not at the level of v-valuation. Is it not the case, therefore, that some kind of inferential process of the kind the internalist recommends will eventually be required. Consequently, is it not the case that, ultimately, reverting to the old 'inference+analogy picture' is forced on me?

The phenomenon of deception, which constitutes our first problem, is what is left of the epistemological problem of other minds when it is understood that there is no logical structural difference between first and third person access in v-valuation. This leftover is nevertheless serious for it still constitutes an extra layer between the potentially knowing subject and what she is supposed to know about. It reminds us that although I might mistakenly take the tree to be a cactus, as I can mistakenly take your embarrassment for anger, there is an extra mistake that I can make in the latter case that I cannot make in the former, which is that you might have intentionally deceived me in thinking that you are experiencing something that you do not experience.

I will now address both of these worries in the process of laying out my non-classical foundationalist picture of our perception of other people's emotions. Here is the structure of the argumentation again: what I have shown so far is that scepticism has *prima facie* no more or no less bite in the case of our awareness of the psychological that it has in the case of our awareness of the physical in emotional *v*aluation. What I want to show now, in the context of remaining epistemological issues, is that knowledge of the psychological is possible, and that non–classical foundationalism would make this the case.

IV.1. Knowing other people's emotions

Let us refresh our memory again: in the ordinary case, becoming aware of someone else's emotion is a case of v-valuing someone else's v-valuing. Kunégonde becoming aware of Barnabé's emotion is a case of her fearing with him the object of his fear (sharing) *via* her recognition of his bodily response's type. The natural way of reading this scenario with an externalist epistemology

in mind is the following: (1) Kunégonde's v-valuation of her husband's fear is a state of knowledge, if and only if it is the case that Barnabé is in fear, and she would not be in the state of v-valuing her husband's bodily response as fear, were it not for the fact that he was in fear. If, however, we are internalists, and borrowing from an existing and familiar tradition in the epistemology of the emotions,[160] we might want to characterise knowledge in the present scenario in the following way: (2) Kunégonde's e-valuation that her husband is in fear is knowledge, if and only if her v-valuation of her husband's fear justifies her e-valuation that he is in fear, and he is in fear.

The first marked difference between the two characterisations is the mention in (2) of the notion of justification, one which is absent from (1). This is an important difference indeed – the key element distinguishing internalist and externalist epistemologies. The second and directly related difference lies in the fact that in characterisation (2), knowledge is a property of e-valuations, not of v-valuations. The reason for this, in turn, is to be attributed to the fact that justification, in this tradition, requires the possibility of reflecting on the ways in which one kind of entity is capable of supporting, constituting evidence or reason for, another kind of entity from the point of view of the creature whose entitlement to knowledge is in question. In (1), for reasons already expounded, no such thing is needed. This puts an end to the easily identifiable differences between (1) and (2). Note that for (2) to work, v-valuations will have to be regarded by the internalist as having epistemic import, which, on her interpretation of my account, they do not have. Recall that, according to me, although v-valuations are structured and recombinable, whereas 'raw' experiences are not, they are not conceived of as composed of inferentially relevant constituents in a sense that would satisfy the internalist.[161] At this stage, we have, thus, already left behind any philosopher who does believe that v-valuation has no epistemic import.

Having, thus, committed myself to a broadly externalist approach to knowledge, I wish to express the sense in which I am sympathetic to some

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[160] Meinong (1917), and more recently, McDowell (1985a), Wiggins (1987), de Souza (1987), Mulligan (1998), have all endorsed versions of this model. See also Chap. 4, sec. I.1 above.

[161] See Chap. 3, sec. III, esp. III.4 and III.5 above.

aspects of the internalist preoccupations with justification. I agree with the internalist that the concept of knowledge, as attributed to human adults, also involves attribution to them of an insight into how the kind of knowledge that is attributed to them is standardly supported. That is, for a creature capable of emotional e-valuation, we would have doubt as to whether one of her e-valuations constituted knowledge, if this person did not have a clue as to why she thinks it appropriate to hold the e-valuation in question. Now, of course, this is not to surrender to the internalist, as I do not believe that for each particular e-valuation, one has to have for it some particular item of evidence for this e-valuation to count as an item of knowledge. The person whose entitlement to knowledge is in question has to be capable of manifesting competence in the standards by which we generally assess the truth or falsity of this kind of statement. Now, not only does this person not need to be capable of having particular evidence for particular e-valuations, she does not need to have, from her point of view, evidence of the kind that would *necessarily* make true her e-valuation, and so guarantee that her e-valuation is a piece of knowledge. For this is what the internalist, raised in the fear of the Big Sceptic, might want. This kind of reassurance, I am afraid, I cannot offer, if only for the following reasons.

Neither of the two characterisations above will do for those who have particularly conservative ideas about what constitutes knowledge, for both are open to Gettier type counter-examples. Consider definition (1). Let us say that Barnabé is in fear. His virility, however, forces him to hide it from Kunégonde, and he shows a lack of care upon his face. Unfortunately, he is not a very good actor and ends up presenting a look upon his face which is phenomenologically, from the point of view of his wife, indistinguishable from when he is in fear. Consequently, Kunégonde v-values him as being in fear. In this improbable scenario, all the conditions for knowledge according to (1) are satisfied, but it is not certain, however, that we would want to say that her v-valuation is knowledge. The same kind of counter examples will bite for definition (2) as well; consequently I am not likely to satisfy the Sceptic, but hopefully it will not matter, given the scope of this thesis. Let me explain: I have accepted that a human adult has to have insight into which kind of evidence counts in favour or against a particular type of judgement, and this makes the case that, for human adults, questions related to knowledge of other people's emotions arise at the

level of e-valuation. (As we will see, when discussing our second worry the fact that such questions arise at the level of e-valuation is anyway forced on me, as questions of ownership are not resolved at the level of v-valuation.). Having conceded that, to the internalist, I side entirely, however, with the externalist in my understanding of the role justification should play in the theory of knowledge, if any. Each context determines what 'knowledge' in the context in question involves, and of course, being externalist, no knowledge as to whether these standards are justified is a necessary condition for ascribing knowledge to the creature whose entitlement to knowledge is in question. This is why, for example, I have no qualms about attributing knowledge to infants or animals, even though they do not have any insight into what kind of evidence they might appeal to as reasons for entertaining the contents they do.

This being said, I will now focus on the elements that we would want to figure in the conditions for knowledge about emotions when the creature under investigation is capable of e-valuation. In the light of these brief remarks concerning our two initial characterizations, we might want to say that (3) Kunégonde's e-valuation that her husband is in fear constitutes knowledge if and only if (a) she is capable of regarding her v-valuation of Barnabé's bodily response as constituting, for her, a *prima facie* reason to e-valuate that he is in fear, and (b) she would not be v-valuing her husband in that way were it not for the fact that he was in fear.

This characterisation of Kunégonde's knowledge captures, first, my understanding of the internalist intuition according to which the creature to whom knowledge entitlement is in question has to be capable of pointing towards the kind of thing that supports her specific claim to knowledge. Second, the fact that Kunégonde's e-valuation is *defeasable* neutralises the sceptic by acknowledging that it is impossible to exclude Gettier types of situations from the point of view of the subject doing the e-valuing. From a broadly externalist perspective, this is just what one would expect. Third, it captures the main externalist intuition with foundationalist tendencies according to which the essential ingredient for conferring knowledge credentials to a thought is that the thought would be presenting the world in the way it does *because* the world is in that way and for no other reasons, and all this independently of what the

creature having the thought thinks about the relation in question. This leads to another commitment, to disjunctivism.

IV.2. The non-bipolarity of v-valuations

Disjunctivism is a claim about the content of experiential states and their individuation. It has it that there are good reasons to individuate the content of perceptual experiences externally, that is *via* what they refer to, when those experiences are veridical, and differently, perhaps internally, when they are not, i.e. when they are illusory or hallucinatory. First note that the way the labels 'internally' and 'externally', as they are used here, point towards semantic notions, not epistemic ones, and should, thus, not be confused with internalism and externalism with respect to knowledge. Second, note that veridical experiences are very bizarre kinds of states for, not only are they true, but they could not be otherwise. I am not asserting a tautology here. A true belief is trivially true of course, but its content could have been false. Veridical experiences are not trivially veridical, for there are no circumstances in which their content could be false, by contrast, for example, with the corresponding belief. Now, v-valuations, I claim, are such that disjunctivism applies to them. When I am lucky, the content of my v-valuing fear in you is individuated directly *via* your fear, and there is no gap there for falsity to crop up. For this reason I call v-valuations, for example my v-valuation of you as in fear, *non-bipolar* states. They cannot take either the value 'true' or 'false', they do not have two poles. By contrast, I call *bipolar* a mental state that can be either true or false, as, for instance, the belief that you are in fear.

Before expanding further on how I characterised the way knowledge of other people's emotions should be understood, in particular, on the ways in which v-valuations constitute reasons for e-valuations, I am in a position to provide the necessary tools for dispelling the first of the two worries I need to dispel, i.e. the phenomenon of deception. For disjunctivism can be put to use here too. The idea, which we owe to McDowell,[162] is that, in the same manner in which we might want to individuate hallucinatory experiences and veridical

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[162] Cf. McDowell (1982), in its original source.

ones differently – although they might be indistinguishable from the first person perspective – so we might want to individuate *real* emotional experiences from *fake* emotional experiences differently, even though they are indistinguishable from the third person perspective. That is to say that, if I have a veridical experience of your fear, then *necessarily* it is an experience of your fear and not of you attempting to make me think that you are in fear. In the latter case, I would be experiencing your fake fear, not your fear. The content of my experience of your fear cannot, by definition, thus be false, although of course, I might experience you as if in fear (when you fake, or when I hallucinate), or I might come to believe that you are in fear, on the basis of some experience, and the latter can be false.

Equipped now with the understanding of disjunctivism and its possible uses, it is possible to understand the work it is supposed to do as far as the theory of knowledge is concerned. Individuating content disjunctively the way I did, I gained *necessary truth* very cheaply, as it were. This, I take, is not controversial. What is controversial is whether there are (*i.*) good motivations for disjunctivism concerning the content of experience, and of course (*ii.*) the question of what use this form of externalism with respect to content might be for the theory of knowledge. As for the first worry, here is unfortunately not the place to dispel it. I will, therefore, satisfy myself with a conditional claim whose antecedent rests on the truth of some form of disjunctivism suited for the content of v-valuations. As to the second worry, here are the considerations I want to make: what we gain by defining the content of v-valuations disjunctively is a guarantee that if the content of my v-valuation is true, then it is necessarily true simply in virtue of being *acquainted* with its content. What we do not gain, however, is the possibility of this fact, i.e. the content of the v-valuation being necessarily true in virtue of being acquainted with its being ascertainable with certainty by the creature having the v-valuation in question. For, of course, it is in the nature of hallucinations that they do not reveal to those who have them that they are hallucinations, at least not hallucinations of the kind philosophers have in mind. In short, one has no way of saying from one's standpoint whether one is hallucinating or not, or if one is being deceived or not, for it all looks the same from the standpoint in question (or so is the role of hallucination and deception in epistemology); the only thing one knows from

one's standpoint, if one is a creature capable of e-valuation, is that if one is not hallucinating and one is not being deceived, then the way the world seems to be to one is in that way necessarily. Those consequences might be thought to be unbearably disappointing until, perhaps, we press the fact that it at least confers to the thoughts of those subjects whose claims to knowledge are in question, real *anchorage* in this world about which they claim to know something: the mind-independent anchorage of the kind Brewer defends in the context of the emotions.[163] Indeed, if they do know something, then it will not be by accident, it is not because my thought happens to be satisfied by the way the world is that I know what I know. This is the spirit of non-classical foundationalism.

I started this section by showing how, equipped with a correct understanding of our awareness of other people's emotions – which, I argued, is parallel in all relevant respects with our awareness of objects in the physical world – there was no reason to suppose that the former poses any more sceptical threat than the latter at the level of v-valuation, irrespective of one's favourite theory in epistemology. I remarked, however, that other people were capable of deceiving us in ways that ordinary objects were not, and showed how non-classical foundationalism proposed to deal with this problem. In this light, I argued that, given a certain form of externalism – one which presupposed the claim, defended in the third chapter, according to which v-valuation has epistemic import, but did not reject outright the preoccupation of the internalist who still wants to talk about justification – non-classical foundationalism, with respect to the possibility of knowing about other people's emotions, was defensible.

Now, some, however sympathetic to what has been said so far, might still object that the knowledge about emotions that is here claimed to be possible, is not the kind that we should be interested in. The complaint here is not that the kind of knowledge claimed to be possible does not satisfy the sceptic's Justificationism, but that the kind of contents under investigation, i.e. v-valuations, do not ascribe the emotion to any particular *owner*. This is our second worry, the one we should now take up.

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[163] Brewer (2001), and see Chap. 4, sec. I.1 above.

IV.3. Knowledge and the question of ownership

What the objector has in mind is probably the following. When wondering about whether knowledge of other people's emotions is possible, we are wondering whether the person whose entitlement to knowledge is in question really conceives of the person to whom she ascribes an emotion *as* a person. That is, as an entity distinct from oneself but similar with respect to, for example, being a creature capable of having emotions like oneself. Whatever conceiving someone as a person ultimately entails, the objector claims, v-valuations are not the kind of thing that is going to ground a full-blown e-valuation of a person, whether we construe 'grounding' in internalist or externalist terms. The objector will point to my repeated claims in the fourth chapter that v-valuations do not make ownership *salient*. She might as well conclude that if she is right in her diagnosis, the upshot is that what is going to ultimately ground a full-blown e-valuation *to a person* of an emotion is some form of reasoning by analogy from one's own case.

Let us go slowly over the objector's diagnosis. In truth, what she asks is for clarification of the sense in which emotional responses to other people's emotional responses justify judgements concerning the kind of emotional experience they are having. Or, in an externalist spirit, and in the framework of my account, the question becomes: in what sense might v-valuings of others people's v-valuings confer knowledge to e-valuings concerning their v-valuings and/or e-valuings? Let me answer this question as it is formulated by the internalist, given my admission that justification should play a role in conferring knowledge to e-valuation for creatures capable of e-valuation – a role which is, to recall, restricted to a general competence in providing an insight into which varying standards count for or against a certain claim to knowledge.

Here is then the objection in more detail. V-valuing someone else's v-valuing is structurally complex. When the object of my emotion is your emotion, I experience (your) bodily response [target] as being about its typical v-value [formal object], whether or not the target of your v-valuing features is in the field of my awareness (recall case study 1 and 2 in the fourth chapter). When Kunégonde experiences the fear of her husband, she recognises (his) bodily response as being about some danger. The parentheses around the personal

pronoun in the descriptions indicate the fact that the bearer of the emotion experienced is not *salient* in the content of the experience. Not *salient* either, are the bodily changes that constitute the *vehicle* of my experiencing your v-valuings, unless I choose, or I am instructed, to shift my attention to these bodily changes for the purpose of e-valuation. What is *salient* in an episode of v-valuing is the (other's) bodily response itself (e.g. fear) and its formal object (danger). This being the case has the following consequences. If my experiences of v-valuings of other people's v-valuings are going to justify at all e-valuings concerning other people's v-valuings, they will do so only in part. For, a full-blown emotional e-valuation will have to mention the bearer of the emotion ascribed and, arguably, the targets of the emotion as well – all things that are not *salient* in the experience of the other person's emotion. But emotional e-valuation will have to contain these elements, for, as my objector would say, what we are looking for is what justifies our attributions of emotions to individual people *as* people, and if this the case, then v-valuings alone cannot justify our individual attributions.

Let me illustrate the objection. Remember our first case study in the fourth chapter? Imagine the same circumstances, but instead of Anatole being in danger of drowning, it is Barnabé's model boat that is in the verge of sinking, to the disappearance of which he reacts with total panic. Kunégonde, who, needless to say, is totally ashamed of her husband's pastime on the beach, and could not care less about the toy's fate, reacts nevertheless, exactly in the same way as she did earlier in the day when Anatole was on the brink of drowning. Her husband's panic is transparent to her. This time, however, the first fright over, she stops, and ponders over her reaction. She comes to the conclusion that *she* did not panic, but *her* husband did. She is *prima facie* justified in believing that there was panic. This is the case because, assessing her own reaction – from the bodily changes she went through to the *salient* aspect of her own experience – it is how she v-valued her husband's bodily response; and as far as she can say, nothing of relevance in the context defeats her conclusion. The contribution, therefore, of Kunégonde's v-valuation of her husband's bodily response in conferring knowledge to her belief is limited to the kind of emotion involved and stops short of supporting a full-blown individual ascription. How then did she get from "there is panic in the air", to "*my* husband panicked"? This

is the point at which we should consider the other elements that come into play in justifying her emotion ascription. The route from the former to the latter is the realisation that his wants and hers are at odds. *She* does not care at all about the model boat, *he* does. The bodily response, therefore, is *motivating* for him, not for her, and this is what justifies her in ascribing the panic to him specifically. Ownership is thus – and the objector is right about this – resolved at the level of e-valuation.

As we have seen, the objector draws even more alarming conclusions from this initial diagnosis. Indeed we have to ask ourselves whether she is correct in her further belief, according to which this fact entails retreating to the reflection+analogy model? Well, it is true that Kunégonde's e-valuation of the situation will start by reflecting on her own bodily changes and what triggered them. It is doubtful, however, that the process of assessment in which she engages has anything to do with the simple application of rules connecting feelings and behaviour that she once gathered on the basis of her own case.[164] Kunégonde's e-valuation in the present context might involve, on her part, all sorts of techniques, competences, and factual knowledge which will help her to reach the right verdict. It might involve appealing to facts she knows about her husband, it might involve imagining or simulating situations in which she experiences loss, etc., it might involve reflecting on bits and pieces of psychological principles, or rules of thumb, with which she is familiar, etc. It might involve too, pondering on her own reaction, given her mood, character traits, etc. In other words, she might go through some or all of the procedure Goldie labels 'understanding emotions', and through this, come up with a verdict in relation to her husband, as to what *he* feels, and what *she* feels. But again, she might not.

What we want to know first, is whether the objector is right in thinking that knowledge requires as much as e-valuation, given that ownership is resolved only at that level, and second, whether she is right to believe that this would entail reverting to the reflection+analogy model.

There are many ways to answer the first question, depending on one's perspective in epistemology, several of which have been already outlined. Given

the broadly externalist and contextualist picture I have espoused in this chapter, here is how I think I should answer. Ownership is one of the many elements that the process of emotionally e-valuating a situation involving basic emotions will deliver. Often, depending on the context and the kind of questions one is interested in with regard to the another person's emotional experience, emotional e-valuation, as we have seen, will involve setting the v-valuation against the background of other facts known about the person: his moods, character traits, interests, fancies, etc.; will involve simulations of different kinds, will involve putting into application bits and pieces of psychological theories one is competent in. The role of the context, when wondering about whether or not a specific attribution of emotion to someone else should be regarded as knowledge, is at least double. This assessment depends, first, on the kind of creature whose entitlement to knowledge is in question, i.e. we expect more in the way of bringing to bear evidence for one's commitments from a psychoanalyst or an epistemologist than from an elephant; and second, it depends on the circumstances of enquiry, i.e. the demands in terms of evidence that the specific circumstances makes on the creature whose knowledge is in question. In the theory of knowledge seminar the circumstances are such that nothing less than an answer to the sceptic appears to be required, or at least a verification procedure so tight that it would exclude the possibility of mistake. When emotions are concerned, the strict application of Goldie's model of understanding might be handy. Fortunately, however, in ordinary circumstances, the demands for knowledge are much lower, and v-valuation alone will constitute grounding enough for one's emotional e-valuation.

Now, does the fact that ownership gets resolved only at the level of e-valuation really gives ground to the objector to think that I have reverted to the reflection+analogy model? I think the objector is largely correct, although he fails to recognise that the general suggestion of this chapter does not suffer from the shortcomings which prompted the rejection of the reflection+analogy model in the first place. To recall, what has always seemed wrong with this model is that, first, it just misrepresents the psychology/phenomenology of the way in which we ascribe emotions to others, and second, and more importantly, that it

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[164] See the exposition of the 'reflection+analogy' model in the Introduction, sec. II above.

presupposes that subjects get to form a conception of other people's mentality on the strict basis of a conception derived from experiences enjoyed in one's own private phenomenological theatre.

In answer to the first question, it suffices to say that my account of the way in which we become aware of other people's experiences at all levels is much richer and complex than the over-simplified way in which the reflection+analogy model construes it (or to be fair, the way I construed the reflextion+analogy model). Anyway, the objector is likely to accept that, and press her second complaint. To this, I answer that the key feature of my suggestion is precisely that there isn't such a thing as a conception of the mental acquired from oneself and projected onto others, at least not at the emotional *v*aluation level. To caricature slightly, in my picture, the world is perceived 'mentally' through and through, and made to be seen 'physically' little by little, whether the object of the seeing is I or somebody else. When this is understood, however, I have no problem in conceding to the objector that my model privileges those same features that are traditionally seen to trap one in the Cartesian quicksand. In this thesis, I have defended the view that my conception of others and of myself is, in large part, derived from the way the world is given to me in experience, material upon which, with the help of my fellow co–specifics, I attempt to make sense of our psychological interactions.

Let me go over the dialectics of this chapter again, and clarify its conclusions. V-valuations of other people's emotions, I argued, do not pose any special sceptical threats which ordinary perceptions of physical objects do not pose, whatever standpoint one occupied in the theory of knowledge. This is the result, I claimed, of construing access to the inner and the outer in a similar fashion. I went on to defend the stronger claim that knowledge of other people's emotions was possible. I showed that this required adopting a broadly externalist strategy, and I argued that pursuing this strategy whilst assuming a disjunctivist account of the content of v-valuations, a non-classical foundationalism concerning v-valuations was defensible. On this account, experiencing v-valuation *v* entails that *v* is known. In the process of expounding on this possible account of our knowledge of other people's experiences, I showed how the disjunctivist claim allowed for treating the problem that deception poses to the epistemology of other people's experiences in a fashion

strictly equivalent to the problem of error. Having adopted a broadly externalist strategy and having, thus, taken on board the possibility that young infants and animals are entitled to knowledge, I argued that the internalist preoccupation with justification had to be taken into account when knowledge is attributed to human adults. This is to say that we would doubt that someone knew that someone else experiences a certain emotion in cases where this person was entirely incompetent with respect to all the possible ways in which support for such attributions might be gathered. For this reason, together with the fact that many aspects of a full-blown emotion ascription were not resolved at the level of v-valuation – in particular ownership – I argued that the reflexive level of e-valuating was part of the evidence package one might bring in support of one's e-valuation. When the context is such that the level of justification required for knowledge is very high, Goldie's model of 'understanding emotions' construed as a quest for knowledge, I claimed, is the right model

The question for this chapter was whether the unorthodox account of our awareness of the emotions in others defended in this dissertation could help solve traditional problems associated with the epistemology of other minds. The answer is Yes, it can *help* solve them. It can provide essential premises for externalist and disjunctivist approaches to psychological knowledge, especially knowledge that a particular emotion is instantiated in a particular context. And it can provide a basis from which the much-derided 'reflection plus analogy' account performs, for the first time in its life, some honest work.

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APPENDIX 1

I. V–values and empirical data

Is the idea that v-values are objects of our emotions a philosopher's fancy or does it make sense empirically? My account of our basic emotions derives, in part, from reading the empirical literature on emotions.

The nature and the role of emotion in the interaction with the environment, and between members of a same or different species, is obviously not of interest for philosophers alone, quite the reverse. Indeed, it might be thought that what emotions are and how they work is primarily an empirical matter. I shall, thus, consider the important contributions the empirical sciences have brought to the topic. I suggest we consider evidence from experimental psychology, neurophysiology, evolutionary neuroanatomy, social psychology, which all appear – in one way or another – to support the kind of perceptual theory of affect I am defending in the third and fourth chapters. In the fifth chapter, I discuss theories of mind reading which are often presented as having to be tested against empirical data from developmental psychology, the theory-theorist and simulation theory, although I deal mainly there with the conceptual issues related to these theories.

All the studies reviewed in this appendix operate from within different conceptual frameworks, approaching the problems from different angles and at different levels, making it difficult for the one who tries to compare the various results and draw general lessons, and for the philosopher to assess the specific import it has on philosophical problems. I shall, thus, briefly go over these various results, and comment upon them in a general form at the end of this appendix.

I.1. Zajonc

Robert Zajonc has defended the claim that *affect* is an independent representational system, one which is demarcated and defined by its own special

representation categories and principles, and governed by its own special laws and regularities.[165] In his 1980 paper, Zajonc argues against the view that emotion is post-cognitive, as opposed to pre-cognitive. He takes the central claim of the post-cognitive view to be that experiencing an emotion consists of some kind of cognitive labelling of the physiological/phenomenological arousal that affects the subject. On the view criticised, arousal becomes the experience of a particular emotion only when some cognitive process acts as a *differentiator*. According to Zajonc, however, affect is pre-cognitive and constitutes an independent information processing system. He distinguishes between cold cognition on the one hand, the objects of which he calls *discriminanda*, and hot cognitions on the other hand, the objects of which he calls *preferenda*. *Discriminanda* are the standard posits of experimental psychology on perception: features such as *mass*, *weight*, *geometrical shape*, *surface reflectance*, *brightness*, *hue*, etc., the positing of which permits the generalisations made by the experimental psychologist on perception. *Preferenda* are the posits of the experimental psychologist working on affect. These are the features that need to be posited above and beyond *discriminanda* to make sense of the generalisations made by the experimental psychologist on affect. What *preferenda* are is not clear and seems to be largely determined negatively – as whatever accounts for well documented psychological generalisations concerning emotions that cannot be reduced to the standard perceptual posits of experimental psychologists.

The strategy at work here is not difficult to identify and could be called a 'transcendental argument from generalisation'. Certain regularities in the behaviour of a system can be accounted for only by the positing of certain features of this system's environment that it represents and processes in an orderly fashion. The strategy and the resulting model raises important ontological and epistemological questions, but constitutes a practice which is commonly accepted in the scientific community, and should not deter us from looking at the evidence Zajonc brings in support of his conclusions.

As examples of *preferenda*, Zajonc cites colour preferences and facial recognition. In both cases, he argues, we cannot account for the subject's

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[165] E.g. Zajonc (1980, 1984).

behaviour by limiting our theoretical posits to such things as brightness, hue, and saturation. For example, the same face can be systematically picked out over others without any identifiable fixed set of physical features grounding those generalisations in the *discriminanda* that defines the face as a particular face. *Preferenda* are the properties that account for this capacity. The existence of *preferenda*, according to Zajonc, is further supported by the so-called 'exposure effect', which is the phenomenon of increasing preferences for objects that can be induced by mere repetition. He criticises earlier work on the phenomenon which all emphasise the role of full propositional recognitional judgement for the explanation of the phenomenon. According to Zajonc, the evidence shows that the preferences in the exposure effect do not arise from stimulus recognition of standard *discriminanda* through representation of a propositional order. In other words, recognition of the propositional order of judgement is not available, nor needed, to account for the regularities that define the exposure effect. The evidence mentioned in favour of the view (pp.160-170) is diverse and impressive, involving preferences for auditory stimuli, facial expressions, colours and other phenomena.

I.2. Panskepp

Panskepp argues that there are four different classes of primitive stimulus-bound affective behaviours in humans and other mammals.[166] These behaviours are held to fall, respectively, under the command of four distinct circuits originating in the limbic cortex and ganglia. The circuits are *rage*, *panic*, *expectancy*, and *fear* (pp.411-412). The main evidence he cites in favour of this hypothesis derives from his research on how and where these circuits operate in the brains of rats. The relevance of these data to the affective life of humans lies on the fact that "the functional terrain of the sub-cortical limbic brain across mammalian species is remarkably similar, in kind if not in precise organisation".[167] Panskepp believes that these circuits constitute an independent affective representational system. Activation and responses of the system are said to be basic in both the sense that it is designed to operate unconditionally

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[166] E.g. Panskepp (1982).

on stimuli that represent life challenging situations, and in the sense that it is genetically hard-wired. It appears crucial to Panskepp's argument that the affective system is representational in nature. Indeed, to the four-hypothesised basic affective categories, we have the corresponding affective perception of specific eliciting situation-types. These basic situation-types are represented in the affective category-types of the affective perceptual system ('rage eliciting', 'fear provoking', etc.). Examples of basic situation types are things such as 'social loss', 'threat', or positive incentives' of various kinds. The result of these genetically hard-wired mechanisms is the production of whatever evolution has selected as the more adapted response given the species the animal belongs to.

Not surprisingly, followers of Panskepp and other researchers in the area have found it necessary to posit more basic affective circuits to account for the basic affective responses of higher animals.

I.3. Maclean

Maclean's work lends further support to the view that affective perception might be governed by a relatively independent and anatomically distinct set of neuro-physiological mechanisms and structures[168]. The evidence for this view derives from his Triune Brain Hypothesis. Roughly, he identifies three cerebro-types in the forebrain which, despite being linked in remarkable ways, are radically different in chemistry and structure, and which correspond plausibly to different stages of our evolutionary history: the reptilian, the paleo-mammalian and the neo-mammalian. Each of them, according to Maclean, has its own type of intelligence, its own memory, its own sense of time and space, and its own motor and other functions. In this three-brain-in-one, the paleo-mammalian brain is held to conform to what is commonly called the limbic system. Maclean reaches four conclusions that are particularly relevant for our concerns. First, that there is evolutionary evidence that affect might have been an independent representational system that might still operate independently today in normal adults. Second, many important dimensions of affect can be traced back to specific neural mechanisms and processes in the limbic system. Third, before

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[167] Panskepp (1982, p. 407).

the neo-cortex and the higher cognitive capacities associated with it, the limbic system proceeded affective information of its own. And fourth, it could only do so with its own limited resources.

I.4. Ekman

Ekman's work is particularly interesting for us as it focuses on affective facial expressions at all levels: their connections with the different emotions, their production as well as their recognition.[169] Ekman's main conclusion, as was the case for the last studies we surveyed, is that the affect is a non-verbal, non-propositional representational system. Ekman's main hypothesis is that there are universal forms of affective facial expressions in humans. How does one proceed to test such a hypothesis? Well, many alternatives are possible, but interestingly enough for us, it was recognition of facial expressions as expressing different emotions that was initially used to test the hypothesis. For example, some tests involved showing photographs of faces expressing typical emotions in our culture to remote cultures which have never been in contact with ours.[170] The result of the experiment widely confirmed the hypothesis, in that the subjects of these remote cultures associated the different types of faces with affective concepts in their language corresponding to the same affective concepts in our language. Ekman's own conclusion on the experiment is that the ways in which humans facially express their emotions are universal. But another conclusion, which could have been possibly drawn from the experiment, is that the ways in which human affectively classify facial expressions – by this I mean recognise a facial expression as instantiating a certain emotion-type – is also universal. In any case, Ekman's experimental apparatus and equipment, as well as the hypotheses selected for testing became more and more sophisticated over the years. He and his colleagues brought evidence that there exist autonomic individuating factors for the basic emotions.[171] They also devised a special measurement system for mapping the musculature of the face, thus providing an

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[168] MacLean (1975).

[169] E.g. Ekman (1971, 1980, 1984 and 1986).

[170] Ekman (1971).

[171] Ekman & Frieson (1986).

operationalised procedure for identifying affective facial types, and measuring deviations from them. Some recent work of Ekman indicates that there may be different neural mechanisms and pathways responsible for voluntary and involuntary facial expressions.[172]

According to Ekman the affective system works with what he calls an *appraiser mechanism*, the representations of which are non-conceptual, evidence of its operation having been demonstrated in animals incapable of conceptual abilities. The affective system selectively operates on certain stimuli that it is programmed to process. This appraisal mechanism operates very quickly and automatically, as many of our emotional responses are quick and immediate. Ekman calls the stimuli to which the affect system is sensitive, *elicitors*. The affect program reacts selectively to different types of elicitors: disgust elicitors, fear elicitors, sadness elicitors, etc. As for Zajonc, Panskeep and Maclean, Ekman believes that the affect system is largely innate, although its outputs might be influenced by experience.

I.5. Damasio

Recently, Damasio has put forward a neurobiological theory of emotions, confirming and complementing some of the earlier findings we have reviewed here.[173] Damasio's main claim is that humans are endowed with two distinct, but interconnected, emotional systems. The primary emotion system – the operations of which are taken care of by components of the limbic system, in particular the amygdala, anterior cingulate and early sensory cortices – is believed to be largely innate, processing information in a pre-programmed, pre-organised and automatic fashion. According to Damasio, the primary emotional system does not only play an essential role in the basic biological regulation of the subject's body, it also processes representations of the external world that it classifies as "good" or "bad".[174] As in all the research on basic emotional responses we have reviewed, the features of the environment which the system processes are thought by Damasio to constitute specific categories that do not

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[172] Ekman (1984, pp. 321-324).

[173] Damasio (e.g. 1990, 1994, 2000).

[174] Damasio (1994, p.117).

map upon the traditional dimensions of perception. Examples of features of the external world that give rise to the categories are "size of animals", "large spans", "type of motion", "certain configuration of the body", etc. The system interprets these features *as* harmful, fearsome, dangerous, disgusting, happy, etc., for want of better words. Upon reception of these representations, distinct bodily response states are generated, as well as pre-set motor and musculo-skeletal dispositions.[175] Though it is difficult not to describe the operations of the primary affective system by means of our ordinary concepts, it is indeed plausible, as Damasio claims, that – given that the neural structures underlying the system's operations are shared between higher animals, infants and adults – the system processes representational categories of its own.

The primary emotional system is not enough, however, to account for important dimensions of a human's emotional life. "In many circumstances", Damasio writes, "emotions are triggered only after an evaluative, voluntary and non-automatic mental process" and this is where the secondary emotional system becomes relevant. The two systems are individuated functionally, not physiologically, as the secondary emotional system uses in great part the mechanisms and pathways of the primary emotional systems. "Stimuli and situations are filtered by an interposed mindful evaluation" (p.130) in creatures capable of conceptual abilities – in my terminology, creatures capable of e-valuations. What is involved is a *cognitive evaluation* of a situation, says Damasio, framed in terms of *images*, which in turn may be verbal or nonverbal. Verbal images involve "words, sentences regarding attributes, activities, names, and so on" (p.136). These images activate various *acquired dispositional representations* stored in the networks of the prefrontal cortex. Those prefrontal responses are then signalled to the amygdala and anterior cingulate (parts of the primary emotion system), which then trigger "a massive response" that can involve everything from visceral, endocrine, and motor factors, usually all of them in concert (pp.137-138). The last step in the process occurs when this collection of information regarding the organism's current body state is signalled back to the limbic and somato-sensory systems.

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[175] Damasio (1994, p.132).

Damasio's own gloss at a more abstract level, with regard to the manner in which his partition of the affect in two different systems underscores the less and more cognitive dimensions of our emotional life is not very illuminating. In particular, it does not provide the tools for a verdict as to how much alike his primary emotional system is to my emotional v-valuation on the one hand, and his secondary emotional system is to my emotional e-valuation on the other hand. The sole lesson that can be drawn, which is rather weak, is that the two pairs appear to be made for one another, in the sense that my account might be one way of cashing out conceptually Damasio's findings at the (semi) empirical level at which he stands. This being so, I shall content myself with general remarks on the bearing of the different data that we have succinctly reviewed on my account.

II. Making sense of the evidence

Behind the varied terminology used by the authors we have reviewed, some key-features of their respective theories have been taken on board in my own philosophical approach to the topic, although I have systematically refrained from committing myself to any issues having to do with the level of implementation. Basic affective states are states with content. In philosophy, we would say that they have intentionality, i.e. they are directed toward, or about, objects. For all of our authors, the mechanisms that give rise to these basic affective representational states are largely innate, and their existence and workings are the result of evolutionary adaptation. Equally, it appears that for most of our authors, the operation of these affective states is not permeable to higher levels of cognitive activity. In this respect they are, at least in one sense, modular mechanisms. In addition, we find that they all insist that the content of these affective representations is not propositional, or language-like. But possibly of even greater interest for us are the ways in which these authors characterise the objects of the basic affective states. This is the terrain where terminology varies, and vagueness is most frequent. The first point to notice is that, as kinds of objects, *preferenda*, *elicitors*, *values*, *positive or negative situation-types*, do not appear to be easily reducible to any of the categories used in experimental psychology on perception, and it is a remarkable fact that most

of the studies we reviewed use evaluative terms to pick them out. Secondly, they all seem to fulfil the same function, i.e. they function like cues, indicators, or salient features of the environment which seem to be directly or indirectly connected to some course of action (from motor behaviour to practical reasoning). Those we have called v-values and the capacity to be sensitive to them, v-valuing.

APPENDIX 2

I. Early imitation: the facts

Long and detailed research on early imitation in very young infants has prompted Meltzoff and others to draw four conclusions with regard to the question of imitation[176]. (a) The capacity to imitate is innate. (b) It is not automatic but is under intentional control. (c) It is not completely rote, but reveals the infant's interpretations of social encounters. (d) It is mediated by an internal representational system which is cross-modal. Of particular interest for the psychologist and the philosopher, there is the capacity, in an infant as young as 42 hours old, to imitate specific facial expressions. This is of particular interest, for the possibility of the child producing her imitative behaviour through visual monitoring is impossible in the absence of mirrors or any such device. (a) This is powerful evidence for the suggestion that the capacity to imitate is innate. Meltzoff and Moore have shown that 12 to 21-day-old infants could respond differentially to behaviours such as tongue profusion, mouth opening, and lip protrusion, by re-producing these same behaviours.[177] They have shown that these responses are not automatic reflexes, as the imitative behaviour survives important temporal gaps between the perception of the behaviour and its imitation. (b) Meltzoff and Moore believe that early imitation in infants is intentional in the sense of being goal-directed. Infants make mistakes and then try to correct them, and even display frustration when they are not satisfied with the result of their effort. Even at this early stage, they seem to be capable of distinguishing between intentions and the consequences of these intentions. They thus show all the signs of someone trying to achieve a certain goal. The experimenters conclude that "infants differentiate between the representation of the target act derived from the external world and the representation of their own bodily acts. The intention is apparently to bring

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[176] E.g. Meltzoff & Moore (1977, 1995), Meltzoff (1993), Meltzoff & Gopnik (1993).

these two into congruence" (p.52). (c) Meltzoff and Moore also believe that early imitation is interpretative in nature. The evidence for this claim is that the infant's imitative behaviour seems to be selective, creative and voluntary. Children appear to *select* different dimensions of the behaviour they set up to imitate, focusing on temporal or spatial dimensions of it, before eventually succeeding in their imitation. Their imitative behaviour does not always stop with the achieving of the target act, but seems to be extended in creative ways. The imitative behaviour appears to be voluntary in the sense that they often do not imitate the adult, or imitate faces imitated the day before, or even imitate someone's face when viewing someone else. (d) The fourth and perhaps most significant conclusion of Meltzoff and Moore is that the representation of the movement of the adult imitated and the representation of the movement to be performed by the infant uses a common information code. This is what they mean by supra-modality, the idea being that the adult's act is registered so that it can be directly used for executing a motor plan. Supra-modality is meant to account for the fact that the infant needs to compare the pattern of the act perceived with the pattern of the act performed. And for the representation of two items to be at all comparable, the idea continues, it has to be couched in the same language. Meltzoff excludes the possibility of the existence of a translation device turning automatically the visual input into a motor/proprioceptive output. The voluntary nature of the response seems to indicate that the infant need *not* produce the movement perceived. The response does not pop out on the infant's seeing the act. The representation can be stored, and can be used at a later stage, which at least shows that the information gained is not automatically translated into a motor plan. Second, the infant's capacity for correcting his imitative efforts supports the claim that he is able to compare two representations, a fact which would not be easily accountable for on the direct translation story. Thirdly, infants enjoy being themselves imitated, which means that they must have access to a representation of their own body movements.

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[177] Meltzoff & Moore (1977).

II. Early Imitation and v-valuation

My concern with the phenomenon of early imitation is the same as Gopnik and Meltzoff. I want to know in what sense, if any, the infant can be said to recognise that someone else than she is having some distinct kinaesthetic experience or experiencing some distinct feeling. We have at least two questions here. The first concerns the capacity to discriminate the type of experience/feeling/emotion involved, and the second concerns the capacity to discriminate the owner of this experience. To answer these two questions, of course, we would need a theory, even a minimal one, of what counts as a capacity to discriminate, for *prima facie*, it might come in different degrees. How 'rich' does the conception of myself as a psychological being have to be, for a perception of someone other than me being a psychological being – in many ways similar and in many ways different to me – to count as a genuine recognition of someone else's emotion? Let me attempt to explain briefly how one might think that this the relevant question.

There is no doubt that conceptions of others as psychological beings come in various degrees. The question is, where is the bottom threshold beneath which we would have doubts as to whether there is genuine recognition of someone else as a psychological being? I think we can satisfy ourselves with a very simple answer to this question in the context of our discussion of perception and affordance. The world, as I emphasised with Gibson, is not perceived as a confused bundle of sensations, but rather as a world composed of determinate and bounded objects, perhaps solid and more or less penetrable, and behaving in reasonably fixed and determinate manners. In this respect, there is no doubt that the infant perceives other people as objects in this restricted sense. But this is not all. These objects are also perceived as affording or excluding various types of action for the infant. In this sense, objects in the environment are *discriminated* in terms of the different possible moves and/or impacts they allow the infant who senses them. Is it possible that other people are such that they are manifestly perceived as allowing types of action for the perceiver that other kind of objects do not? If that were the case, it would encourage the thought that people are, in this minimal sense, discriminated *as living creatures*

rather than simple inert objects in terms of the specific actions, impacts, contacts, etc. that they specifically afford to the child.

In line with what has been said all through this thesis, it should be clear that I do not believe that there is any sharp distinction to be drawn between seeing something as psychological and seeing something as physical. For one to understand that one is faced with either type of objects, one has at least to perceive them as bounded, as having causal powers of their own, as being internally causally connected, etc. One way of putting this point is to say that perceiving objects in that way is having implicit expectations as to how objects will appear to be in sub-consequent perceptions.[178] Moreover, understanding that one is faced with objects is to perceive them as significant for oneself as an agent and as an emotional being. Objects afford actions of all sorts, as well as pleasures and pains to those who perceive them, and are perceived as such. In this sense, as already emphasised, objects are perceived as psychologically relevant for the perceiver. That all this is the case in young infants and animals is beyond doubt. Now, what other elements should the perception of living objects like persons, by contrast with perceptions of inert objects, incorporate to count as genuine perception of persons? Of course, as already emphasised, living creatures of the animal kind afford types of actions that other objects might not, simply in virtue of their size, their flexibility, their movements, etc. Other people might afford things being done to oneself – things like caressing, grooming, smiling at, etc. – that other objects generally do not afford, or not in the same way. This is a very importance difference between perceptions of living and non-living objects, but one that might not be enough for the former to count as a genuine perception of a person. A child can perceive both her father and the rug as affording caresses. What we really want in order to count the child's perception of her father as a perception of another person is for her to conceive of him as a being, in some relevant respects, like her. And this seems to require that the child has a conception of herself as a specific kind of object, a psychological one, and is able to recognise her father as being of the same kind. For example, we might want the child to understand that her father is, *like her*, a

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[178] On these topics which I cannot unfortunately give justice to in this thesis, see e.g. Campbell (1993, 1994a, 1994b, 1995); Bermúdez (1998, esp. Chap. 8 and 9).

perceiver and an agent capable of emotions. And, I want to claim, this is exactly what early imitation shows. Of course the child does not conceptualise this identity. She does not conceive of her father and herself *as* instantiating the categories perceiver, agent, and emoter. In my own terminology, I would say that this conceptualisation happens at the level of e-valuation of the other person. The sense in which she perceives him as being *like her* consists of her *treating* him as a perceiver, an agent and an emoter. To put it again in terms of affordances, what early imitation shows is that the child perceives the caregiver as affording imitation, and this is no trivial affordance. The caregiver is perceived as the sort of thing that moves and acts in ways *in which I can move and act myself.* And if Meltzoff's cross–modal hypothesis is right, then the ways in which the caregiver is perceived as 'like me' encompasses the kinaesthetic and proprioceptive elements accompanying the doing. It is, thus, very difficult to resist the thought that, when the adult is imitating the child's gasp of pleasure, the child perceives the adult's gasps of pleasure as being the impact of her own gasps of pleasure on him, together with an awareness that they both experience the same feelings or kinaesthetic experience.

I should not want, however, to exaggerate the level at which other people are conceived by the child as being 'like her'. The truth is that the only conclusions that the phenomenon of imitation supports is that caregivers are treated by the child as affording very special kinds of action and emotions which are experienced by that child as being replicated and replicable at all levels. This is only the beginning of a conception of others as persons, but one that is enough for the use I make of it in my characterisation of v-valuation. In the fourth chapter, I argue that for a v-valuation to count as a perception of someone else's emotion, both *sharing* of the emotion and *recognition* of the emotion had to be involved. What interests me here is the recognitional level. For an emotion to be recognised as being experienced by someone else it is enough that the bodily response of someone else be perceived as affording actions and emotions of certain types that other kinds of objects do not afford, i.e. those actions that are characteristic of our interaction with other living creatures. This, I claim, is more than enough for distinguishing a case when a v-value is perceived *via* the perception of someone else's emotion from a case when a v-value is perceived *via* another kind of target. As I have admitted, this

falls short of experiencing the emotion of someone else as being *owned* by him. That is, this falls short of recognising the emotion as affecting a centre of consciousness other than oneself, and not any other. Ownership, I agreed, gets fully resolved only at the level of e-valuation.

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